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This section contains a collection of reviews of significant civil federal
question cases decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit during the ten months ending October 30, 1993. Members of the
Washington and Lee Law Review wrote the following summaries.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Authority of Attorney General
United States Attorney General, in representing an agency
in settlement agreements, is bound by the laws of that
agency.
Executive Business Media, Inc. v. United States
Department of Defense
3 F.3d 759 (4th Cir. 1993)
The Attorney General of the United States represents the United States
in litigation' except where Congress has given a government agency specific
authority to conduct its own litigation.2 A well-settled principle is that the
Attorney General has broad discretion and plenary authority in conducting
1. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1988) (reserving authority to conduct litigation involving United
States or agency or officer thereof to Department of Justice under direction of Attorney
General unless law specifically authorizes otherwise); 28 U.S.C. § 519 (1988) (stating that
Attorney General shall direct all United States attorneys and supervise all litigation where
United States or agency or officer thereof is party unless law specifically authorizes otherwise).
2. See FDIC v. Irwin, 727 F. Supp. 1073, 1075 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (stating that specific
delegation of authority to sue or be sued gives FDIC power to initiate and conduct its own
litigation), aff'd, 916 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1990).
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litigation, 3 encompassing the authority to dismiss cases and enter into
settlements, including consent decrees. 4 Federal courts must enforce settle-
ment agreements that the Attorney General has made.
Despite the Attorney General's clearly extensive discretion in conducting
litigation, the precise limit of these discretionary powers remains unclear.
For example, one may conclude that the Attorney General can ignore
regulations governing federal agencies when representing them in litigation
because few limits exist on the Attorney General's power. However, Article
II, Section 3 of the Constitution sets forth the duty of the executive to
uphold the law. Therefore, one also reasonably might conclude that the
Attorney General is bound to abide by regulations governing agency conduct
when representing those agencies in litigation and entering settlement agree-
ments. In Executive Business Media, Inc. v. United States Department of
Defense,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit con-
sidered whether the Attorney General, when entering a settlement agreement
for litigation in which the Attorney General represents a government agency,
is bound by the laws governing that agency.
In Executive Business Media, the Defense Commissary Agency (DCA),
an agency within the Department of Defense (DOD), decided to publish an
internal employee newspaper called Vision, a bi-monthly periodical, for
distribution in commissaries throughout the world. Although government
agencies generally are required to carry out their printing through the
Government Printing Office, the DOD previously received a waiver allowing
it to publish some materials through contracts with private enterprises. The
waiver required the DOD to award contracts for printing materials through
a competitive bidding process.
6
Accordingly, the DCA decided to accept competitive bids to publish
Vision, and both the plaintiff, Executive Business Media, Inc. (EBM), and
3. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 331-32 (1928) (stating that power
to enter settlements and consent decrees is within discretion of Attorney General); Confiscation
Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 458 (1868) (stating that power of Attorney General to control
all suits where United States is party includes power to dismiss any case); United States v.
Hercules, Inc., 961 F.2d 796, 798 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that authority of Attorney General
to control litigation in which United States is party is plenary unless Congress specifically
authorizes agency to conduct its own litigation); United States v. Newport News Shipbuilding
& Dry Dock Co., 571 F.2d 1283, 1287 (4th Cir.) (calling 28 U.S.C. §§ 516 and 519 broad
grant of authority to Attorney General to conduct litigation involving United States), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 875 (1978); FTC v. Guignon, 390 F.2d 323, 324 (8th Cir. 1968) (stating that
Attorney General has plenary power of supervision in all litigation where United States or one
of its agencies is party unless law authorizes otherwise).
4. See Swift & Co., 276 U.S. at 331-32 (holding that power to enter settlements and
consent decrees in cases involving United States is within discretion of Attorney General);
Exec. Order No. 6166 (1933), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 901 note (1988) (stating that, in any
case controlled by Department of Justice, decision of whether to abandon, compromise, appeal,
prosecute or defend is within discretion of Department of Justice).
5. 3 F.3d 759 (4th Cir. 1993).
6. See 32 C.F.R. § 247 app. B, at § F(S) (1993) (stating that, in selecting publisher,
DOD shall circulate proposals to widest possible selection of publishers and shall select publisher
by competitive bid).
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Downey Communications, Inc. (Downey), submitted bids. Downey won the
contract. However, a dispute soon arose between Downey and the DCA
after Downey arguably led Vision advertisers to believe that their products
would receive preferential treatment from the DCA. As a result, the DCA
refused to approve the final Vision contract, and Downey sued in the United
States Court of Claims. In a settlement proposal, Downey offered to drop
its suit if the DCA would modify the Vision contract to award Downey a
contract to publish a DCA Guidebook, an annual telephone and fact
directory, from 1992 to 1994, with an option to publish in 1995. The
Department of Justice (DOJ), representing the DCA in its litigation, accepted
Downey's offer and entered a settlement agreement.
EBM subsequently brought this suit against the DOD and Downey and
asked for injunctive and declaratory relief that the DCA's contract with
Downey for publication of the DCA guidebook was unlawful. EBM claimed
that the settlement agreement was illegal because it circumvented the com-
petitive bidding procedures required by the DOD regulations governing the
awarding of printing contracts.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
denied injunctive relief and granted summary judgment for the defendants.
The district court determined that it could not review the settlement terms
of the Downey suit because the Attorney General had plenary discretion to
settle the litigation under 28 U.S.C. §§ 516 and 519. Although EBM raised
other issues, the district court based its decision solely on this conclusion.
EBM appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
To resolve the issue, the court of appeals first stated its general
agreement with the propositions that the Attorney General has broad
discretion and plenary authority to control litigation under 28 U.S.C. §§ 516
and 519 and that decisions of the Attorney General generally are not
reviewable. The court also acknowledged an executive order that transfers
to the DOJ all authority to compromise, prosecute, defend, appeal, or
abandon any case referred to the DOJ. 7 The defendants argued that, while
the Attorney General's authority to agree to settlements may have limits,
the Attorney General can violate laws governing an agency's conduct while
representing that agency in litigation. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding
that the same laws that bind an agency bind the Attorney General when
she represents that agency. Rejecting the argument that final authority
regarding litigation decisions requires absolute discretion, the court reasoned
that to allow the Attorney General to violate the law under the guise of
settling litigation would go against its understanding of law.
The court compared the Attorney General's plenary authority to an
agency's plenary power where law commits action within a narrow area to
the absolute discretion of the agency. The court noted that even in such a
case of absolute agency discretion, courts retain the power of review over
allegations that an agency acted unconstitutionally, exceeded its jurisdiction,
7. Exec. Order No. 6166 (1933), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 901 note (1988).
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or violated its own regulations. The court reasoned that the same limits
should apply to the otherwise plenary authority of the Attorney General.
The court recounted that the Joint Committee on Printing issued a
waiver allowing the DOD to contract for printing services outside the
government pursuant to statutory law and required the DOD to promulgate
regulations promoting competitive bidding procedures. The regulations that
the DOD promulgated specifically require that the DOD give all qualified
bidders a fair and equal opportunity to submit proposals to publish any
publication. 8 The court concluded that the Attorney General could not
circumvent this requirement for competitive bidding.
The Attorney General and the DOD advanced an alternative argument
contending that the DCA did not violate DOD regulations in light of
government authority to modify competitively-bid contracts under the "car-
dinal change doctrine." This doctrine allows changes to a contract within
its general scope, but requires the government to submit the new contract
for competitive bidding if modifications alter the whole scope of the
contract. The government and Downey argued that the contract changes
were merely deductive because both the contract and the settlement agree-
ment provided for publication of material for use by DCA employees and
because the same general regulatory requirements governed both. EBM
urged that the contract changes were cardinal based on the differences
between the DCA Guidebook and Vision magazine. EBM documented the
publications' different categorization under DOD guidelines and their dif-
fering content, length, frequency of publication, advertising appeal, and
production costs.
The court maintained that the issue remained whether the settlement
agreement violated the DOD's mandatory bidding procedures. While ac-
knowledging that the cardinal change doctrine may provide the best frame-
work for analyzing this issue, the court remanded the issue to the district
court and stated that the court may consider the doctrine as it relates to
the competitive bidding procedure. The court maintained that the determi-
nation of whether the two publications differ to the extent that either one
or two contracts were made is a factual issue that the district court should
solve. The court examined EBM's other asserted violations concerning the
Downey settlement agreement, but found the allegations to be without
merit.
The Attorney General clearly has far-ranging discretion to conduct
litigation and settle lawsuits. In deciding the previously unresolved question
of whether the Attorney General is bound by the regulations of the agency
she represents, the Fourth Circuit did not attempt to disturb this long held
doctrine and agreed that the Attorney General has plenary power over
litigation she conducts. However, in Executive Business Media, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that plenary power does not mean absolute power. In
8. See 32 C.F.R. § 247 app. B, at § F(5) (1993) (stating that all potential publishers
shall be given fair and equal opportunities to submit bids for publications).
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reaching its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit specifically rejected an interpre-
tation of Article II, section 3 of the Constitution (executive's duty to
faithfully execute laws) that allows the Attorney General to disregard
regulations binding the conduct of agencies she represents. As a result, the
Fourth Circuit has set a precedent notifying government officials that they
cannot use settlement agreements or other actions taken pursuant to liti-
gation as an excuse to violate regulations governing an agency.
B. Freedom of Information Act
Agency documents involved in multistage proceedings are
exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information
Act to the extent that the documents reflect tentative positions
for future stages of the proceedings rather than former
agency positions during an earlier phase of the process.
City of Virginia Beach v. Department of Commerce
995 F.2d 1247 (4th Cir. 1993)
The deliberative process privilege of the Freedom of Information Act's
(FOIA) Exemption 5 exempts "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums
or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an
agency in litigation with the agency" from release under the FOIA. 9 Courts
have included attorney work product 0 and information subject to an agen-
cy's "executive privilege"" within this exemption. Thus, Exemption 5 strives
to balance the need for public access to information against the need for
candor and full disclosure in the decision-making process. The FOIA creates
a "presumption for disclosure," and the courts strictly limit application of
exemptions 2 by requiring the government to demonstrate a legitimate basis
for withholding requested information.
3
Disputes over the scope of Exemption 5 protections arise when a FOIA
request includes documents relating to agency involvement in a series of
proceedings on a single issue. When an agency's duties require participation
in multiple phases of a decision-making process, disagreement may emerge
over whether requested information pertains to formal positions taken during
an earlier phase of the process or whether the information reflects the
agency's tentative position for future stages of the same process.
In City of Virginia Beach v. Department of Commerce, "4 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether Exemp-
9. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1988).
10. See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 864 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (discussing attorney work product exemption).
11. See Access Reports v. Department of Justice, 926 F.2d 1192, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(discussing executive privilege exemption).
12. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 8 (1988) (holding that
"FOIA exemptions are to be narrowly construed").
13. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988).
14. 995 F.2d 1247 (4th Cir. 1993).
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tion 5 protections extend to documents prepared during the early stages of
agency involvement in a multistage proceeding. This litigation emerged
during the City of Virginia Beach's (City) effort to construct a pipeline
diverting water from Lake Gaston. To begin construction, the City needed
both a permit from the United States Corps of Engineers (Corps) and an
easement from Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO). Procedures
for securing these items required the National Marine Fisheries Service's
(NMFS) participation in the approval process.
Originally NMFS's Northeastern Office agreed with the Corps that the
City need not prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), and the
Corps approved the project. The State of North Carolina challenged this
decision in the District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina,
and the court remanded the matter to the Corps for reconsideration of its
decision not to require an EIS. At this point, NMFS transferred authority
to its Southeastern Region, which was more sympathetic to North Carolina's
opposition to the project. NMFS changed its position to urge requirement
of an EIS prior to the Corps granting the City's permit. While the Corps
reconsidered its decision, the City held a seminar introducing a plan to
mitigate the project's environmental effects. NMFS representatives attended
the seminar, but the agency later denied knowledge of the City's plan.
Shortly thereafter, the Corps again granted the City's permit and thereby
reaffirmed its decision not to require an EIS. The district court upheld the
Corps' decision on review,"5 and the City turned to VEPCO to secure an
easement.
The granting of an easement by VEPCO requires the approval of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), which must consider the
comments of NMFS before reaching a decision. In anticipation of NMFS's
continued opposition to the project, the City wrote the NMFS director
seeking justification for the agency's change of position and apparent
hostility toward the project. In this letter, the City further alleged bias on
the part of NMFS personnel assigned to the project. In response to the
City's complaints, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), which oversees NMFS, launched an investigation into the City's
allegations. The results of that investigation became "the Collins Report."
The City and NMFS exchanged another round of letters, but failed to
reach a satisfactory resolution. Consequently, the City filed an extensive
FOIA request. NMFS responded by furnishing a limited number of the
requested documents. After unsuccessfully pursuing administrative remedies,
the City filed this suit to enforce its request.
Shortly after this filing, NMFS sought summary judgment. The mag-
istrate recommended that the district court grant NMFS's motion, but after
the City supplemented its response to the motion, the district court remanded
15. See North Carolina v. Hudson, 731 F. Supp. 1261, 1273 (E.D.N.C. 1990), (upholding
Corps' decision not to require Environmental Impact Statement), aff'd, 940 F.2d 58 (4th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1164 (1992).
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the recommendation to the magistrate for in camera review of the docu-
ments. The magistrate then determined that NMFS should release a limited
number of the withheld documents, and both sides raised objections in the
district court. The district court conducted an in camera review of the
documents and revised slightly the magistrate's ruling by reclassifying one
of the documents as exempt. The district court then divided the remaining
documents, which the magistrate originally ruled as exempt, into three
categories: (A) documents responding to the City's first letter; (B) documents
relating to the Collins Report; and (C) other miscellaneous materials. The
district court characterized all but two of the Category A documents as
"postdecisional" and "nondeliberative" because the documents related to
the permit stage of the process. The court held that NMFS must release all
of the documents in this category, except two, which the district court
found exempt because they concerned the upcoming FERC hearing. The
district court also ordered the release of both the Category B documents,
which summarized the result of NOAA's investigation of NMFS's conduct
during the permit proceeding, and the miscellaneous Category C documents.
NMFS agreed to release the Category C documents, but appealed the district
court's decision regarding the documents in Categories A and B.
On appeal, NMFS contended that Exemption 5's deliberative process
privilege applies to the Category A and B documents that the district court
ordered NMFS to release. The Fourth Circuit noted that NMFS must prove
that the requested documents are "predecisional" and "deliberative" to
invoke this exemption successfully. The court stated that this burden does
not require the government to specify a decision to which the document is
preliminary. However, the law does require that, in instances where the
government may release parts of a document without exposing privileged
information, the government must release the nonprivileged information.16
To resolve this issue, the court of appeals first focused on the district
court's analysis of the two Category A documents that the district court
classified as exempt. The district court had found that these documents
addressed the agency's role in upcoming FERC proceedings. The Fourth
Circuit agreed with the district court's analysis, but emphasized the need to
view all of the documents in terms of the overall process. Specifically, the
court of appeals reasoned that documents which appear to explain a previous
agency position in an earlier proceeding may reflect the agency's evolving
position for a future proceeding. Thus, when applying Exemption 5, judges
must consider the grand scheme of the administrative process, rather than
attempt to connect every document to a single phase of the process. The
appellate court found that the district court failed to apply this reasoning
to the other documents.
The court of appeals also cautioned against becoming involved in a fact
and opinion dichotomy. The court rejected the district court's reliance on
16. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988).
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Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Justice,7 which held that the
recitation of facts in a report are distinguishable from agency deliberations.
The Fourth Circuit noted that the government in Playboy failed to connect
the requested documents to a future decision. In the instant case, NMFS's
factual narrations anticipate future proceedings before FERC. The court
found support for this finding in the City's admission of its intent to use
the requested documents to prepare for the FERC hearings.
Finally, the court of appeals addressed the question of segregating
Category A documents. Because the FOIA focuses on information, rather
than entire documents, an agency must release portions of documents that
it reasonably can segregate from exempt material without compromising the
agency's deliberations. Because the magistrate and district court reached
different conclusions regarding the documents' content, the Fourth Circuit
remanded the case to the district court to review the d6cuments and
determine whether or not any nonexempt portions are reasonably separable.
The appellate court turned next to the Collins Report, or Category B,
documents. The court found the factual and deliberative material within
these documents so extensively intertwined that NMFS could not reasonably
segregate the materials. The Fourth Circuit held that releasing any of these
documents would compromise the deliberative process, and therefore, the
court declared the Collins Report documents exempt under the deliberative
process privilege.
In conclusion, this decision reflects the court's desire to preserve free
deliberation during all stages of an extended administrative process. The
Fourth Circuit emphasized the judiciary's responsibility to evaluate requested
documents by allowing for the agency's evolving position on an issue, rather
than attempting to link each document with a distinct phase in a lengthy
decision-making process. Furthermore, the court reaffirmed the FOIA's
focus on information, as opposed to full documents, and required district
courts to explore the possibility of segregating documents containing exempt
material.
II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION/DISCRIMINATION
A. Validity of Affirmative Action Plans
Statistical evidence comparing composition of blacks on
police force and that of blacks in relevant labor pool is
insufficient to support the adoption of an affirmative
action plan in the hiring and promotion of state troopers.
Maryland Troopers Ass'n v. Evans
993 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1993)
The Supreme Court has voiced serious doubts about the wisdom and
legality of affirmative action.18 These doubts are evident in City of Richmond
17. 677 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
18. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (holding
FOR THE CIVIL PRACTITIONER
v. J. A. Croson Co.' 9 Under the strict scrutiny of Croson, even benign
preferences on the basis of race are unacceptable unless they serve a
compelling state interest and are narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 20
Furthermore, the most liberal of the Supreme Court decisions upholding
affirmative action, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,2' requires
racial preferences to be temporary and prohibits racial preferences from
imposing undue burden upon the interests of white employees. 22 The plurality
opinion of Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education requires narrowly
tailored preferences to have a "strong basis in evidence." 24 The justification
for this stringent standard of review is the perniciousness of judging men
and women by race. The Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids the states to classify men and women on the basis of
race, except as a last-resort remedy for well-defined instances of racial
discrimination.? The two-step analysis of Croson embodies this constitu-
tional premise. First, the state must have a strong evidentiary basis to justify
the necessity of remedial action. 26 Second, the state must narrowly tailor
race-based preferences to meet the state's remedial goal. 27
Despite application of strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court has validated
certain race-based measures that ameliorate the effects of past discrimina-
tion. In United States v. Paradise,28 the Supreme Court approved a court-
ordered plan with numerical, racial preferences for the Alabama Department
of Public Safety (ADPS).2 9 Paradise upheld a court order which required
the ADPS to promote one black trooper for every white trooper until the
ranks were twenty-five percent black, or until the ADPS developed a
promotional procedure devoid of discrimination."
In Maryland Troopers Ass'n v. Evans,3' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered the extent to which a state must
establish an evidentiary foundation for the adoption of a hiring and pro-
motion plan with numerical, racially based employment goals. The dispute
in Evans centered on a Maryland Troopers Association (MTA) challenge to
race-conscious remedial policies subject to strict scrutiny); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267, 273 (applying Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection analysis to claims of
racial distinctions), reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1014 (1986); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433
(1984) (holding racial distinctions invalid in child custody determination).
19. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
20. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493.
21. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
22. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
23. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
24. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986).
25. Id. at 279.
26. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (quoting Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. at 277 (plurality opinion)).
27. Id. at 507.
28. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
29. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 185-86 (1987) (plurality opinion).
30. Id.
31. 993 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1993).
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the numerical goals of a 1990 Consent Decree resulting from a 1985 lawsuit
between the Coalition of Black Maryland State Troopers (Coalition) and
the Maryland State Police (MSP). Under an original Consent Decree from
a 1974 lawsuit, the MSP agreed to hire and promote certain percentages of
black troopers at each state trooper rank so as to achieve an overall
composition of sixteen percent black troopers in five years. In 1979, a
modification of the decree lowered the overall goal to fourteen percent
black troopers, but added the requirement that thirty-three percent of the
entry-level troopers be black.
In 1982, after reports of cronyism and rigged examinations in the
promotional system, the Attorney General of Maryland issued the critical
Report on Promotional Practices in the Maryland State Police (Report). In
response to the Report, the MSP adopted the Affirmative Action Promo-
tional Plan for Law Enforcement Personnel. The promotional plan, which
commenced on March 27, 1985, required specific numerical goals for the
hiring and promotion of black troopers within the lower ranks of the MSP.
On June 19, 1985, the Coalition filed suit against the MSP in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging ongoing
racial discrimination. In December 1990, the Coalition and the MSP entered
into a second Consent Decree which required the MSP to meet specified
numerical goals until the MSP achieved an overall goal of twenty-two
percent black troopers. On January 11, 1991, the MTA intervened to
challenge the goals outlined in the new Consent Decree.
On August 11, 1992, the district court rejected the MTA's challenge by
ruling that the evidence of racial discrimination was sufficient to warrant a
race-conscious remedy. The evidence before the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland assumed two basic forms. First, the district
court considered the findings in the 1985 Attorney General's report. Second,
the district court considered statistical comparisons between the composition
of blacks in the MSP and the composition of blacks in the relevant, qualified
labor pool. The district court found the existence of racial discrimination
when it compared the black composition of the MSP to a baseline figure
of twenty-two percent, which represented the black composition of the
relevant, qualified labor pool. The district court ordered the parties to adopt
the Consent Decree because of the district court's finding of racial discrim-
ination.
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the MTA alleged that the hiring and
promotional goals of the Consent Decree violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. The Coalition responded with statistical evidence, the 1985 report,
and an argument that the prevention of backsliding warrants affirmative
action. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court and held that the
parties did not have the requisite evidence to warrant a race-conscious
remedy.
The Fourth Circuit remarked that the Coalition's primary evidence
justifying the institution of a race-conscious remedy was statistical and that
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all racial and ethnic distinctions are inherently suspect. The court felt that
a stringent standard of review was necessary because the use of race as a
reparational device risks perpetuating race-consciousness. Statistics alone,
the court stated, do not support an inference of past discrimination. Such
an inference requires gross statistical disparities and corroborating anecdotal
evidence of racial discrimination, neither of which confronted the court.
According to the Fourth Circuit, statistical disparities alone prove little.
The Fourth Circuit placed heavy importance on the fact that the
percentage of black troopers in the MSP had risen from nine and one-half
percent in 1980 to seventeen and one-tenth percent in 1991, such that it
nearly matched the percentage of blacks in the qualified labor pool. Indeed,
the percentage of blacks in the upper ranks of the force had risen as well.
In support of its rejection of the Consent Decree, the Fourth Circuit
compared the facts of Evans to the facts of United States v. Paradise,3 2 in
which the Alabama Department of Public Safety systematically excluded
blacks from employment as state troopers. According to the Fourth Circuit,
Evans has little in common with either Paradise or other cases that have
upheld race-conscious remedies. The Fourth Circuit noted that Evans pres-
ents little more than an example of easily remedied parochialism, whereas
Paradise is an example of gross statistical, racial disparity supported by an
unwillingness to rectify discrimination. Finally, the Fourth Circuit soundly
rejected the backsliding justification for affirmative action. The Fourth
Circuit remarked that fear of regression cannot justify remedies utilizing
affirmative action. According to the Fourth Circuit, constitutional require-
ments of equal employment opportunity demand that such remedies must
end sooner, rather than later.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Evans is in accord with the decisions
from other circuits that have addressed affirmative action. 33 The strict
scrutiny of Evans further limits the instances where a state or state agency
may utilize race-conscious relief. Evans and Paradise combine to define the
rare instances where a state constitutionally may impose a race-conscious
remedy. After Evans, individuals will face great difficulty defending affir-
mative action policies with mere statistical evidence. While defending benign
race-conscious policies in the Fourth Circuit still should be possible, Evans
will weigh heavily against future attempts.
32. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
33. See Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 989 F.2d 225, 227 (6th Cir. 1993)
(following two-step analysis of Croson); Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 940 F.2d
1394, 1398-1402 (l1th Cir. 1991) (providing exegetic discussion of Croson), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 969 (1992); Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Housing Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 593 (7th Cir.
1989) (utilizing Croson in suit where corporation sued for racial discrimination under Equal
Protection Clause based on race of its owners), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845 (1990). But see
Stuart v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446, 451 (1st Cir. 1991) (distinguishing Croson on its facts), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1948 (1992); Newark Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Harrison, 940 F.2d 792, 807
(3d Cir. 1991) (same).
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B. Discrimination in Housing
Immigration Reform and Control Act governs Fair
Housing Act such that employers must provide family
housing to foreign temporary workers only where such is
the practice in the area and occupation.
Farmer v. Employment Security Commission of North Carolina
4 F.3d 1274 (4th Cir. 1993)
The 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act prohibit discrimination
in the providing of housing on the basis of familial status or handicap.1
4
Each year North Carolina farmers employ thousands of temporary farm-
workers. The federal government permits farmers to hire foreign temporary
laborers through the "H-2A" program.35 According to the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (Act), H-2A employers must provide
housing to all foreign temporary agricultural workers. 6 Additionally, H-2A
employers must provide family housing to foreign temporary workers upon
request when such is the prevailing practice in the area and occupation.37
Regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act extend H-2A employers'
housing responsibilities to United States workers who are not reasonably
able to return to their residence within the same day.3" The regulations
further secure for domestic workers rights to family housing subject to the
same "prevailing practice" limitation as foreign workers. 9 In other words,
under the statutory and regulatory regime of the Act, H-2A employers must
provide family housing to foreign and domestic temporary workers upon
request only if the provision of such housing is the prevailing practice in
the area where the employer is located and within the workers' intended
occupation. 40
In Farmer v. Employment Security Commission of North Carolina,
4
1
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered
whether the provision in the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988,
34. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1988).
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) (1988).
36. Id. § 1188(c)(4) (1988).
37. Id.
38. 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(a) (1993), titled "Preferential treatment of aliens prohibited,"
provides that "[t]he employer's job offer to U.S. workers shall offer the U.S. workers the
same benefits, wages, and working conditions which the employer is offering, intends to offer,
or will provide to H-2A workers." 20 C.F.R § 655.102(b) (1993), which describes the "[m]inimum
benefits, wages, and working conditions" referred to in subsection (a), contains the Secretary
of Labor's regulations with respect to the provision of housing as a benefit of temporary
agricultural employment. Thus, the Secretary's regulatory scheme plainly contemplates housing
as one of the benefits to which American temporary agricultural workers are entitled in the
same degree as foreign H-2A workers.
39. 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(I)(vi) (1993).
40. Id.
41. 4 F.3d 1274 (4th Cir. 1993).
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prohibiting discrimination based on familial status, controls the provision
in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which requires family
housing only when providing housing is the prevailing practice in the
intended area of employment. The plaintiffs were all United States workers
who sought agricultural employment with provisions for housing in family
units. The plaintiffs did not dispute that family housing is not the prevailing
practice for temporary agricultural jobs in North Carolina within the mean-
ing of the Act.
On October 29, 1991, plaintiffs filed an action in United States District
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief on behalf of a class composed of women and families
accompanied by minor children who seek or are discouraged from seeking
temporary agricultural employment with housing. Jacqueline Wilson brought
an additional action requesting similar relief on behalf of a sub-class
comprised exclusively of women who seek or are discouraged from seeking
seasonal agricultural employment with housing through the North Carolina
Employment Security Commission. The plaintiffs' complaint contained two
claims. First, the complaint alleged that the defendants had discriminated
against the plaintiffs by denying housing based on familial status in violation
of the 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act. Second, the sub-class
plaintiffs claimed that in discouraging them from seeking temporary em-
ployment with H-2A farmers with free housing, the Employment Security
Commission had discriminated against them on the basis of gender, in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.42
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the court
treated as a motion for summary judgement. On June 1, 1992, the district
court granted the motion in favor of the defendants as to the Fair Housing
Act claim. The district court first held that the family provision of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 could not be harmonized
with the familial-status discrimination provisions of the 1988 'amendments
to the Fair Housing Act. The district court also held that the requirements
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act control those of the Fair
Housing Act where H-2A employers are concerned and that the regulations
promulgated pursuant to the Immigration Act require participating H-2A
employers to provide family housing only where such is the prevailing
practice in the area and occupation of intended employment. The court
then denied summary judgment with respect to the sub-class plaintiffs' Title
VII gendef discrimination claim by holding that all members of the sub-
class had exhausted their administrative remedies and were therefore entitled
to proceed with discovery.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(1)-(17) (1988). In addition, the sub-class's gender discrimination
claim was founded on the Department of Labor regulations forbidding Employment Service
System affiliates, such as the North Carolina Employment Security Commission, from accepting
job orders containing any "unlawful discriminatory specification by ... sex." 20 C.F.R.
§§ 653.501(d)(1), (e)(1) (1993).
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On August 14, 1992, the Fourth Circuit granted the plaintiff's petition
for an interlocutory appeal as to the district court's determination of the
Fair Housing Claim. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the Immigration
Reform and Control Act should be read in tandem with the Fair Housing
Act to require H-2A employers to provide workers access to free family
housing regardless of the prevailing practice in the area. However, the
Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court holding that there was no way
to harmonize the statutes on the basis of their language or legislative
histories.
The Fourth Circuit then turned to two basic tenets of statutory con-
struction in order to decide which statute controlled. First, relying on the
well-settled doctrine that repeal of a statute by implication is not favored
without some evidence in the legislative history indicating otherwise, 43 the
court could not find that the 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act
implicitly repealed the Immigration Reform and Control Act. Second, relying
on the basic principle of statutory construction that, when two statutes are
in conflict, a specific statute closely applicable to the substance of the
controversy at hand controls a more generalized provision,4 the court
reasoned that the narrower and earlier statute should prevail and conse-
quently held that the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 controls
the 1988 Amendment to the Fair Housing Act.
The Fourth Circuit therefore affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendants as to the Fair Housing Claim.
In so doing, the Farmer court concluded that the Immigration Reform and
Control Act governed the Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988 and that
participating H-2A farmers need not provide family housing to seasonal
agricultural laborers, whether foreign or domestic, unless such is the pre-
vailing practice in the area and occupation of intended employment.
The precise issue addressed in Farmer was one of first impression. The
Fourth Circuit was the first federal court to decide this issue, and as such,
the Farmer decision is the sole judicial interpretation of the interplay of the
1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act and the regulatory scheme
promulgated pursuant to the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.
C. Discrimination Based on Political Affiliation/Patronage Dismissals
Application of a state statute which allows the governor
to transfer civil servants on the basis of political views
was unconstitutional, but governor had affirmative
defense of qualified immunity.
Akers v. Caperton
998 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1993)
Many initial acts of the winner of a political election include replacing
high government officials from the previous administration with individuals
43. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549
(1974); Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936).
44. HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 6 (1981) (per curiam).
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of the winner's choice. 45 The replacements usually share the winner's political
views and faithfully followed the winner during the political campaign.
46
However, such political dismissals, also known as patronage dismissals, have
prompted recent charges of First and Fourteenth Amendment violations
from those officials dismissed from their jobs. 47
Searching for a balance between a winner's right to appoint officials of
his choice and the fundamental individual rights of incumbent officials, the
Supreme Court of the United States has set forth guidelines regarding
political dismissals. In Elrod v. Burns,4 the Court held that patronage
dismissals of officials who are not responsible for making policy violate the
First Amendment. 49 Four years later, in Branti v. Finkel,50 the Court clarified
its rule by holding that patronage dismissals are unconstitutional unless the
individual's party affiliation is a requirement for effective performance of
the public office at issue." Soon after the Branti decision, in Delong v.
United States,12 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
extended both Elrod and Branti to include transfers and reassignments as
prohibited actions where they have the practical effect of dismissals a. 5  A
resulting split over treatment of transfers among several courts of appeals54
led the Supreme Court, in the case of Rutan v. Republican Party,15 to
include all transfers and reassignments as prohibited actions under Elrod
and Branti.1
6
One affirmative defense related to the issue of patronage dismissals is
the doctrine of qualified immunity. While the United States Constitution
prevents government officials from violating federal civil rights of others
5 7
officials also must be able to act decisively without worrying that a court
may prohibit their actions. 8 Thus, in certain situations, officials must be
45. Susan L. Martin, A Decade of Branti Decisions: A Government Official's Guide to
Patronage Dismissals, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 12 (1989) (citing GALES ANrD SEATON'S REGISTER
OF DEBATES IN CONGRESS (Jan. 1832) (statement of Sen. Marcy)).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
49. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372 (1976).
50. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
51. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980).
52. 621 F.2d 618 (4th Cir. 1980).
53. Delong v. United States, 621 F.2d 618, 623 (4th Cir. 1980).
54. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 868 F.2d 943, 951 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussing split
among circuit courts and adopting "substantial equivalent to a dismissal" test from Delong),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 497 U.S. 62 (1990). But see Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723,
731 n.9 (3d Cir. 1987) (rejecting Delong test and applying Elrod and Branti to all adverse
employment actions).
55. 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
56. Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 75 (1990).
57. U.S. CoNsr. amends. V and XIV, § 1.
58. See Mitchell v. Rice, 954 F.2d 187, 191 (4th Cir.) (explaining need for doctrine of
qualified immunity to accomplish public goals and to encourage public service), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 299 (1992); Swanson v. Powers, 937 F.2d 965, 967 (4th Cir. 1991) (explaining
doctrine and providing immunity from civil liability by allowing official to enforce state revenue
code based on unsettled law), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 871 (1992).
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able to make decisions that infringe on the rights of others without incurring
liability for civil damages. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,59 the Supreme Court
presented the standard for a court's evaluation of the appropriateness of
the doctrine of qualified immunity. 60 Specifically, the Court allowed the
defense in situations where the conduct of governmental officials does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.6'
In Akers v. Caperton,62 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit considered both the limitations on patronage dismissals and
the related application of the doctrine of qualified immunity. Specifically,
the court of appeals focused on the constitutionality, in light of the Supreme
Court's guidelines, of a West Virginia statute that allowed the Governor to
transfer civil servants on the basis of their political views. The court also
examined the Governor's claim of qualified immunity as an affirmative
defense for his administration's conduct.
In Akers, Democrat Gaston Caperton (Governor) defeated the Repub-
lican incumbent in the November 1988 West Virginia gubernatorial election.
After his inauguration, the Democratically controlled legislature passed an
amendment to a statute governing the governor's discretion to dismiss and
appoint public employees for political reasons, effective July 1, 1989.
Specifically, the legislature included among these public employees "any
persons appointed by the governor to fill policymaking positions and county
road supervisors or their successors. ' 63 On July 20, 1989, the Secretary of
Transportation (Secretary) informed all County Maintenance Superinten-
dents (Superintendents) that they could transfer voluntarily to positions as
Area Maintenance Managers or that they could remain in their current
positions until the Governor's administration made a decision on their
status. After no Superintendent opted to transfer, the administration trans-
ferred all of them in October 1989 for political reasons.
Six Superintendents subsequently filed a civil rights discrimination law-
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Governor, the Secretary, and the
Secretary's replacement. The complaint asked the district court to reinstate
the Superintendents to their previous positions and to assess damages against
the defendants in both their individual and official capacities.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia ruled on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. The
district court dismissed all claims against the Secretary, on whom the
Superintendents had not timely served the complaint. The district court
further dismissed the claims against the Governor and the Secretary's
replacement in their official capacities; the court explained that a lawsuit
59. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
60. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
61. Id.
62. 998 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1993).
63. W. VA. CODE § 29-6-4(d) (1992).
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against a state official in his official capacity is a lawsuit against the state
and not against a person. The district court ruled, however, that the transfers
did violate the Superintendents' First Amendment rights and that the Gov-
ernor and the Secretary's replacement were not entitled to assert a qualified
immunity defense to avoid personal liability for money damages. The
defendants filed an interlocutory appeal after the district court set the issue
of damages for trial.
The Fourth Circuit initially determined the appropriate issues before it.
The court recognized that the district court's disposition of the case was
not a final adjudication of all the claims of the parties. The court also
confirmed that a district court's denial of a qualified immunity claim is
immediately appealable. Yet, according to the doctrine of pendent appellate
jurisdiction, an appellate court may consider additional issues if these issues
substantially overlap the issue on appeal. Stating that the parties had argued
fully the patronage dismissal claims and that the claims substantially related
to the qualified immunities issue, the Fourth Circuit concluded that it had
the authority to examine both issues.
The Fourth Circuit introduced its analysis of the constitutional claims
with an overview of the practice of patronage dismissals and the limitations
that the Supreme Court has placed on such dismissals. Stating that, on
review, it would consider the facts in a manner favorable to the non-moving
party, the court of appeals addressed the constitutionality of the statute
that allowed the Governor to transfer or dismiss county road supervisors.
Specifically, the court decided whether the Superintendents' political party
affiliations is an appropriate requirement for the accomplishment of the
Superintendents' duties. In its analysis, the Fourth Circuit focused on the
Superintendents' job descriptions and rank in the state's hierarchy and on
several terms that the defendants used to describe the Superintendents.
First, the court listed the statutory duties of the Superintendent at the
time of the transfers. These duties included planning and directing main-
tenance, executing instructions from superior officials, preparing reports,
and inspecting roads and bridges. The Fourth Circuit included additional
duties that the defendants alleged, such as setting priorities for work and
advising superior officials on courses of action for certain employment and
budget decisions. The court noted that all of these duties corresponded to
well-defined, yet limited, objectives.
Second, the Fourth Circuit pointed out that Superintendents are at a
hierarchical rank seven levels below the Governor. Applying the view of
the Supreme Court in Rutan, the court concluded that an employee will
receive less First Amendment protection the higher the employee ranks and
declared that Superintendents are not "high-level" employees. In fact, the
positions in the two levels immediately above Superintendents in the hier-
archy are civil service positions, which do not have political affiliation as
a requirement.
Finally, the court considered the defendants' argument that the Super-
intendents are policy-makers, confidants, and communicators. Recognizing
that the Superintendents do make limited policy decisions, the court stated
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that the inquiry under Branti is one of degree. Thus, the court found that
the low level of policy-making in the statute's description of the Superin-
tendents' duties does not outweigh the Superintendents' First Amendment
rights. Finding that party affiliation was not an appropriate requirement
for the Superintendents' effective performance, the Fourth Circuit accord-
ingly held that the West Virginia statute was unconstitutional as the State
applied it to County Maintenance Superintendents.
Addressing the qualified immunity issue, the Fourth Circuit presented
the conflicting common law principles-individual rights and the govern-
ment's need to operate smoothly-and the Supreme Court's standard for
evaluating qualified immunity defenses. Applying the Harlow standard, the
court recognized that it must decide whether the conduct of the defendants
violated the Superintendents' rights at the time of the transfers in question.
The Fourth Circuit initially examined the two bases for the district court's
ruling. First, the district court had stated that the law at the time of the
transfers indicated that the transfers violated the First Amendment. Second,
the district court had found that the defendants were unable to raise a
qualified immunity defense because they tried to circumvent established
patronage dismissal guidelines by amending a statute.
The Fourth Circuit, however, disagreed with the lower court's finding
of the status of the law at the time of the transfers. The court explained
that the law in the Fourth Circuit in 1989 treated dismissals and transfers,
both based on political motivation, differently. As Elrod and Branti had
not addressed employment decisions other than dismissals, the court of
appeals quoted Delong, which stated that an action other than a dismissal
is within the application of Elrod only if the action has the practical effect
of a dismissal. Furthermore, the Supreme Court, noting a split among the
circuits regarding actions other than dismissals, did not decide Rutan until
June 21, 1990, months after the Governor had transferred the Superinten-
dents.
Therefore, the critical issue for the Fourth Circuit was the status of the
law at the time of the actions and not at the time of the trial court's ruling.
In October 1989, at the time of the transfers, the clearly established law in
the Fourth Circuit was the "tantamount to dismissal" test, where govern-
ment officials retained qualified immunity unless the transfers were tanta-
mount to dismissals. Dismissing the possible impropriety of a summary
judgment ruling where a dispute existed over a material fact, the court
found that the defendants did have a qualified immunity defense. The
Superintendents did not take a deduction in salary, and they continued to
work in the same counties as they did as Superintendents. Thus, the transfers
were not tantamount to a dismissal, and the defendants did not violate the
clearly established law at the time.
Having affirmed the unconstitutionality of the statute and having re-
versed the denial of the qualified immunity defense, the Fourth Circuit
remanded the case to the trial court to address the claims for injunctive
relief. Citing a related state case, Akers v. West Virginia Department of
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Highways,64 where a court ordered reinstatement of a superintendent after
a similar unconstitutional finding, the Fourth Circuit asked the trial court
to determine the status of all related litigation before considering the
remaining claims.
The Akers holding is a reminder that the stance of the Fourth Circuit
on patronage transfers and reassignments was in conflict with other circuits
between 1980 and 1990.65 However, the issue surrounding such transfers
and reassignments became moot when the Supreme Court for the United
States handed down Rutan, holding that all such actions fall under Elrod
and Branti and are impermissible. Akers also emphasizes that the proper
standard when evaluating any patronage employment decision, and subse-
quent defenses of qualified immunity, is the standard that existed at the
time of the conduct in question.
III. BANKING/SEcuRITES
A. Securities Exchange Act
An entity other than a purchaser or seller lacks standing
to request injunctive relief under the Securities Exchange
Act.
Advanced Resources International, Inc. v. Tri-Star Petroleum Co.
4 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1993)
The United States Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores66 held that only actual purchasers or sellers of securities have standing
to bring private damage actions under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 193467 and Rule lOb-5, 68.69 The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit extended this requirement to
injunctive actions .7 Several circuits, however, have found limited exceptions
to the actual-purchaser requirements. 7' Against this background, the United
64. 425 S.E.2d 840 (W. Va. 1992).
65. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (illustrating courts of appeals split over
treatment of transfers as prohibited actions).
66. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
67. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
68. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993).
69. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 (1975) (stating that
only actual purchasers or sellers of securities have standing to bring private damage actions).
70. See Cowin v. Bresler, 741 F.2d 410, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that Blue Chip
rule applies to injunctive actions).
71. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that plaintiff
need not be defrauded purchaser or seller in order to sue for injunctive relief under Rule lOb-
5), aff'd, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); Tully v. Mott Supermarkets,
Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 1976) (assuming that Blue Chip standing rule does not apply
where plaintiff only seeks injunctive relief to prevent incipient lOb-5 violations); Davis v.
Davis, 526 F.2d 1286, 1290 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating strict insistence on purchase or sale is not
as critical in suit for injunctive relief as it is if plaintiff is seeking damages). But see Head v.
Head, 759 F.2d 1172, 1174 (4th Cir. 1985) (adopting Blue Chip standing requirement in
damages case but giving no indication of whether it would apply equally to actions seeking
injunctive relief).
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States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Advanced Resources
International, Inc. v. Tri-Star Petroleum Co.72 considered whether an entity
other than a purchaser or seller of securities has standing to request injunctive
relief under Rule lOb-5. The Fourth Circuit concluded that such standing was
absent and, therefore, affirmed a district court's summary judgment for the
defendants in a consulting firm's lOb-5 action against a petroleum company.
Tri-Star, a Texas corporation, was the manager of a joint venture named
Australian Petroleum Joint Venture. In April 1991, Tri-Star's President, James
Butler, asked Scott Reeves, a project manager for Advanced Resources Inter-
national (ARI), a Virginia consulting firm with expertise in oil and gas recovery,
to study the potential for methane gas recovery in the Comet Ridge area of
Queensland, Australia. Butler informed Reeves that Butler was looking for a
maximum of four potential partners in a project to extract methane gas from
the Comet Ridge area.
Butler informed Reeves that Tri-Star had undertaken a two-year study, in
which Tri-Star had performed all of the relevant geological work and examined
all of the wells in the Comet Ridge area. Reeves agreed to furnish an evaluation
of the Comet Ridge area based on the assumptions that Butler provided, but
Reeves did not know that Tri-Star intended to develop the project area at
that time. The prospects of successful methane recovery depended upon many
of the assumptions that Butler provided. Although Reeves questioned many
of the assumptions, he performed the analysis set forth by Butler.
On December 16, 1991, Reeves gave Butler the report containing the
analysis that Butler requested. ARI corporate policy did not authorize Reeves
to issue any report that Butler would use to raise money. Moreover, Reeves
inadvertently failed to include in the report a disclaimer and disclosure of the
risk factors involved in the project.
Tri-Star and Butler gave prospective investors a lengthy document that
included Reeves's report and references to that report. The document extolled
the favorable possibilities of methane gas recovery in the Comet Ridge area.
ARI doubted many of these statements, but the document did not make clear
whether ARI endorsed all of the report's claims.
ARI asked Butler and Tri-Star to circulate a corrective disclosure and to
stop using the ARI report. Butler replied that Tri-Star would circulate a limited
disclosure if Tri-Star could continue to use the report as Tri-Star wished. ARI
refused and told Butler that ARI did not authorize Tri-Star to use the report
to raise funds from investors.
ARI sued Tri-Star and Butler in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, seeking a preliminary injunction, a permanent
injunction, and declaratory relief. ARI asserted violations of section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) and of section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, claims of common-law fraud and misrepresentation, and breach
of the duty of good faith.
72. 4 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1993).
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The district court denied a preliminary injunction because the court lacked
jurisdiction over Tri-Star and Butler with regard to the 1934 Act and the
Lanham Act. The district court stated that ARI would not likely prevail on
the merits of its claims under the 1934 Act because ARI was not a purchaser
or seller of securities. In addition, ARI was not likely to succeed under the
Lanham Act because ARI and Tri-Star were not "competitors" as the Lanham
Act required. Finally, with regard to ARI's claims under the theories of
common-law fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of good faith, the district
court reasoned that ARI had failed to demonstrate that it would suffer
"irreparable harm" if the court did not grant the injunctive relief.
Tri-Star and Butler filed an answer to ARI's complaint and thereby waived
their objections to the exercise of personal jurisdiction. They then filed a
motion for summary judgment and argued that the district court should grant
summary judgment for the same reasons that the court denied ARI's motion
for preliminary injunction. After a hearing, the district court agreed with Tri-
Star and Butler and entered judgment against ARI on all its claims. ARI
appealed.
Before the Fourth Circuit, ARI argued that the district court erred in not
granting a preliminary injunction because ARI had shown a likelihood of
irreparable harm if the court did not issue the injunction. ARI claimed that
the report would mislead investors, who would sue ARI for damages, and
that the report would damage ARI's reputation. The Fourth Circuit held that
both of these potential harms were speculative at best, because damages could
occur only if the analysis in the report proved to be untrue, something that
might not happen. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district
court did not err in denying the preliminary injunction.
ARI further claimed that the district court erred in finding that ARI did
not have standing to bring a claim under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 of the
1934 Act because ARI was not a purchaser or seller of securities. ARI argued
that although the Supreme Court had declared in Blue Chip that only
purchasers or sellers of securities had standing to bring private damages actions
under lOb-5, an exception to the rule should apply to cases in which the
plaintiffs seek injunctions.
The Fourth Circuit declined to provide an exception in this case. The
court noted that other circuits had found very narrow exceptions to Blue Chip
in the cases ARI cited. For example, exceptions existed if the plaintiff was
the government, 73 a shareholder whose stock valuation was threatened by
deceptive practices, 74 or a potential investor or shareholder who would have
73. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that plaintiff
need not be defrauded purchaser or seller in order to sue for injunctive relief under Rule lOb-
5 where Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) or United States Attorney institutes litigation),
aff'd, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
74. See Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546-47 (2d Cir. 1967)
(holding that plaintiffs had standing to seek injunction even though plaintiffs had not sold
their stock where they claimed defendant corporation was depressing price of stock by market
manipulation, deceit, and fraud).
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bought or sold but for the actions of the defendant.75 The Fourth Circuit
concluded that ARI fit into none of those exceptions.
Although the harms ARI sought to avoid were consistent with the aims
of the 1934 Act, a plaintiff, to have standing to seek injunctive relief, must
claim a personal injury. ARI claimed that investors could suffer injuries from
relying on ARI's report because the investors may invest in a possibly disastrous
project. The potential injuries to ARI-damage to ARI's reputation and the
speculative threat of investors bringing suit against ARI-were too removed,
the Fourth Circuit reasoned, to provide standing in a suit for injunctive relief.
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court finding that ARI had
no standing to bring a claim under the 1934 Act.
ARI also argued that the district court erred in failing to enjoin Tri-Star
and Butler's continuing use of ARI's report. ARI claimed that such use of
the report violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The Lanham Act provides
national protection of trademarks, and ARI contended that Tri-Star's use of
the report falsely implied that ARI sponsored or endorsed the project. The
circulation of the report, ARI alleged, would harm ARI's good name, just as
one company's use of another's mark might hurt the reputation of the
originator of the mark by implying a false association between two products
or services. Also, ARI claimed that Tri-Star's use of the report harmed ARI's
reputation, which depended upon accurate analyses and evaluations.
The Fourth Circuit rejected these arguments, stating that a typical Lanham
Act plaintiff claims that its competitor, the defendant, used the plaintiff's
mark in a way that may confuse the public as to the source of that good or
service. Although some courts have permitted expansion of the Lanham Act
to protect interests in voices, likenesses, and images, the Fourth Circuit refused
to extend that line of reasoning to prohibit the use of a commissioned, signed,
unaltered report when that use implies a false endorsement. Therefore, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that plaintiff failed to
assert a valid claim under the Lanham Act.
Additionally, ARI alleged that the district court erred in refusing to enjoin
Tri-Star and Butler from using its report under the common-law theories of
fraud and misrepresentation. ARI specifically challenged the district court's
finding that Tri-Star and Butler's misrepresentations did not induce the report.
Also, ARI challenged the requirement that it had to show damages had
occurred for the district court to issue an injunction. ARI claimed that it need
only show that, if the court did not issue an injunction, damages will occur
to its reputation and that ARI will suffer damages by defending a lawsuit
against irate investors in the Comet Ridge project.
The Fourth Circuit agreed that ARI had made allegations that, if proven,
would indicate misrepresentations and ARI's reliance on those misrepresenta-
75. See Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir. 1970) (proclaiming that minority
stockholder, though not purchaser or seller, had standing to claim injunctive relief against
directors of corporation, because directors' actions, if continued, would deprive plaintiff of
favorable disposition of shares).
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tions. However, ARI failed to show the requisite damages. The Fourth Circuit
concluded that ARI's claims of damages were too conjectural to support its
fraud claim. ARI had not proven that Tri-Star would continue to circulate
the report, that investors would invest in the project based on the ARI report,
that the project would fail, that investors would sue ARI, or that investors
would successfully sue ARI concerning the report. Even if the events unfolded
as ARI feared, ARI would have a remedy at law for any damages it might
sustain in a lawsuit against investors. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court's grant of summary judgment to Tri-Star on the basis that
ARI failed to properly allege all of the elements necessary to establish fraud.
Concerning ARI's claims under the 1934 Act, the Fourth Circuit's Tri-
Star opinion appears to be consistent with the Supreme Court's actual-
purchaser requirements set out in Blue Chip. Even though some circuits have
found exceptions to the actual-purchaser requirements of Blue Chip in suits
seeking injunctive relief,76 the facts of Tri-Star did not warrant extending those
exceptions any farther.
The Fourth Circuit's treatment of the Lanham Act claim, however, may
conflict with other circuit's expansive view of the concept of a "mark." '
Although no other circuits have addressed a case in which a defendant used
a signed and unaltered report, the facts in Tri-Star are somewhat analogous
to Better Business Bureau of Metropolitan Houston, Inc. v. Medical Directors,
Inc.8 As the Tri-Star dissent notes, in Better Business Bureau, whether an
advertisement might mislead consumers was a question of fact for the jury.
Accordingly, the Lanham Act issues in Tri-Star may have been unsuitable for
disposition by summary judgment.
76. See, e.g., Newman, 664 F.2d at 17 (deciding that when SEC or United States
Attorney institutes Rule 10(b)-5 litigation, court's concern is with scope of rule, not with
plaintiff's standing to sue); Davis v. Davis, 526 F.2d 1286, 1289 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that
plaintiff was seller for purposes of 10(b) standing to claim injunctive relief even though
defendant had not yet made payment to plaintiff for shares); Kahan, 424 F.2d at 173
(proclaiming that minority stockholder, though not purchaser or seller, had standing to claim
injunctive relief against directors of corporation, because directors' actions, if continued, would
deprive plaintiff of favorable disposition of shares); Genesco, 384 F.2d at 546-47 (holding that
plaintiffs had standing to seek injunction even though plaintiffs had not sold their stock where
they claimed defendant corporation was depressing price of stock by market manipulation,
deceit, and fraud).
77. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1107 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that false
endorsement claim premised on unauthorized imitation of entertainer's distinctive voice is
cognizable under section 43(a)); Better Business Bureau of Metro. Houston, Inc. v. Medical
Directors, Inc., 681 F.2d 397, 403 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that Better Business Bureau had
Lanham Act claim when weight reduction center used its name in advertising and falsely
implied that Bureau endorsed center's program); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc., v. Pussycat
Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979) (recognizing claim under section 43(a) because
uniform that star of X-rated movie wore was confusingly similar to plaintiff's trademark
uniforms); Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding
celebrity stated claim under section 43(a) by showing that advertisement featuring photograph
of look-alike falsely represented that advertised products were associated with him).
78. 681 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1982).
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The Fourth Circuit applied the common-law theories of fraud as Virginia
law required. Virginia law consistently has held that an allegation of fraud in
the abstract does not give rise to a cause of action.79 However, concerning all
three of ARI's claims, the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Tri-Star appears to be
a result of the individual facts of this case rather than a result of a conflict
of opinion with other circuits.
B. Agricultural Credit Act
Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 permits banking institutions
to merge and compete with institutions that formerly
possessed exclusive rights to conduct business within a
particular territory.
Buckeye Production Credit Ass'n v. Farm Credit Administration
997 F.2d 11 (4th Cir. 1993)
The Federal Farm Loan Act of 191610 established a financial system to
deal with the special capital needs of farmers. This system chartered three
specific types of lending institutions and gave each institution an exclusive
territory in which it could conduct business. The Farm Credit Association
(FCA) administered this special banking scheme and its institutions: Federal
Land Bank Associations (FLBAs), which made long-term real estate loans;
Production Credit Associations (PCAs), which made short and intermediate-
term loans; and Agricultural Credit Associations (ACAs), which made all three
types of loans. The system has changed numerous times in the intervening
years." Congress created the most recent version of this system with the
Agricultural CreditAct of 1987 (the 1987 Act),8 2 which mandated that FLBAs
and PCAs sharing similar territory submit a merger proposal to their share-
holders.
Buckeye Production Credit Association (Buckeye) and Fostoria Federal
Land Bank Association (Fostoria) shared exclusive lending rights in nine Ohio
counties. Buckeye and Fostoria were among the few institutions that chose
not to join in the 1985 mergers creating the Fourth District PCA and the
Fourth District FLBA. Under the provisions of the 1987 Act, the Fourth
District PCA and the Fourth District FLBA voted to merge, creating Farm
Credit Services of Mid-America (Mid-America), an ACA whose charter in-
cluded Buckeye's and Fostoria's formerly exclusive territories. Buckeye and
Fostoria then brought suit against the FCA, claiming that it misconstrued the
1987 Act when it included their territories in Mid-America's charter.
79. Community Bank v. Wright, 267 S.E.2d 158, 160 (Va. 1980).
80. The Federal Farm Loan Act, Pub. L. No. 64-158, 39 Stat. 360 (1916).
81. The Farm Credit Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-181, 85 Stat. 583 (current version at
12 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2279) wrought the most sweeping changes.
82. Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-233, 101 Stat. 1568 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2279).
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In Buckeye Production Credit Ass'n v. Farm Credit Administration,8 3 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided whether section
7.8 of the 1987 Act protected the exclusive status of Buckeye's and Fostoria's
right to conduct business in a certain territory. This determination hinged
upon language in section 7.8 providing that a merged association is subject
to all of the "obligations" of the associations that merge to create it. 4 The
district court found that the statute unambiguously defined "obligations" in
the broadest sense and, therefore, held that Mid-America had to amend its
charter to omit the exclusive territory of Buckeye and Fostoria. The Fourth
Circuit disagreed, finding the language of section 7.8 ambiguous. The court
analyzed the statute, first, by looking at the "plain meaning" of the words
and, second, by deciding whether the district court's construction was consistent
with the context and purposes of the 1987 Act.
The Fourth Circuit noted that a word such as "obligation" can have
numerous meanings and that in a complex legislative scheme few terms are
truly unambiguous. The court examined the spirit and the letter of the law in
order to determine the proper interpretation of section 7.8, and found that
the purpose of the 1987 Act, as well as the remaining extant portions of the
earlier Farm Credit statutes, was to provide sufficient numbers of loans to
farmers. Furthermore, giving the FCA leeway in chartering lending institutions
would help accomplish this goal. Conversely, under the district court's inter-
pretation, the FCA has only token power and can do nothing to further the
purpose of the statute. In addition, the Fourth Circuit noted that the statute
consistently used the word "obligation" in the narrow financial sense, referring
only to the economic obligations, such as outstanding loans, of the merging
banks. The court found that the consistent meaning and usage of the term
"obligation" elsewhere in the statute was probative of the legislative intent
and explained that a court must construe the meaning of a word to be
consistent throughout a statute. As such, the Fourth Circuit decided that
section 7.8 was ambiguous and that the district court had erred in its
interpretation of the statute.
The Fourth Circuit explained that the FCA's regulations and comments
pursuant to the 1987 Act clearly indicated that the agency thought that the
"obligations" discussed in section 7.8 were only financial obligations such as
notes, loans, and mortgages. Under such a construction, the noncompetition
requirements that the previous statutory scheme created did not carry over in
the 1987 Act. The Court of Appeals stated that, because the language of the
statute was ambiguous, the court would give any reasonable agency construc-
tion of the statute considerable deference. Finding that the FCA's interpretation
of the 1987 Act was reasonable, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court
and upheld Mid-America's charter as the FCA originally drafted it.
While the Fourth Circuit's decision seems quite specific and technical, its
ramifications are broad. Many farmers now will be able to borrow at better
83. 997 F.2d 11 (4th Cir. 1993).
84. 12 U.S.C. § 2279c-1(b)(1) (1988).
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rates because Buckeye and Fostoria may have to face competition. The Fourth
Circuit's opinion exemplifies how the system under the 1987 Act will force
lenders under the FCA, such as Buckeye and Fostoria, either to become more
competitive or to go bankrupt. The court interpreted Congress's continual
adjustment of the farm credit system as a legislative attempt to improve the
rights of borrowers and decided the case in accordance with that theory. In
this manner, the Fourth Circuit implemented Congress's directive to organize
and administer the farm credit system for the benefit of the farmer rather
than of the lender.
IV. BANKRUPTCY
A. Calculation of Interest Rates Under Cramdown Provision
Fourth Circuit adopts local lending market approach in
calculating rate of interest under cramdown provision of
Bankruptcy Code.
United Carolina Bank v. Hall
993 F.2d 1126 (4th Cir. 1993)
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to retain possession
of property securing a loan, despite the objections of the secured creditor.s
When a creditor objects to a Chapter 13 plan, one of two events may occur.
The debtor may surrender the secured property to the creditor 86 or, under the
"cramdown" provision, the creditor may retain the lien securing the claim
and accept payments equivalent in value to the secured property itself.s7 These
payments substitute for the actual liquidation of the securing property under
Chapter 7.
In calculating the amount of the payments that the debtor will pay under
the cramdown provision, the court must accomplish two tasks. First, the court
must include in each installment a portion of the value of the securing
property.88 The total amount of these payments must be no less than the value
of the lien.89 If the creditor is undersecured, the value of the lien must equal
the value of the securing propertyf 0 Second, the court must determine the
appropriate rate of interest that will compensate the creditor for the delay in
receiving the principal amount that the creditor could have received more
promptly under a Chapter 7 liquidation. 9'
A conflict, however, exists among the circuits over the method for
calculating the appropriate rate of interest. Most courts have used the "local
85. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1988).
86. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C) (1988).
87. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(5)(a)(B)(i)-(ii) (1988).
88. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1988).
89. I1 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (1988).
90. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
91. See 2 DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 9-10 (1992) (stating that this
compensation is discount rate that calculates present value of future sum).
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lending market" 92 or "the cost of funds" approach.93 The lending market
approach essentially treats the property that the debtor retains in the cramdown
provision as a new loan.94 The bankruptcy court then should match this new
loan's rate of return to that rate which the creditor could obtain in the local
consumer lending market.95 The cost of funds approach, on the other hand,
treats the rate not as part of a new loan, but merely as a discount rate that
places the creditor in the same position economically as if the debtor had
surrendered the collateral or the creditor had foreclosed under Chapter 7.9
This approach permits the creditor to make new loans by approximating the
situation where the creditor borrows funds (usually at the prime rate) to replace
those funds locked in bankruptcy proceedings.9
In United Carolina Bank v. Hall,9 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit addressed two issues. First, the Fourth Circuit considered
whether the issue of rate calculation was moot as a result of Loretta Hall's
(Debtor) default under a consent decree. Second, the court considered how to
calculate the appropriate rate of interest when it applied the cramdown
provision of the Bankruptcy Code.
In United Carolina Bank, the Debtor purchased a mobile home from a
mobile home dealer, who then sold the finance contract to the United Carolina
Bank (Bank) with recourse. The Debtor purchased the mobile home for
92. See In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that appropriate rate
of interest is current market rate for similar loans in region where new loan is made); Memphis
Bank and Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427, 431 (6th Cir. 1982) (same); In re Landscape
Assocs., 81 B.R. 485, 487 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1987) (same); In re Neff, 60 B.R. 448, 457
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985) (holding that floating interest rate based on rates charged to similar
customers appropriate); In re Cooper, 11 B.R. 391, 394 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (holding that
appropriate rate of interest is current market rate for similar loans in region where new loan
is made); In re Benford, 14 B.R. 157, 160 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981) (same).
93. See In re Fowler, 903 F.2d 694, 697-98 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that "formula"
based on prime rate or rate on treasury obligations was appropriate to calculate discount rate);
United States v. Doud, 869 F.2d 1144, 1146 (8th Cir. 1989) (same); In re Bloomingdale
Partners, 155 B.R. 961 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1993) (holding that appropriate rate is calculated by
taking risk-free rate and adding to that base rate additional amount of interest to account for
creditor's risk); In re IPC Atlanta Ltd. Partnership, 142 B.R. 547 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992)
(same); In re Oaks Partners Ltd., 135 B.R. 440, 445-46 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991) (finding that
"formula" based on prime rate or rate on treasury obligations was appropriate to calculate
discount rate); In re Jordan, 130 B.R. 185, 192 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991) (same); In re Huddock,
124 B.R. 532, 534 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1991) (holding that prime rate appropriate for cramdown
calculation, but only without risk component); In re E.I. Parks No. 1 Ltd. Partnership, 122
B.R. 549, 555 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1990) (holding that appropriate rate should be based on
government securities with added risk component); In re Richards, 106 B.R. 762, 766 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 1989) (holding that rate at which creditor lends money is not deciding factor for
present value analysis).
94. In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir. 1990).
95. See In re Bryson Properties, 961 F.2d 496, 500 (4th Cir. 1992) (giving tacit approval
of view of "local lending market" approach).
96. In re Fowler, 903 F.2d 694, 697-98 (9th Cir. 1990).
97. In re Jordan, 130 B.R. 185, 188 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991); see 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
1325.06, at 1325-37 (Lawrence P. King, 15th ed. 1993).
98. 993 F.2d 1126 (4th Cir. 1993).
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$21,000 by paying $3,000 down and financing the rest at 13% interest. She
was to make 180 payments of $231.57. On May 20, 1991, the Debtor filed a
petition in bankruptcy court under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. The
Debtor submitted a Chapter 13 plan requesting that she retain possession of
her mobile home. Under the plan, she would pay the Bank the current full
value of the mobile home because the Bank's lien exceeded that value. The
Debtor would pay the current full value at a 10% rate of interest in 50
monthly installments of $314.50 each. The Bank objected to this plan and
sought to liquidate the Debtor's assets under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code. The bankruptcy court approved the Debtor's plan and decided that
10% was appropriate. The Bank argued that the appropriate rate of interest
should be the rates that local mobile home dealers charged. The Bank
demonstrated that area mobile home dealers charged interest rates of 13.50o
on new mobile homes and 15.506 on used mobile homes. Under this calcu-
lation, the appropriate rate of interest should lie somewhere between 13.5%
and 15.5%. The bankruptcy court rejected this argument and held that the
prime rate that North Carolina banks charged at that time was 8.5% and that
an additional 1.5% would compensate the Bank for the deferred payment of
the value of the securing property. The Bank appealed to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.
On appeal, the district court overturned the bankruptcy court's calculation.
The district court held that the current consumer credit market rate of interest,
as the Bank advocated, provided a more accurate method of calculation. The
district court noted that, while the bankruptcy court's plan was easy to
implement, the plan did not reflect accurately the local lending market and
could penalize the creditor. The bankruptcy court should have used the interest
rate that prevailed in the local consumer market for similar loans. Even though
the interest rate for used mobile homes in the area was 13.5%, the district
court capped the rate at the 13% contract rate. According to this calculation,
the Debtor would make payments of $336.12 per month. The Debtor subse-
quently appealed from this decision.
While the appeal was pending, the Debtor made twenty payments under
the district court's plan then defaulted. After a hearing on December 1, 1992,
the Bank and the Debtor agreed to a consent decree, whereby the Debtor
would account for an arrearage of $2,033.47 through an immediate payment
of $500.00 and four bi-weekly installment payments of $427.12 each, beginning
December 11, 1992. The Debtor also defaulted under this agreement. The stay
was lifted because the Debtor could not meet her obligation under the consent
decree. The Debtor then filed a motion to reinstate the stay.
Because the Debtor defaulted under the consent decree and the stay was
no longer in effect, the Bank first argued that the appeal was moot. As a
result, the Bank argued that the court should allow the Bank to proceed with
Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. The Bank contended that any overpayment
the Bank received was irrelevant so long as the total recovery did not exceed
the allowable claim. The Debtor, on the other hand, maintained that a
determination of the accurate rate of interest remained important. She had
already made twenty payments under the plan, and the other unsecured
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creditors had an interest in insuring that the interest rate charged did not
interfere with their claims.
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the Debtor and held that any failure to
determine the appropriate amount to be paid under the cramdown provision
would not adequately take into account the interests of other creditors. Because
the resources in a Chapter 13 proceeding are finite, an excessive rate of interest
would reduce the funds available to pay other creditors. Applying this reasoning
to United Carolina Bank, the court illustrated that the Debtor had made
twenty payments under the plan that the district court approved. These
payments totaled $6,722.40. Under the bankruptcy court's calculation, the
total payments would have equaled $6,290.00, an amount $432.40 less than
the amount that the Bank had collected. If the district court had erred in its
calculation, the Bank would have received $432.40 in predefault funds that
possibly could have satisfied debts owed to other creditors. The Fourth Circuit
concluded that calculation of the correct interest rate was very important. On
the merits of the case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the holding of the district
court by agreeing with that court's determination that, while the bankruptcy
court's rule was simple in application, the rate did not adequately protect the
creditor. The Fourth Circuit rejected the bankruptcy court's approach and
concluded that its approach placed too great a risk on the creditor, in that
the Debtor's payments would not adequately represent a fair present value.
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the cost of funds approach rested on
the false assumption that a creditor has an unlimited supply of credit. The
court concluded that just the opposite is true and that utilizing the creditor's
borrowing capacity without providing an adequate return created a loss for
the creditor. The Fourth Circuit measured this loss as the difference between
the interest that the creditor could have earned in the current market for loans
similar to that of the debtor, less the cost to the creditor of making such a
loan and the creditor's cost of borrowed capital. The Fourth Circuit held that
a secured creditor's lending market provides the best tool to calculate the rate
that gives the creditor the present value of the creditor's secured claim. The
court reasoned that the appropriate discount rate should reflect the business
opportunity that the creditor would have been able to pursue, but for the
Chapter 13 proceedings. The Fourth Circuit tempered this approach by noting
that a bankruptcy court must consider carefully how the creditor processed
the loan in order to avoid unjust enrichment of the creditor. To eliminate any
windfall that could benefit the Bank in United Carolina Bank, the district
court capped the interest at the contract rate to which the secured creditor
originally had agreed. The Fourth Circuit affirmed this approach as a matter
of equity.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion remains consistent in two important aspects
with the leading cases supporting the local lending market approach. 99 First,
99. See In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that appropriate rate
of interest is current market rate for similar loans in region where new loan is made); Memphis
Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427, 431 (6th Cir. 1982) (same).
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the Fourth Circuit predicated United Carolina Bank on the assumption that
the lender makes a new loan to the debtor.' ° ° Second, when the local market
rate exceeds the contract rate, the court should cap that rate at the contract
rate.10' The difference between the Fourth Circuit's reasoning and that of other
circuits results from the Fourth Circuit's concern for the possible loss to a
creditor if courts use the cost of funds approach. The courts in other circuits
were concerned more with a court's lack of expertise to determine interest
rates and reasoned that the cost of funds approach is too difficult to calculate
and that bankruptcy courts are more familiar with the rates charged on local
consumer loans.
The local lending market is arguably not the best approach because it
may not adhere to the statutory goal of the cramdown provisions in Chapter
13. The legislative history to Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code'0° declares
that the bankruptcy courts should charge a rate calculated through "a present
value analysis that will discount value to be received in the future."' 0 3 The
Eleventh Circuit has affirmed this legislative intent and stated that Congress
intended that any deferred payment place the creditor in the same position as
if the creditor had received the present value of any claims paid immediately. 0
In addition, the local lending market approach creates problems because it
may overcompensate the creditor. 0 The cramdown provisions should com-
pensate the creditor for the immediate value had the creditor sold the secured
property in a Chapter 7 foreclosure, not for what the creditor could have
made in a subsequent loan with those funds.10
The issue of calculating the discount rate under the cramdown provisions
may be the determining factor in bankruptcy reorganization.' 7 Moreover, few
bankruptcy issues are as confusing and difficult to confront as the proper
determination of the discount rate.'01 While the courts agree that the cramdown
provision requires application of a discount rate, the courts have yet to develop
100. Memphis Bank & Trust, 692 F.2d at 431.
101. Hardzog, 901 F.2d at 860.
102. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 414-15 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6369-70.
103. Id.
104. In re Southern States Motor Inns, Inc., 709 F.2d. 647, 652 (lth Cir. 1983).
105. See C. Frank Carbiener, Present Value in Bankruptcy: The Search for an Appropriate
Cramdown Discount Rate, 32 S.D. L. REv. 42, 63 (1987) (stating that cost of funds approach
promotes mitigation of damages).
106. See COLLIER, supra note 92, 1325.0614][b][iii][B], at 1325-47 (stating that treating
Chapter 13 payments like new loan transaction provides creditor with administrative costs of
new loan, as well as profit); see also In re Huddock, 124 B.R. 532, 534 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1991) (finding that Bankruptcy Code protects creditor's interest in property, not creditor's
interest in profit on loan); cf. In re Willis, 6 B.R. 555, 559 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980) (stating
that interest rate charged by creditor serves dual purpose of compensating lender for delay in
receiving principal and for risk of nonpayment).
107. Carbiener, supra note 105, at 43.
108. Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L.
REv. 1061, 1119 (1985).
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a uniform and systematic method for calculating that rate.' 9 This trend
continued with the Fourth Circuit's opinion in United Carolina Bank, in which
the Fourth Circuit rejected the cost of funds approach and accepted the local
lending market approach for calculating the discount rate.
B. Tolling of Bar Date for Filing Claims Against Bankruptcy Estate
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act tolls the period for
filing claims against the bankruptcy estate for service
personnel.
Anderson v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust
(In re A. H. Robins Co.)
996 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1993)
Section 525 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 194010 (Act)
essentially tolls periods of limitation both in favor of and against military
service personnel whenever such military service coincides with the limitations
period."' The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit previously
has held in Ricard v. Birch"2 that section 525 is unconditional; the only critical
factor is military service and once that is shown, the period of limitations
automatically is tolled for the duration of the service. "13 In Anderson v. Dalkon
Shield Claimants Trust (In re A. H. Robins Co.)," 4 the Fourth Circuit
considered whether the Act operates to toll the period that the district court
set within which all claimants against A.H. Robins's estate could bring a suit.
As part of the Chapter 11 reorganization plan for A.H. Robins, the
district court, on November 21, 1985, entered an order establishing April 30,
1986, as the deadline for filing claims against the estate ("bar date"). Major
Anderson's injuries first manifested themselves in May 1979, when she under-
went a total abdominal hysterectomy afid her physicians diagnosed her as
having several other medical conditions possibly related to the placement of a
Dalkon Shield IUD in her uterus in January 1972. Major Anderson, stationed
in Hawaii from June 1983 through September 1989, had no actual knowledge
109. See Carbiener, supra note 105, at 45 (dividing into eight categories different methods
courts have applied in calculating rates).
110. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501-91 (1988).
111. See, e.g., Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 862 F.2d 242, 245 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that
statute of limitations in product liability action was tolled during period of military service in
Coast Guard); Bickford v. United States, 656 F.2d 636, 639 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (holding that
application of section 525, tolling statute of limitations, to career serviceman does not require
showing of impairment in bring suit); Ricard v. Birch, 529 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1975)
(holding that statute of limitations in action for wrongful death was tolled while defendant
was in military); Detroit Harbor Terminals v. Kuschinski, 181 F.2d 541, 542-43 (6th Cir. 1950)
(holding that section 525 allows otherwise time-barred request for stock exchange in bankruptcy
proceedings).
112. 529 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1975).
113. Ricard, 529 F.2d at 217.
114. 996 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1993).
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of the Dalkon Shield claims procedure prior to October 1989, when her mother
informed her of the possibility of making such a claim.
After learning of the claims procedure, Anderson took two months to
assemble her medical records. She filed her claim in January 1990. Both the
bankruptcy court and the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia held that the Act does not apply to toll the running of bar dates
established in Chapter 11 reorganizations. Consequently, both courts held that
Anderson's claim would be allowable only as a late-filed claim.
On appeal, Anderson argued that the plain language of section 525
operated to toll the bar date during her period of military service. Her service
extended from November of 1978 to the time that she filed her claim.
Therefore, she argued that her claim was timely. Dalkon Shield Claimants
Trust (Trust), however, sought to avoid the application of section 525 by
arguing that the Act does not apply to all limitation periods.
The Trust first posited that the bar date was not a period limited by any
law, regulation, or order within the Act, but merely a "date certain" by
which claimants and creditors must file proof of a claim to be eligible for a
distribution from the estate. Second, the Trust urged that the application of
the Act in this case would have the effect of impairing the Trust's interest in
finality and certainty with regards to its ultimate solvency.
As to the first argument, the Fourth Circuit found the Trust's attempted
distinction between a period of time and a date certain to be without substance.
As to the second argument, the court was unconvinced that the circumstances
of this case justified excusing, in bankruptcy cases, an otherwise facially-
applicable statute. The court reasoned that no evidence existed that Congress
intended to exclude bankruptcy cases from the tolling effect of the statute.
Further, Congress unambiguously exempted periods of limitation prescribed
by internal revenue laws."' The Fourth Circuit further reasoned that presence
of the internal revenue exception and the absence of any mention of a similar
exception in bankruptcy cases bolstered the conclusion that the Act tolled the
statute in the instant case. Finally, noting that the operation of any tolling
statute, including section 525, necessarily impairs the parties' finality interest,
the court concluded that the language of section 525 simply reflects Congress's
judgment that the benefits of the toll effect, which inure both to military
personnel and to those with rights of action, outweigh the costs. Therefore,
the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's order of dismissal holding that
the period of limitation was tolled during her military service and that Major
Anderson's claim was timely.
The Anderson court's holding that the Act applies to toll periods of
limitation once the fact of military service is established conflicts with other
circuits which limit the application of the Act in various ways. Courts in New
Mexico, Florida, Alabama, and the Fifth Circuit have held that the tolling
effect of section 525 does not apply to career military personnel absent a
115. 50 U.S.C. app. § 527 (1988).
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showing of actual prejudice of handicap as a result of the military service." 6
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit's holding in Anderson requires only that the
serviceperson seeking the tolling effect of the statute show that the period of
military service coincides with the limitations period.
C. Choice of Law in Credit Transaction Disputes
State law governs disputes between federal agency and
private creditor over relative priority of liens.
United States v. Currituck Grain, Inc.
6 F.3d 200 (4th Cir. 1993)
State commercial law generally governs disputes arising out of private
credit transactions. Complex issues, however, arise in cases where federal
agencies such as the Farmer's Home Administration (FmHA) act as lenders
and then become involved in disputes with private creditors over the relative
priorities of liens on collateral. Absent a federal statute, federal courts face
the question of whether to apply uniform federal common law or state
commercial law in such cases. The United States Supreme Court addressed
this precise issue when it decided two cases in United States v. Kimbell Foods,
Inc." 7 The Court in Kimbell Foods began by noting that federal law governs
questions involving the rights of the United States arising under nationwide
federal programs." 8 Even so, the Court refused to fashion a nationwide federal
rule governing precedence among federal and private liens in cases involving
federal loan programs." 9 The Kimbell Foods Court instead adopted state law
as the appropriate federal rule of decision.2' In doing so, the Court considered
three factors: (1) the need for nationwide uniformity inherent in the specific
federal programs in question; (2) whether application of state law would
frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs; and (3) the extent to
which application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships
116. See, e.g., Pannell v. Continental Can Co., 554 F.2d 216, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1977)
(holding section 525 inapplicable as defense to adverse possessor because career serviceman
showed no actual impairment in bringing claim); Crouch v. United Technologies Corp., 533
So. 2d 220, 222-23 (Ala. 1988) (holding that section 525 did not toll state's statute of limitations
in favor of career serviceman absent showing that military service impaired his ability to
prosecute suit); Bailey v. Barranca, 488 P.2d 725, 728-30 (N.M. 1971) (stating that intent of
Act mandates showing of actual handicap in prosecuting claim); King v. Zagorski, 207 So. 2d
61, 64-67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (holding section 525 inapplicable absent showing of actual
prejudice in pursuing claim).
117. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
118. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726 (1979).
119. See id. at 729 (stating that Court was unpersuaded that nationwide standards favoring
United States claims were necessary).
120. See id. at 740 (holding that, absent congressional directive, courts must determine
relative priority of private liens and consensual liens arising from Small Business Administration
and FmHA lending programs under nondiscrimatory state laws).
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predicated on state law.12' In United States v. Currituck Grain, Inc.,' 2 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had the opportunity
to apply the Kimbell Foods rule to a case almost factually identical to one of
the cases reviewed in Kimbell Foods.Iu
In Currituck Grain, FmHA extended a farm operating loan to Mr. and
Mrs. Robert Meiggs in early 1985. In return, the Meiggs granted FmHA a
security interest in their 1985 crops of soybeans and corn. FmHA properly
perfected its security interest by filing a financing statement with the Currituck
County, North Carolina Register of Deeds. Currituck Grain, Inc. (Currituck)
subsequently purchased the Meiggs' crops. At some point after the sale to
Currituck, the Meiggs defaulted on their FmHA loan.
Sixty-two months after Currituck's last purchase from the Meiggs, FmHA
filed suit against Currituck and alleged conversion of the crops. Currituck
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that FmHA had no possessory interest
in the grain, either at the time of sale or at the time of suit, to serve as the
basis for its cause of action. Currituck argued that North Carolina law made
FmHA's security interest unperfected and thus subordinate to Currituck's
interest as a purchaser. FmHA responded that, under principles of federal
common law, the six year statute of limitations for conversion of government
property applied and made the FmHA's action timely.
The district court granted Currituck's motion to dismiss, and FmHA
appealed. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of FmHA's
conversion action. In doing so, the court concluded that the district court
appropriately adopted North Carolina law as the rule of decision and applied
North Carolina law correctly to the facts of this case.
First, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court's application of North
Carolina commercial law. The Court began by addressing whether FmHA had
a perfected security interest in the crops at the time of purchase and at the
time of suit. The court rejected Currituck's argument that Currituck's purchase
of the Meiggs' crops extinguished FmHA's security interest at the time
Currituck made the purchase. The general rule under North Carolina's Uniform
Commercial Code provisions is that a third-party purchaser purchasing prop-
erty subject to a creditor's security interest from a debtor is liable to the
creditor for repossession or conversion unless the creditor authorizes the
transaction . 24 North Carolina creates an exception to this rule for buyers in
121. See id. at 728-29 (discussing factors to consider in evaluating whether federal courts
should formulate uniform federal rules).
122. 6 F.3d 200 (4th Cir. 1993).
123. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 723-25 (1979) (discussing
facts of United States v. Crittenden (No. 77-1644), companion case of Kimbell Foods). In
Crittenden, FmHA failed to properly perfect its security interest in a tractor, making the
interest of a repairer of the tractor, who acquired a lien as the result of nonpayment of repair
bills, superior to FmHA's interest under Georgia law. Id.
124. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-306(2) (1986) (stating that, except where article otherwise
provides, security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other
disposition unless secured party authorized disposition in security agreement or otherwise).
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the ordinary course of business, but excludes from this exception buyers of
farm products from persons engaged in farming operations.'12 The court
concluded that Currituck, although a buyer in the ordinary course of business,
did not fall within this statutory exception because it was a buyer of farm
products from persons engaged in farming operations.
Although FmHA's security interest was perfected at the time of the Meiggs'
sale to Currituck, the Fourth Circuit concluded that FmHA's interest no longer
remained perfected. As a general rule, security interests remain perfected in
North Carolina for five years after the filing of a financing statement, but
expire at that time unless creditors file continuation statements.'26 North
Carolina, however, makes an exception for agricultural liens involving soy-
beans, corn, and other crops, which become unperfected only eighteen months
after sale of the collateral by the debtor. 27 FmHA's security interest in the
crops became unperfected on June 20, 1987, eighteen months after the Meiggs'
last sale to Currituck and long before FmHA filed suit against Currituck in
1991.
The Fourth Circuit noted that its analysis did not end with the conclusion
that FmHA's security interest was unperfected. Some security interests, al-
though unperfected, are still superior to the interests of other persons under
North Carolina law.'1s After concluding that Currituck was a buyer in the
ordinary course of business and without actual knowledge of the prior security
interest, 29 the court determined that Currituck's interest in the grain was
superior to that of FmHA under North Carolina law. Because North Carolina
permits secured creditors to bring actions for conversion only when they have
superior interests, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of FmHA's
suit for conversion.
Second, the Fourth Circuit addressed FmHA's argument that its cause of
action for conversion, once accrued, was indestructible and thus unaffected
by the later subordination of its security interest. According to FmHA, the
six year federal statute of limitations imposed the only limit on its ability to
bring a conversion action. The court rejected FmHA's argument on the ground
that FmHA's analysis ignored the fact that FmHA no longer had a right of
125. See id. § 25-9-307(1) (stating that buyer in ordinary course of business other than
person buying farm products from person engaged in farming operations takes free of security
interest that his seller creates even though security interest is perfected and even though buyer
knows of its existence).
126. See id. § 25-9-403(2) (1986 & Supp. 1993) (stating that effectiveness of filed financing
statement lapses on expiration of five year period unless continuation statement is filed prior
to lapse).
127. See id. § 44-69.1 (1986) (stating that no lien upon peanuts, cotton, soybeans, corn,
wheat or other grains shall be effective for any purpose for period longer than 18 months).
128. See id. § 25-9-301(1) (1986 & Supp. 1993) (identifying persons who take priority over
unperfected security interests).
129. See id. § 25-9-301(1)(c) (stating that unperfected security interest is subordinate to
rights of, in case of goods, instruments, documents, and chattel paper, person who is buyer
of farm products in ordinary course of business, to extent that he gives value and receives
delivery of collateral without knowledge of security interest and before it is perfected).
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recovery under applicable North Carolina substantive law. To provide FmHA
with a right of recovery, the court would not only have to rule that the federal
statute of limitations applied to FmHA's cause of action, but also have to
fashion a federal common law rule displacing North Carolina substantive law
as the basis for decision. While the court recognized that federal courts have
the power to displace North Carolina substantive law with uniform federal
common law, the court stated that the Supreme Court's opinion in Kimbell
Foods did not permit it to do so in this case. The court chose not to conduct
a lengthy analysis of the Kimbell Foods factors because the court considered
one of the cases in Kimbell Foods clearly analogous to this one.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Fourth Circuit held that, absent a
congressional directive, the relative priority of private liens and consensual
liens arising from government lending programs will be determined under
nondiscriminatory state laws. FmHA had not argued that North Carolina law
was discriminatory. As a result, the court concluded that the district court
properly adopted North Carolina law as the federal rule of decision and
dismissed FmHA's conversion action.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Currituck Grain is a straightforward
application of North Carolina commercial law to determine the relative interests
of the United States and a private party in property subject to a lien. As
such, it may be useful for anyone seeking to understand North Carolina
commercial law as it relates to liens. In applying state law to its determination,
the Fourth Circuit followed the principles laid out in Kimbell Foods. Because
of the similarity between Currituck Grain's facts and the facts in one of the
Kimbell Foods cases, Currituck Grain provides little insight into cases where
courts must determine whether to apply uniform federal common law or state
law as the appropriate rule of decision.
V. CwVn PROCEDURE
A. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
A court may not deny a plaintiff's motion for voluntary
dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure where the plaintiff makes the motion before the
adverse party files an answer or motion for summary
judgment.
Marex Titanic, Inc. v. The Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel
2 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1993)
Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for voluntary
dismissal of actions in Rule 41(a). 30 Rule 41(a)(1) authorizes a plaintiff to
130. See FED. R. Crv. P. 41(a) (providing for voluntary dismissal). Rule 41(a) provides:
(a) Voluntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof
(1) By Plaintiff; by Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 66,
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dismiss an action on his own without seeking a court order by filing a notice
of dismissal at any time before the adverse party serves an answer or a motion
for summary judgment.' Rule 41(a)(2) authorizes a court to dismiss an action
"upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper."'3 2 Dismissal
under Rule 41(a)(1) is preferable for plaintiffs because it allows them to select
their own terms of dismissal, so long as they have filed a notice of dismissal
before the adverse party serves them with an answer or a motion for summary
judgment. If the plaintiff fails to act in time, Rule 41(a)(1) dismissal is no
longer available, and the plaintiff must seek dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2).111
In Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.,'3 4 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that courts may deny
Rule 41(a)(1) dismissal if the parties have argued the merits of the case and
introduced substantial evidence, even though the adverse party has made no
service of an answer or motion for summary judgment. Harvey Aluminum
altered the balancing test of Rule 41(a)(1) because it allows plaintiffs to
abandon lawsuits without prejudice only when their lawsuit has not reached
an advanced stage.'35 Defendants arguing for the Harvey Aluminum exception
often argue that Rule 41(a)(1) is "intended to establish the most accurate
possible test for determining how much defendants and federal taxpayers must
spend on a lawsuit before they have a right to a judgment of some sort."' 36
In Marex Titanic, Inc. v. The Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 3 7 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether a
court can vacate a notice of voluntary dismissal because the parties have
argued the merits and introduced substantial evidence. Thus, the Harvey
Aluminum exception to Rule 41(a)(1)(i) confronted the Fourth Circuit.
and of any statute of the United States, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff
without order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service
by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever
first occurs, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have
appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or
stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice ....
(2) By order of Court. Except as provided in paragraph (I) of this subdivision of
this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order
of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper ....
131. Id. For a collection of cases discussing or delineating the plaintiff's right to file a
dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(i), see Milton Roberts, Annotation, Plaintiff's Right to File
Notice of Dismissal Under Rule 41(a)(l)(i) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 A.L.R.
FED. 214 (1981).
132. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).
133. Id. This arbitrary limitation is designed to prevent unreasonable abuse and harass-
ment. See 5 J. MOORE ET AL, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 41.04 (2d ed. 1992) (examining
FED. R. Civ. P. 41).
134. 203 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 964 (1953).
135. Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 203 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir.
1953).
136. See Winterland Concessions Co. v. Smith, 706 F.2d 793, 795 (7th Cir. 1983) (rejecting
Harvey Aluminum exception).
137. 2 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1993).
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The dispute in Marex Titanic centered on the wreck of the RMS Titanic,
which sank on April 15, 1912, approximately 400 miles off of the Newfound-
land coast. In a 1987 joint salvage operation, Titanic Ventures, a private
American corporation, and the Institute of France for the Research and
Exploration of the Sea became the first salvers to recover artifacts from the
wreck site.
On August 7, 1992, Marex Titanic, Inc. (Marex) filed an action with the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia requesting
that the district court name it the sole and exclusive owner of all objects
recovered from the Titanic or, alternatively, that Marex be granted a salvage
award. Marex then made representations to the district court that all others
had abandoned competing salvage claims. However, Marex had never con-
ducted salvage operations on the Titanic. Marex representatives merely depos-
ited two objects taken from the wreck in order to establish the court's
jurisdiction. The district court issued a warrant of arrest on August 12, 1992.
On September 23, 1992, Titanic Ventures' lawyers entered a special
appearance and requested that the district court vacate the warrant of arrest
due to the factual misrepresentations that Marex utilized to obtain the warrant.
After hearings on the matter, including testimony by several of Titanic
Ventures' witnesses, the district court issued a temporary restraining order
barring Marex from salvaging the wreck until further order.
After three days of hearings, Marex evidently became dissatisfied with its
prospects for success. On October 1, 1992, Marex filed a notice of voluntary
dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(i). Titanic Ventures had not yet served
Marex with an answer or a motion for summary judgment. The district court
cited Harvey Aluminum for support of the district court's decision to vacate
Marex's notice of dismissal. On October 2, 1992, the district court allowed
Titanic Ventures to intervene in Marex's action. The district court vacated
Marex's earlier warrant of arrest, granted exclusive salvage rights to the wreck
to Titanic Ventures, and permanently enjoined Marex from salvaging the
vessel.
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Marex claimed that the district court
violated Rule 41(a)(1)(i) when it vacated Marex's notice of voluntary dismissal.
The Fourth Circuit agreed, reversing the district court and rejecting the analysis
of Harvey Aluminum. According to the Fourth Circuit, if a plaintiff files a
notice of dismissal before the adverse party serves the plaintiff with an answer
or a motion for summary judgment, the dismissal is effective at the moment
of filing and is available as a matter of unconditional right.
First, the Fourth Circuit noted that courts must give the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure their plain meaning. The Fourth Circuit remarked that courts
must cease their inquiry if they determine that the text of a rule is clear and
unambiguous. According to the Fourth Circuit, courts must protect the plain
meaning of a rule from encroachment.
Second, the Fourth Circuit held that filing the notice itself closes the case.
The Fourth Circuit determined that Rule 41(a)(1)(i) establishes a right which
belongs to the plaintiff and which the adversary or the court may not extinguish
or circumscribe. According to the Fourth Circuit, not even a perfunctory order
exists to close the file.
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Next, the court addressed Titanic Ventures' claim that Harvey Aluminum
provides an exception to Rule 41(a). The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that it
had cited Harvey Aluminum with approval in Armstrong v. Frostie Co.,
3 8
but the Fourth Circuit noted that Armstrong relied only upon the proposition
that Rule 41 permits early disengagement of parties. Clearly presented with
the issue, the court soundly rejected the Harvey Aluminum exception to the
plain meaning of Rule 41(a)(1)(i).
Although the Fourth Circuit recognized that its holding would allow some
parties to dismiss their case in order to avoid an unfavorable decision on the
merits after the court has considered evidence, the Fourth Circuit refused to
modify the text of Rule 41(a). Instead, the court deferred to the text's plain
meaning, leaving the responsibility for improving the text to Congress.
When Marex filed its notice of voluntary dismissal, Titanic Ventures had
not served them with an answer or a motion for summary judgment. According
to the Fourth Circuit, under Rule 41(a)(1)(i), Marex's notice of voluntary
dismissal terminated the action and vacated the district court's interlocutory
orders. Titanic Ventures might have been able to initiate a new, independent
civil action, but the district court could not allow Titanic Ventures to intervene
in Marex's defunct action.
The Fourth Circuit emphasized that sanctions are available under Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. According to the court, even if a
plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed its action pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(i), a
court still can impose Rule 11 sanctions. Thus, the Fourth Circuit recognized
that courts nevertheless can impose a penalty upon a plaintiff that utilizes
Rule 41(a)(1)(i).
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Marex Titanic places the court in line
with the decisions from the other circuits. 9 The Harvey Aluminum decision
even has found disagreement in its own circuit.140 Thus, the Fourth Circuit's
decision generates further doubt about the vitality of the Harvey Aluminum
exception to rule 41(a)(1)(i). Marex Titanic should facilitate voluntary dismis-
sals in the Fourth Circuit. At the very least, the restrictions of Harvey
Aluminum should no longer fetter Fourth Circuit plaintiffs, although some
138. 453 F.2d 914, 916 (4th Cir. 1971) (upholding district court decision vacating plaintiff's
notice of voluntary dismissal).
139. See Matthews v. Gaither, 902 F.2d 877, 880 (llth Cir. 1990) (implicitly rejecting
Harvey Aluminum); Manze v. State Farm Ins. Co., 817 F.2d 1062, 1066 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating
"State Farm cannot complain that the plaintiff exercised her prerogative under the rule
[41(a)(1)(i)l when State Farm could have prevented voluntary dismissal simply by answering
the complaint"); Universidad Central del Caribe, Inc. v. Liaison Comm. on Medical Educ.,
760 F.2d 14, 18-19 (1st Cir. 1985) (noting that courts have severely limited Harvey Aluminum);
Winterland Concessions Co. v. Smith, 706 F.2d 793, 795 (7th Cir. 1983) (rejecting Harvey
Aluminum exception); D.C. Elecs., Inc. v. Nartron Corp., 511 F.2d 294, 297-98 (6th Cir.
1975) (doubting vitality of Harvey Aluminum); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 506 F.2d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding "[i]f such a comprehensive
modification of the Rule is desirable, the request must be addressed to the Supreme Court
and to Congress, not to this Court"), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1048 (1975).
140. See Thorp v. Scarne, 599 F.2d 1169, 1175 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing cases repudiating
and distinguishing Harvey Aluminum).
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individuals might encounter Harvey Aluminum's rationale in dictum.
B. Personal Jurisdiction
A court may not maintain personal jurisdiction over a
foreign national when the exercise of such jurisdiction is
unreasonable, despite the existence of minimum contacts.
Ellicott Machine Corp. v. John Holland Party Ltd.
995 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1993)
Courts normally follow a two-step process when evaluating the propriety
of personal jurisdiction obtained under a state's long-arm statute. 4 For a
court to exercise personal jurisdiction, the forum's long-arm statute must
provide the court authorization to do so, and the court's exercise of jurisdiction
must comport with Fourteenth Amendment due process standards.' 42 The due
process question is the source of much difficultly in personal jurisdiction
disputes and has received a significant amount of the Supreme Court's
attention. 41
Due process requires that a defendant have minimum contacts with the
forum state for a court to assert personal jurisdiction. 44 A defendant establishes
minimum contacts when she directs her activities toward the forum state.
45
However, the existence of minimum contacts does not conclude the inquiry
into the propriety of asserting jurisdiction. Once a court finds minimum
contacts, the court then must determine whether those contacts satisfy the
concept of "fair play and substantial justice."' 46 Depending on the particular
circumstances of the case, jurisdiction may be unreasonable even though the
defendant has minimum contacts with the forum.
The Supreme Court has identified five factors for courts to consider in
evaluating whether the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant who has
minimum contacts with the forum state is reasonable: (1) the burden on the
141. See English & Smith v. Metzger, 901 F.2d 36, 38 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that task
in evaluating propriety of exercise of personal jurisdiction is normally two-step process).
142. See id. (describing two-step test courts apply in evaluating propriety of exercise of
personal jurisdiction).
143. See generally Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985) (holding
that federal district court's assertion of jurisdiction pursuant to forum state's long-arm statute
did not violate Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984) (holding that defendant's regular circulation of magazines in
forum state was sufficient to support assertion of jurisdiction); Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S.
235, 254 (1958) (holding that defendant trust company did not have sufficient contacts with
forum state to warrant exercise of jurisdiction); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 320 (1945) (holding that exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporation
satisfied due process because corporation had minimum contacts with forum state).
144. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
145. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (stating that minimum contacts exist when defendant
purposefully directs its activities toward forum state).
146. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
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defendant; (2) the forum's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiffs
interest in obtaining relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in
obtaining an efficient resolution of the dispute; and (5) the shared interest of
the several States in furthering substantive social policies. 47 Courts must apply
these factors with particular care and force when the defendant is a foreign
national. ,4
Against this background, the Fourth Circuit evaluated the reasonableness
of asserting jurisdiction over a foreign national in Ellicott Machine Corp. v.
John Holland Party Ltd. . 49 In Ellicott, the plaintiff, Ellicott Machine Cor-
poration (Ellicott), filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland seeking a determination that it
owed nothing on a subcontract that it entered into with defendant John
Holland Party Limited (Holland).
Ellicott is a United States manufacturer of sand dredges and headquartered
in Baltimore, Maryland. In October 1988, a representative of Ellicott traveled
to Australia to discuss the bid on a contract to furnish a sand dredge to
Minproc Engineers Party Limited (Minproc), an Australian mining company.
The successful bidder would supply component parts of the dredge and would
assemble the dredge at Minproc's mining site in Australia. Minproc encouraged
Ellicott to subcontract with Holland, another Australian company, for the
assembly of the dredge. While in Australia, Ellicott met with Holland to
discuss this possibility, and Holland presented an informal bid. Ellicott rejected
Holland's bid as too high.
Minproc eventually awarded Ellicott the contract to furnish the sand
dredge. In May 1989, Ellicott invited several construction firms to submit
formal bids on the assembly subcontract. Although not among the invited
companies, Holland faxed a second bid, which was substantially lower than
Holland's first bid, to Ellicott's corporate headquarters in Baltimore on May
11, 1989. Ellicott accepted Holland's bid on June 28, 1989.
On July 11, 1989, Elllcott sent Holland a purchase order specifying the
terms of the subcontract. After receiving a modified order from Holland,
Ellicott revised the terms and forwarded them to Holland. Again, Holland
marked up and signed the revised order in Australia, and returned it to
Baltimore, where Ellicott agreed to Holland's revisions and signed the order.
The parties conducted the subcontract negotiations by letter, fax, and telephone
between Holland in Australia and Ellicott in Maryland.
After beginning performance of the subcontract, Holland claimed that
late shipments of material and a labor strike in Australia created unanticipated
costs. Holland contacted Ellicott several times during and after the performance
of the contract and requested extra compensation in the amount of $595,126.
147. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (listing
five factors for courts to apply when analyzing reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction).
148. See Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987) (stating that
courts should use "[glreat care and reserve" when expanding notions of personal jurisdiction
to international field).
149. 995 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1993).
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Ellicott refused to pay the cost overruns and contended that Holland was
responsible for the additional expenses. Holland threatened suit in Australia
and thereby prompted Ellicott to file this action and serve Holland under
Maryland's long-arm statute.
The District Court for the District of Maryland granted Ellicott's motion
for a default judgment when Holland failed to appear or answer. Holland
never received notice of the action and did not learn about the default judgment
until notified by Ellicott. Holland filed a motion for relief from and vacation
of the judgment and argued that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction
over Holland because of Holland's insufficient contacts with Maryland. The
district court granted the motion.
Ellicott appealed the district court's decision to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In deciding the appeal, the Fourth Circuit
applied a two-step test evaluating the propriety of asserting personal jurisdiction
under a state's long-arm statute. The court first looked to the Maryland long-
arm statute to determine whether the statute authorized jurisdiction. Ellicott
argued that the statute authorized jurisdiction because Holland transacted
business in Maryland by virtue of negotiating with Ellicott's Baltimore offices.
The Fourth Circuit, however, found no reason to address this argument. The
court held that the Maryland legislature intended for the statute to extend
personal jurisdiction to the limits that federal due process permits. Conse-
quently, the court merged the normal two-step test into a single due process
analysis.
The Fourth Circuit next addressed the issue of whether Holland had
minimum contacts with Maryland. The court held that minimum contacts
existed because Holland purposefully initiated the business relationship between
the parties by pursuing Ellicott to Maryland and executing the contract by fax
and telephone. However, the court held that the fact that the parties did not
perform the contract in Maryland and did not have a longstanding business
relationship mitigated Holland's contacts. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that Holland's contacts with Maryland were of a fairly insubstantial
nature.
Due to the insubstantial character of Holland's contacts with Maryland
and the substantial connection of the whole venture with Australia, the Fourth
Circuit focused particularly on the reasonableness of asserting personal juris-
diction over Holland. The court applied the factors that the Supreme Court
has promulgated for judging reasonableness and concluded that Maryland's
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Holland would not comport with tradi-
tional notions of "fair play and substantial justice." In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court found that, while Maryland had an interest in adjudicating an
action involving a resident, the fact that Ellicott sought its fortune away from
Maryland diminished the state's interest. Moreover, no indication existed that
Ellicott could not receive a fair hearing in an Australian tribunal, whereas
litigating in Maryland would impose a heavy burden on Holland.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the issues in Ellicott implicated fun-
damental social policies affecting international trade, business, and sovereignty
concerns that weighed against the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction.
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Further, because Ellicott performed the general contract for an Australian
corporation, Minproc used the sand dredge in Australia, and the merits of
the case involved an Australian labor dispute and Australian shipping delays,
the court believed that the Australian judicial system could best adjudicate the
Holland/Ellicott dispute. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judg-
ment of the district court.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Ellicott represents a rare instance where
the assertion of personal jurisdiction over an alien defendant is unreasonable
even though minimum contacts exist.5 0 Generally, the exercise of jurisdiction,
even over an alien defendant, is proper once a court finds that the defendant
has minimum contacts with the forum state.' Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit's
application of the reasonableness analysis in Ellicott was consistent with the
analysis of other circuits. 52 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the circum-
stances of this case, in particular the significant connection with Australia and
the burdens and inefficiency that would result if the court required Holland
to litigate in Maryland, weighed against the reasonableness of jurisdiction.
The outcome in Ellicott indicates that the reasonableness determination, in
addition to the minimum contacts determination, will be the decisive factor
in cases where a court exercises personal jurisdiction over a foreign national.
VI. CoNsTITuTONAL LAW
A. Privileges and Immunities Clause
Virginia statute establishing harvesting fee for nonresident
commercial fisherman violates Privileges and Immunities
Clause.
Tangier Sound Waterman's Ass'n v. Pruitt
4 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 1993)
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 of the
United States Constitution prohibits a state from discriminating against citizens
of other states in their practice of certain fundamental rights. 3 The United
States Supreme Court has included among these rights the right to a common
150. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116 (stating that exercise of jurisdiction is rarely improper
when defendant has purposefully engaged in forum activities).
151. See id. at 114 (stating that interests of forum and of plaintiff in exercise of jurisdiction
often outweigh concerns with burdens placed on alien defendant once court has established
minimum contacts).
152. See A.I. Trade Fin. Inc., v. Petra Bank, 989 F.2d 76, 83 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that
several factors are evaluated to determine whether exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable once
court finds minimum contacts); Grand Entertainment Group, LTD. v. Star Media Sales, Inc.,
988 F.2d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that court must consider five factors Supreme Court
has set out for determining reasonableness of jurisdiction); Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A. Inc.,
965 F.2d 1014, 1028 (lth Cir. 1992) (same); Irving v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 864
F.2d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1989) (same).
153. U.S. CONsr. art. IV, § 2.
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calling,'4 the right to purchase or inherit property,15 and the right to travel
for purposes of employment.5 6 Yet, the Privileges and Immunities Clause is
not absolute and does not prevent a state from discriminating against out-of-
state citizens where there exists a substantial state interest in doing so.,"
In Toomer y. Witsell,58 the United States Supreme Court developed the
inquiry that a court must make when reviewing an out-of-state citizen's claim
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Specifically, a court must deter-
mine if valid independent reasons exist for the state's discriminatory treatment
and if the level of discrimination relates closely to these reasons. 59 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had applied the Toomer
standard most recently in O'Reilly v. Board of Appeals60 where it presented
a two-step test. First, the court must determine whether the right that the
state seeks to regulate is sufficiently fundamental to the livelihood of the
country and its citizens so as to fall among those rights that the Privilege and
Immunities Clause protects.' 61 Second, the court must decide whether the state
restriction of this privilege relates closely to the furthering of a substantial
state interest. 62
In Tangier Sound Waterman's Ass'n v. Pruitt,6 1 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered the constitutionality, under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, of a Virginia statute establishing a "special
nonresidential harvester's license." Virginia Code Section 28.1-47.1, which
took effect January 1, 1992, increased the fee for a nonresident commercial
fisherman's harvester license from $350 to $1,150 per year. In the past,
nonresident commercial fishermen also had been responsible for all license
fees that resident commercial fishermen paid. When passing the statute, the
General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia explained that the
increased fee would generate money for the enhancement and conservation of
the commonwealth's fishery resources. The new fee reflected the total expenses
for the management and research of fisheries in 1989-90 divided by the number
of resident commercial fisherman.
Prior to the enactment of the statute, no party had challenged the
commonwealth's assessing of a harvester license fee to nonresidents. Following
the enactment, however, the Tangier Sound Waterman's Association and
individual fishermen from Maryland (collectively, the Fishermen) filed suit
against the Commissioner of the Virginia Marine Resources Commission (the
Commissioner) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
154. Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 387 (1978).
155. Id.
156. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524-25 (1978).
157. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948).
158. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
159. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 395-96.
160. 942 F.2d 281, 284 (4th Cir. 1991).
161. O'Reilly v. Board of Appeals, 942 F.2d 281, 284 (4th Cir. 1991).
162. Id.
163. 4 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 1993).
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Virginia. The Fishermen claimed that the statute violated the Privileges and
Immunities, the Commerce, the Equal Protection, and the Supremacy Clauses
of the Constitution and that federal vessel enrollment laws preempted the
nonresident fee. Subsequently, the district court held that the statute violated
the Privileges and Immunities Clause and permanently enjoined its enforce-
ment. The district court rejected the Fishermen's other claims on their merits,
and the Commissioner filed an appeal on the privileges and immunities ruling.
The Fourth Circuit introduced its analysis of the privileges and immunities
claim with a summary of the Supreme Court's standard in Toomer and the
Fourth Circuit's application of that standard in O'Reilly. The court dealt
briefly with the first step of the O'Reilly test by finding that the privilege at
issue was one that the clause protected. The court noted the lack of dispute
between the parties over whether the privilege involved was a protected
privilege-"the right to earn a living"-and whether the statute restricted this
privilege.
The court of appeals then examined the second step of the O'Reilly
analysis and explained the Commissioner's claim that a substantial state interest
relating to the discrimination existed. First, the Commissioner contended that
the nonresident fee served a substantial state interest by keeping Virginia
taxpayers from subsidizing the costs of nonresident fishermen. The statute
specifically sought to recoup the nonresident fishermen's share of expenses in
managing fishery resources. Payment of these expenses by Virginia taxpayers
solely, the Commissioner asserted, would be unfair to residents. Second, the
Commissioner explained that the state interest related to the discrimination
that nonresident fishermen experienced because, under Toomer, a state may
charge nonresidents a fee that compensates for any added enforcement burden
or for any conservation expenditures from Virginia-paid taxes that nonresidents
create.
The Fourth Circuit, however, found that the evidence did not support
allowing the Commonwealth to discriminate against nonresident fishermen.
The nonresident fee, as the General Assembly had calculated it, did not achieve
the desired goal of equal treatment of residents and nonresidents. The Com-
monwealth computed the nonresident fee by dividing expenditures on all
recreational and commercial fishermen by the number of resident commercial
fishermen only, and such a computation results in unfairly charging nonresident
fishermen for programs that benefit all fishermen. Moreover, in enacting the
statute, the Commonwealth did not consider other fees and taxes that both
resident and nonresident fishermen already were paying to the Commonwealth
of Virginia.
The court of appeals did agree that Toomer allows a state to discriminate
against nonresidents if the state tries to advance a substantial state interest
and, specifically, if the state distributes the costs approximately evenly to both
groups. Therefore, a state can impose a higher fee on nonresident fishermen
if the purpose of that fee is to place the burden equally on resident and
nonresident fishermen. In this instance, the Commonwealth did not show that
it created a method of allocating costs that resulted in an equal burden on
both groups. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the statute plainly did not
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relate to the advancement of the state interest that the Commissioner proposed
and therefore determined that it did not need to decide whether that interest
was substantial.
Tangier Sound demonstrates the specific method by which the Fourth
Circuit analyzes potential violations of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the United States Constitution under the Toomer v. Witsell test. Other
courts of appeals, however, have placed little reliance on Toomer and have
relied more on recent United States Supreme Court decisions that cite Toomer.'6
For example, the First Circuit'6 has relied on Hicklin v. Orbeck,'" in which
the Supreme Court determined that the constitutionality of discrimination
against nonresidents depended on whether there was a substantial reason for
the discrimination against nonresidents, whether they were the peculiar source
of an evil at which the statute was aimed, and whether there was a reasonable
relationship between the danger that the nonresidents represented and the
discrimination. 67 The Sixth Circuit'6 has cited United Building & Construction
Trades Council v. Camden,169 where the Supreme Court stated that application
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to a state's act of discrimination
against out-of-state residents involves a two-pronged test similar to that stated
in Toomer.70 Finally, the Third 7' and Seventh'7 Circuits have relied on
Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper,73 which held that any barrier to
nonresidents would violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause unless justified
by a substantial reason for differentiating between residents and nonresidents. 74
164. Compare Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267,
1285 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 977 (1993) and Thorstenn v. Barnard, 842 F.2d
1393, 1398 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 489 U.S. 546 (1989) (both relying on test from 1985 decision
in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper) with Alerding v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic
Ass'n, 779 F.2d 315, 316 (6th Cir. 1985) (relying on two-pronged test from 1984 decision in
United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden) and Piper v. Supreme Court of New
Hampshire, 723 F.2d 110, 113 (Ist Cir. 1983), aff'd, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) (relying on 1978
decision in Hicklin v. Orbeck).
165. Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 723 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 1983), aff'd,
470 U.S. 274 (1985). On review, the United States Supreme Court presented a detailed Privileges
and Immunities Clause analysis, which several circuits have adopted.
166. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
167. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 (1978).
168. Alerding v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 779 F.2d 315, 316 (6th Cir. 1985).
169. 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
170. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 218 (1984)
(creating test where court must determine whether challenged act burdens one of privileges
and immunities that clause protects and whether justification exists to render discrimination
permissible; for latter, court must consider whether substantial reason for discrimination exists
and whether this discrimination relates substantially to state's objective in enacting discrimi-
natory statute).
171. Thorstenn v. Barnard, 842 F.2d 1393, 1398 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 489 U.S. 546
(1989).
172. Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 1285 (7th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 977 (1993).
173. 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
174. See Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 280 (1985) (applying
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In fact, in Friedman v. Supreme Court of Virginia,17 the Fourth Circuit itself
combined the methodology of Toomer, Hicklin, and Piper in its analysis of
a privileges and immunities issue. Nevertheless, all of these opinions basically
follow the test that the Supreme Court articulated in Toomer. The only
difference in analysis among the circuits is the exact Supreme Court decision
on which a certain circuit relies.
B. Supremacy Clause
Imposition of municipal service fee upon federal agencies
that own property in municipality violates principle of
federal tax immunity.
United States v. City of Huntington
999 F.2d 71 (4th Cir. 1993)
Under the principle of federal tax immunity, states may not, consistent
with the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, directly tax the
federal government or its instrumentalities. 176 Although the courts have varied
in their application of the federal immunity doctrine, the United States Supreme
Court "has never questioned the propriety of absolute immunity from state
taxation."7
In United States v. City of Huntington,7 1 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether the City of Huntington,
West Virginia (City) had the authority to impose a municipal service fee upon
federal agencies that own property in the City. The Fourth Circuit concluded
that the service fee constituted a tax from which the federal government was
immune. In 1985, the City enacted an ordinance that imposed a "fire service
fee" against owners of residential and commercial buildings. In 1990, the City
combined this fee with a "flood protection fee," creating a single "municipal
service fee." The City assessed the fee on the basis of square footage of
buildings in the City. Property owners with delinquent accounts were subject
to civil penalties.
The City assessed the fee against federal agencies owning property in
Huntington, including the General Services Administration (GSA) and the
United States Postal Service (USPS). The City assessed penalties and instituted
standard laid out in Toomer and Hicklin by explaining in further detail that, in first step,
substantial reason for discrimination does not exist unless something indicates that non-citizens
constitute peculiar source of evil at which state aims its statute and, in second step, even with
source of "evil," reasonable relationship must exist between danger presented by non-citizens
and discrimination; moreover, when deciding close relationship to state's objective, court may
consider availability of less restrictive means).
175. 822 F.2d 423, 426 (4th Cir.), aff'd, 487 U.S. 923 (1987).
176. See U.S. Cowsr. art. VI, cl. 2 (providing for supremacy of federal law); M'Culloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819) (establishing general principle that states may
not tax United States).
177. United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 733 (1982).
178. 999 F.2d 71 (4th Cir. 1993).
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collection proceedings in state court after the two agencies refused to pay the
fee. The United States then filed a complaint in federal court that requested
that the court enjoin assessment or collection of the tax against the agencies.
The GSA and the USPS also petitioned the court to declare them immune
from the fees. The District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia
ruled that the GSA and the USPS were subject to the fees. The United States
appealed.
The Fourth Circuit indicated that if the service fee constituted a tax, then
clearly the agencies would have immunity. According to the Fourth Circuit,
the Supreme Court has never established a specific standard for determining
whether a particular assessment constitutes a tax. However, the Supreme Court
has consistently held that this determination must consider "the real nature
of the tax and its effect upon the federal right asserted.' ' 79 The Fourth Circuit
concluded that to ascertain the real nature of the assessment, the proper
analysis must assess the economic realities underlying the circumstances in a
particular case.
The Fourth Circuit applied two tests that the District Court used in making
its determination. 80 The first test asked whether the service fee would entail
an enforced contribution to provide for the support of government.,8' The
second test, which courts established in the context of bankruptcy claim
priority contests, analyzed the elements of a tax: "(a) An involuntary pecuniary
burden, regardless of name, laid upon individuals or property; (b) Imposed
by, or under authority of the legislature; (c) For public purposes, including
the purpose of defraying expenses of government of undertakings authorized
by it; and (d) Under the police or taxing power of the state."' 82 The Fourth
Circuit concluded that the City's "municipal service fee" clearly qualified as
a tax under this definition.
The Fourth Circuit distinguished "user fees" from taxes. The court
indicated that the United States must pay reasonable user fees. However, not
every assessment associated with some state-provided benefit would constitute
a user fee. The court defined user fees as payments given in return for a
government-provided benefit. In contrast, taxes represent a coerced contribu-
179. United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 184 (1944) (quoting Carpenter
v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367-68 (1930)), overruled by United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S.
466 (1958).
180. The District Court used a third test adopted from United States v. Maine, 524 F.
Supp. 1056 (D. Me. 1981), which the Fourth Circuit found inapplicable to this matter because
it derived from cases that addressed the more limited principle of state immunity from federal
taxation. See United States v. City of Columbia, 914 F.2d 151, 153-54 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding
that three-part test established in state immunity case was not applicable to federal immunity
case because states' immunity from federal taxation is more limited than federal government's
immunity from state taxation).
181. See United States v. Maryland, 471 F. Supp. 1030, 1036 (D. Md. 1979) (holding that
state environmental surcharge was tax because benefits financed from surcharge accrued to
general public).
182. United States v. City of Huntington, 999 F.2d 71, 73 n.4 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting
In re Lorber Indus., 675 F.2d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 1982)).
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tion for the support of government. The court found that the liability of the
GSA and the USPS for the City's "user fee" would arise from the agencies'
status as property owners, and not from their use of a City service. The court
considered fire and flood protection and street maintenance core government
functions. The court reasoned that the City could not transform a tax for
such services into a "user fee" by simply dividing the tax into its constituent
parts, such as a "fire service fee." The Fourth Circuit concluded that the
City's service fee qualified as a tax; the GSA and the USPS were therefore
immune from the City's assessment. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit reversed
the decision of the district court, and remanded with instructions to enter
judgment for the United States.
The decision of the Fourth Circuit in City of Huntington is consistent
with other courts' interpretations of the federal immunity doctrine. 8 The
court's approach to determining whether a "user fee" or "service fee"
constitutes a tax also comports with the United States Supreme Court's analysis
in National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States.' In finding that an
"annual fee" that the Federal Communications Commission charged cable
television operators constituted an unauthorized tax, the Supreme Court in-
dicated that a "fee" connotes a "benefit" conferred upon an individual or
group that other members of society do not share. 85 A "tax," however,
applies without regard to benefits to an individual taxpayer; the sole assessment
criterion is the ability to pay, based on property or income. 86 Moreover, in
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. City of New York,'87 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that the label that a local
government applies to an assessment does not determine whether the assessment
is a tax. 8 The Fourth Circuit's opinion in City of Huntington clearly instructs
local governments that they cannot circumvent the federal government's im-
munity from taxation by using the label "service fee" to disguise a levy that,
in effect, constitutes a tax.
183. See United States v. City of Spokane, 918 F.2d 84, 86 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
no state can impose tax upon instrumentality of United States), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2888
(1991); United States v. City of Columbia, 914 F.2d 151, 153 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding federal
government immune from taxation by states absent congressional authorization); United States
v. Hawkins County, 859 F.2d 20, 22 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that state may not levy tax
directly upon United States or its closely connected agent or instrumentality), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1005 (1989); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 665 F.
Supp. 402, 409 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (finding that federal government, its agencies, and its
instrumentalities are immune from all form of taxation and that immunity extends not only
to general taxation but also to special assessments for local improvements), aff'd, 848 F.2d
436 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 893 (1988).
184. 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
185. National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-41 (1974).
186. Id.
187. 882 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1989).
188. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. City of New York, 882 F.2d 710, 715 (2d Cir.
1989) (holding that federal statute exempting Amtrak from "taxes and other fees" assessed
by state or local authorities did not apply to rent that Amtrak paid city under leases).
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C. Freedom of Speech
Fraternity's "ugly woman contest" receives First
Amendment protection.
Iota Chi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity
v. George Mason University
993 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1993)
Many schools in recent years have attempted to regulate student
conduct that is offensive to other students, but such regulation may violate
the First Amendment. In Texas v. Johnson,8 9 the Supreme Court laid out
a two-part test for determining whether conduct is sufficiently communi-
cative to deserve First Amendment protection. First, a court must find an
intent to convey a particular message. Second, a significant probability
must exist that others will understand the message.9' If conduct meets the
Johnson test, the First Amendment protects that conduct. However, the
Supreme Court has held that content-based regulation of protected ex-
pression is allowable to serve compelling state interests.' 9' In particular,
schools have a compelling interest in regulating the educational environ-
ment. 92 Thus, confusion exists as to what level of regulation universities
may impose on student conduct that is offensive to others.
In Iota Chi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Uni-
versity, 93 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
considered whether university sanctions of a fraternity for holding an
''ugly woman contest" violated that fraternity's First Amendment right
to freedom of expression. The appellee, the Iota Chi Chapter of Sigma
Chi Fraternity, held an "ugly woman contest" in the cafeteria of the
student union of George Mason University. Eighteen members of the
Fraternity dressed as caricatures of women. One participant painted himself
black, wore pillows inside his clothing, and spoke in slang. The university's
administration argued that the activity was both sexist and racist. The
university imposed sanctions on the fraternity limiting its social activities
and requiring the fraternity to plan and implement an educational program
addressing diversity and feminine concerns.
In response, the fraternity filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment
and injunctive relief against the university's sanctions under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The fraternity claimed that the sanctions violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary
judgment to the fraternity on its First Amendment claim, and the university
189. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
190. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
191. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 509-10
(1991).
192. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
193. 993 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1993).
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appealed on the theory that the district court should have considered
certain factual issues which remained in question. The university argued
that a proper hearing on the issue required greater consideration of whether
the fraternity's intent was expressive and of the harm caused to the
educational environment.
Although the Fourth Circuit agreed that summary judgment is not
appropriate where factual issues are in dispute if such issues are material
to the outcome, the court found no such material issue in dispute. First,
the court considered whether the fraternity's performance deserved con-
stitutional protection. The court recognized that live entertainment gen-
erally deserves protection as expressive conduct and that even entertainment
apparently devoid of ideas may qualify for protection because of the
difficulty of evaluating the content of speech. The court found that the
level or quality of the entertainment is not a significant consideration and
that the fraternity's skit, as live entertainment, was inherently expressive
and deserving of First Amendment protection.
The court then addressed the university's argument that the skit was
simply mindless fun and not artistic expression. The university argued that
a proper hearing required further argument to evaluate the fraternity's
intent under the Johnson test. The university, however, had presented
affidavits asserting that the message of the fraternity's activity was contrary
to the university's philosophy and purpose. The court found that these
affidavits were themselves an admission that the fraternity's conduct met
the first prong of the Johnson test-that the conduct was intended to
convey a message. The court emphasized that the university's affidavits
acknowledged that the university intended the sanctions to punish the
fraternity because the message inherent in its conduct interfered with the
well-being of the university community. The court viewed these statements
as admissions that the university thought the fraternity intended to convey
a message. Though the court believed the fraternity did not intend to
convey exactly that message for which the university sanctioned the fra-
ternity, the court determined that the fraternity did intend to treat the
university's concern over sexual and racial issues with humor. Therefore,
the court believed no further argument over whether the activity satisfied
the first prong of the Johnson test was necessary. The court also found
that the activity met the second prong of the Johnson test because of the
probability that the audience would understand the fraternity's humorous
message.
Finally, the court compared this case to R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul.'
94
In R.A. V., the Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance which banned
symbols aggravating racial or gender tensions, but allowed those reflecting
more acceptable ideas. 95 Similarly, the university in Sigma Chi sanctioned
the fraternity to counteract ideas in conflict with the university's ideals.
194. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
195. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2547 (1992).
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While the university had a substantial interest in promoting its ideals
of gender equality and freedom from racism, the court found that this
interest did not outweigh the constitutional interest of the fraternity.
Rather, the court concluded that the university had many constitutionally
permissable alternatives available and ought not achieve its goals through
limitations on speech. Based on this reasoning, the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the decision of the district court.
In his concurrence, Judge Murnaghan asserted that the court had gone
farther than necessary by invalidating university prohibitions on offensive
conduct. He argued that the court should grant the fraternity's suit because
the university had punished the fraternity for an activity the university
had itself given permission for. Judge Murnaghan concluded that the
university's sanctions were acceptable in themselves because the university
had designed them narrowly to serve a compelling interest.
Debate over universities' ability to infringe on the right of their
students to freedom of expression has become common in recent years as
universities restructure their codes of conduct to be more sensitive to the
concerns of minority students. 9 6 Prior to this decision, however, only
three district courts had considered the validity of university conduct codes
banning offensive speech.
97
The Fourth Circuit is the first appellate court to consider whether
universities may punish students for offensive speech. The Sigma Chi
decision strikes a firm blow in defense of the First Amendment. Five years
earlier, however, in Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neill,98
the Fourth Circuit upheld similar university regulations of student conduct.
In that case, the court considered whether the University of Virginia could
ban shanties that students had constructed on university property and near
a historical monument. The court affirmed this university regulation
because the regulation was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling gov-
ernment interest (aesthetics), it left open other channels of communication,
and it was content neutral. 99
196. See generally Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives
in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 343 (1991) (discussing campus racism and constitutional
implications of attempts to deal with it); Lauri A. Ebel, University Anti-Discrimination Codes
v. Free Speech, 23 N.M. L. RaV. 169 (1993) (discussing constitutionality of campus speech
codes); Carol W. Napier, Can Universities Regulate Hate-Speech After Doe v. University of
Michigan?, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 991 (1991) (discussing Doe and application of that decision).
197. See Iota Chi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 773 F. Supp.
792, 795 (E.D. Va. 1991) (invalidating university sanctions for offensive speech as violative of
First Amendment); UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp.
1163, 1177, 1180 (E. D. Wis. 1991) (holding that University of Wisconsin's speech code was
vague and overbroad and violated student's First Amendment rights); Doe v. University of
Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 886-87 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (striking down University of Michigan's
prohibition on offensive speech because it was vague and overbroad).
198. 838 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1988).
199. Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neill, 838 F.2d 735, 736, 737 (4th Cir.
1988).
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The difference in outcome between S.A.A.C. v. O'Neill and Sigma
Chi v. George Mason appears to result from the court's perception in the
former case that the prohibition was content neutral. The First Amendment
does not prohibit university regulation of student conduct that is content
neutral, and it does not prohibit content based regulation that serves a
sufficiently compelling interest if there is no less restrictive alternative.
Prohibitions of offensive speech reflect university judgments about what
is acceptable and are inherently not content neutral: They can survive only
if they serve a sufficiently compelling state interest and if there are no
less restrictive means of achieving that interest. Since universities do have
less restrictive means of maintaining an environment conducive to learning,
university limitations on speech probably will continue to fail constitutional
muster in the Fourth Circuit.
D. Defamation
Church of Scientology is a public figure and must make a
showing of actual malice to establish a claim for
defamation.
Church of Scientology International v. Daniels
992 F.2d 1329 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 195 (1993)
The United States Supreme Court, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan ,20
held that a public official, in order to recover for defamation, must prove
that the defendant published the challenged statement with actual malice. 20 ,
The Sullivan Court defined actual malice as either the knowledge of falsity
or reckless disregard for the veracity of the published statement. 202 Numerous
cases since Sullivan have helped develop the bare standards that decision
asserts. 203 Against the background of this line of case law, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Church of Scientology Inter-
national v. Daniels,204 considered whether a public figure libel plaintiff
produced evidence upon which a jury could find that the defendant made
the challenged statement with the requisite actual malice. The Daniels court
also considered the plaintiff's contention that the district court erroneously
denied a motion to compel discovery.
200. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
201. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). See generally Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (extending requirement of proving actual malice
to public figures as well as to public officials).
202. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
203. See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 692
(1989) (noting that purposeful avoidance of truth can constitute evidence of reckless disregard
for truth); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (stating that sufficient evidence
must exist to show defendant seriously doubted truth of challenged statement); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (requiring plaintiff to show that defendant made false
publication with high degree of awareness of probable falsity).
204. 992 F.2d 1329 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 195 (1993).
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The plaintiff in Daniels, the Church of Scientology International (CSI),
attacked Eli Lilly & Company, the manufacturer of the anti-depression drug
Prozac, through a series of full page advertisements in USA Today News-
paper. In response, the Vice President of Eli Lilly, Mitchell Daniels, met
with the editorial board of USA Today. USA Today later quoted Daniels
as saying that the Church of Scientology was not a church, but a commercial
enterprise organized only to make money, and that every judge who had
ever considered the Scientology movement had reached the same conclusion.
CSI brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, alleging that Daniels's statements were both false and
defamatory, and demanded both compensatory and punitive damages. The
district court granted Daniels's motion for summary judgment and deter-
mined that the challenged statement was not defamatory as a matter of
law. The district dourt also held that CSI failed to produce enough evidence
upon which a jury could find, by clear and convincing evidence, that Daniels
made the statement with actual malice.
Appealing the grant of defendant's summary judgment motion, CSI
alleged that the published statement was defamatory per se in that a jury
could find that the statement was harmful to CSI's religious organization.
Daniels, on appeal, countered with three arguments. First, Daniels asserted
that the challenged statement referred only to the Church of Scientology in
general, and therefore did not specifically target CSI. Second, Daniels
contended that CSI could not make the necessary showing that the chal-
lenged statement was harmful to CSI's trade or business because CSI
conceded that it suffered no actual damages. Third, Daniels argued that
CSI failed to produce evidence upon which a jury could find that Daniels
made the statement with actual malice.
-The Fourth Circuit, finding the actual malice issue determinative, refused
to address Daniels's first two arguments. The Daniels court began by
considering CSI's assertion that the two primary court opinions upon which
Daniels purportedly based his statement had actually concluded that the
Scientology movement was a "church." CSI argued that this implied that
Daniels had knowledge of the falsity of his statement. After examining the
opinions in question, the Fourth Circuit determined that a reader could
interpret the opinions to support either contention. Therefore, although
Daniels's statement arguably may have been incorrect, his statement con-
stituted neither deliberate falsification nor knowing fabrication.
The Daniels court also rejected CSI's contention that the court could
impute actual malice from Daniels's failure to conduct extensive research
on the subject before he made the challenged statement. Instead, the court
found ample evidence on the record that Daniels based his statement on a
voluminous collection of articles and commentary that detailed the numerous
allegations of scandal and impropriety directed toward the Scientology
movement. Although the Fourth Circuit declined to assign probative value
to the articles, the court determined that their descriptions of the plaintiff's
organization were sufficiently incompatible with general notions of a "church"
to defeat a contention that Daniels may have harbored a substantial doubt
as to the accuracy of the challenged statement.
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After disposing of the defamation issue, the Fourth Circuit addressed
CSI's contention that the magistrate erroneously denied CSI the ability to
compel USA Today to produce material pertaining to the editorial board
meeting. After noting the defendant's offer to stipulate to the accuracy of
the challenged statement and CSI's failure to pursue alternative methods of
obtaining the privileged material, the court determined that the magistrate's
denial of additional discovery was not in error.
The Fourth Circuit's relatively straightforward application of defamation
law in Daniels is neither unique nor controversial. The interesting aspect of
Daniels is the court's treatment of questions concerning the legal status of
the Scientology movement. 25 Although the Fourth Circuit specifically re-
fused to hold that Daniels's statement that the Church of Scientology was
not a true "church" was accurate, the Daniels court appeared to indicate
that the statement was accurate by noting that a great volume of reputable
articles supported the challenged statement. 206 The Fourth Circuit's treatment
of this question, coupled with the Ninth Circuit's decision to revoke the
tax-exempt status of the Church of Scientology of California, 2 7 seems to
raise doubts as to the legal status of the Scientology movement as a religion.
E. Prisoners' Rights of Access to Courts
Prison officials' confiscation of inmate's legal materials
contained on contraband computer disks does not infringe
unconstitutionally on inmate's right of access to courts.
Bryant v. Muth
994 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1993)
The United States Supreme Court, in Ex Parte Hull,20 established that
prisoners have a constitutional right of access to courts.209 This right of
205. See Church of Scientology Int'l v. Daniels, 992 F.2d 1329, 1334 (4th Cir.) (noting
that courts lack authority to assign "religion" status to organizations), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 195 (1993). Specifically, the court left open for future consideration the question of whether
an organization such as CSI could make a defamation claim without alleging that it suffered
actual damages. Id. at 1332.
206. Id. at 1333-34 (detailing number and scope of articles supplied by defendant for
record which tended to provide support for opinion professed in challenged statement).
207. See Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 823 F.2d 1310, 1315 (9th Cir. 1987)
(upholding revocation of tax exemption claimed by Church on basis that Church did not
operate exclusively for religious purposes), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988); see also United
States v. Church of Scientology, 973 F.2d 715, 716 n.1 (9th Cir. 1992) (gathering cases dealing
with tax status and tax liability of various entities within Scientology movement).
208. 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
209. See Ex parle Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 548-49 (1941) (holding that regulation requiring
prison officials' approval to file legal documents with courts is invalid); see also Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (stating that prisoners have fundamental right of adequate
and meaningful access to courts); Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345, 1348 (4th Cir. 1978)
(stating that threat of physical harm to prisoner for continuing pursuit of judicial relief imposes
unconstitutional limitation on prisoner's right of access to courts), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913
(1979); Blanks v. Cunningham, 409 F.2d 220, 221 (4th Cir. 1969) (stating that prison officials'
denial of reasonable opportunities for prisoner to communicate with his attorney concerning
validity of conviction constitutes impairment of access to courts).
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legal access imposes an affirmative duty on prison officials to assist prisoners
in filing legal papers with the courts, either by providing prisoners with an
adequate legal library or by providing them with access to persons with
legal training. 210 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
has held that prison officials that confiscate or destroy prisoners' legal
materials or deny prisoners writing supplies violate prisoners' constitutional
right of access to the courts21 and create grounds for a civil suit against
the offending prison officials.
Prison officials may not promulgate regulations that infringe upon
prisoners' constitutional rights unless such regulations reasonably serve
legitimate penological interests.212 Prisoners also have a clear right of access
to courts. Nonetheless, federal courts are reluctant to interfere with the
internal administration of prisons. 213 In addition, government officials per-
forming discretionary duties receive qualified immunity from 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 suits if their conduct does not violate established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would know. 2 4 In Bryant
210. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828 (requiring prison authorities to provide inmates with
assistance from legally trained personnel or with access to adequate law libraries).
211. See Carter v. Hutto, 781 F.2d 1028, 1032 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that confiscation
or destruction of prisoner's legal materials during cell search by prison officials infringes on
prisoner's right of access to courts); Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir.
1975) (holding that prisoner's contention that he was denied access to courts when denied use
of legal and writing materials raised genuine issue of material fact in § 1983 action). Other
circuits also have held that destruction of legal materials and denial of writing supplies can
constitute denial of access to courts. See Simmons v. Dickhaut, 804 F.2d 182, 184 (Ist Cir.
1986) (holding that failure to return personal legal materials after three requests is adequate
to show intentional deprivation of right of access to courts); Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d
964, 968 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that allegation of denial of access to personal legal papers
and books constitutes claim of denial of access to courts); Patterson v. Mintzes, 717 F.2d 284,
288 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that prison officials' failure to return necessary legal materials to
transferred prisoner until two weeks after judicial proceeding constitutes denial of access to
courts); Hiney v. Wilson, 520 F.2d 589, 591 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that confiscation of
prisoner's legal papers may constitute denial of access to courts); Sigafus v. Brown, 416 F.2d
105, 107 (7th Cir. 1969) (holding deprivation of materials needed for reasonable access to
courts grounds for damages in civil suit); DeWitt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682, 686 (9th Cir. 1966)
(holding that confiscation of transcript of state court conviction prior to appeal constitutes
interference with right of access to courts).
212. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (holding prison regulations compromising
prisoners' constitutional rights legitimate if they reasonably serve valid penological interests).
213. See id. at 85 (stating that courts should exercise restraint and show deference to
legislative and executive branches regarding prison administration because they possess requisite
expertise); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584-85 (1984) (stating that courts should defer
to expert judgment of prison officials absent substantial evidence of exaggerated response to
security concerns); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981) (stating that courts should
not assume that prison officials are insensitive to constitutional standards or ignorant of
rehabilitation methods).
214. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (holding that for liability to
exist, right must be sufficiently clear so that reasonable official would know action violates
right); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (stating that objective reasonableness
of government official's conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law, determines
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v. Muth," 5 the Fourth Circuit considered whether prison regulations calling
for confiscation of contraband computer disks violated an inmate's consti-
tutional right of access to courts when the disks contained that inmate's
legal materials and whether prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity
for such actions.
In Bryant, the plaintiff, Victor George Bryant, a prisoner in the Federal
Correctional Institute in Butner, North Carolina, possessed two computer
disks that allegedly contained documents comprising one year's legal work
that Bryant had done in preparation for postconviction appeals. Bryant also
possessed a third computer disk containing a program used to circumvent
access barriers to prison computers. Bryant did not dispute that he knew
his access was unauthorized. Furthermore, Bryant could have applied to the
Chief Executive Officer of the prison for permission to use the prison
computers for legal work.
On November 13, 1987, prison officials confiscated Bryant's three
computer disks that they believed contained unauthorized legal work. At a
hearing shortly after prison officials confiscated the disks, Bryant testified
that he received the disks from another inmate, who had obtained them
from an instructor who had brought them from home. Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) regulations prohibited Bryant's possession of the disks.216 Therefore,
the prison officials decided that the disks constituted "contraband" subject
to seizure, 2 7 and the officials ordered Bryant to turn the disks over to
defendant William R. Muth, the Supervisor of Education at that time.
Muth gave the disks to defendant Gregg Robbins, a computer instructor at
the prison, and ordered Robbins to reformat the disks. Robbins, however,
neither reformatted the disks nor otherwise destroyed Bryant's legal work.
Approximately two weeks later, Bryant requested a hard copy of his legal
materials. Prison officials gave Bryant a printout comprising about one-
third of the disks' contents.
On March 16, 1988, Bryant filed a pro se request with the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina for a temporary
restraining order barring destruction of the disks. The district court granted
the order. On April 1, 1988, prison officials gave Bryant what they believed
to be a complete printout of the disks' contents. However, because Bryant
had created identical directories on each disk, making one appear to be a
backup of the other, officials mistakenly gave Bryant the contents of only
one of the disks.
The district court held that Bryant's complaint constituted a civil rights
action against Muth and Robbins individually. Relying on Carter v. Hutto,2 s
whether official is entitled to qualified immunity); Mitchell v. Rice, 954 F.2d 187, 190 (4th
Cir.) (stating that plaintiff bears burden of clearly establishing law allegedly violated), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 299 (1992).
215. 994 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1993).
216. See 28 C.F.R. § 553.10 (1993) (listing property that inmates may possess).
217. See 18 U.S.C. § 4012 (1988) (authorizing prison officials to seize contraband); 28
C.F.R. § 553.12(a) (1993) (defining contraband materials).
218. 781 F.2d 1028 (4th Cir. 1986).
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the court ruled further that Bryant's right of reasonable access to courts
entitled him to a complete copy of his legal materials. However, the district
court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground
that Bryant had no further constitutional claim because he had already
received a complete hard copy of his legal materials. Bryant then filed a
motion for reconsideration, claiming that he did not receive a complete
hard copy of all his legal materials. The district court struck its earlier
order and reinstated the complaint. On July 19, 1989, approximately twenty-
one months after seizure of the disks, Bryant received a complete printout
of all legal materials that the disks contained. After Muth and Robbins
again moved to dismiss the complaint, Bryant filed a motion to amend his
complaint to claim monetary damages from Muth and Robbins on the
ground that they illegally confiscated, mutilated, and reformatted the con-
tents of the contraband disks. Bryant claimed that, by failing to give him
a printout of the disks' contents for twenty-one months, Muth and Robbins
denied him access to the courts in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. The district court permitted the amend-
ment and denied defendants' motion to dismiss.
Muth and Robbins then filed for summary judgment, claiming that
Harlow v. Fitzgerald19 entitled them to qualified immunity. The district
court, after concluding that Muth and Robbins were not entitled to qualified
immunity, denied summary judgment. The district court reasoned that
Bryant had a clearly established constitutional right to his legal materials
even though he had no right to possess the contraband disks that contained
the legal materials.
The defendants appealed the denial of summary judgment to the Fourth
Circuit on the ground that the district court improperly denied them qualified
immunity, an appealable final decision. Defendants claimed that the court
should have granted summary judgment on two grounds: first, that they
were entitled to qualified immunity because they followed established BOP
regulations in confiscating Bryant's contraband disks, and second, that
Bryant had no constitutional right to legal materials that he had created
through unauthorized use of prison computers.
To resolve the issue, the court recounted the well-established right of
prisoners to have reasonable access to courts and noted that confiscation
or destruction of an inmate's important legal materials can constitute a
violation of that right. The court then distinguished the facts in Bryant
from the facts in two previous cases in which the Fourth Circuit held
destruction of legal materials to be a violation of the right of access to
courts. In Carter v. Hutto,20 prison officials destroyed legal materials,
including handwritten notes comprising the basis of a habeas corpus attack,
seized during a search of an inmate's cell. 221 In Oxendine v. Williams,
22
219. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
220. 781 F.2d 1028 (4th Cir. 1986).
221. See Carter v. Hutto, 781 F.2d 1028, 1032 (4th Cir. 1986) (concluding that destruction
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the court held that confiscation of legal materials or denial of writing
supplies by prison officials could constitute unreasonable denial of access
to courts.22a The court stated that the facts in Bryant's case differed from
those in Carter and Oxendine because Bryant created his legal materials
utilizing computer disks and computer access he knew to be unauthorized.
The court also recognized the legitimate need to restrict prisoners' access
to computers due to the immense potential for abuse and noted that Muth
and Robbins had statutory authority to confiscate the disks. The court
further stated that giving Bryant a right to his legal materials would allow
him to profit from breaking prison rules. The court reversed the district
court's decision that Bryant had a right to a printout of any materials
contained on the disks on the grounds that the district court failed to
distinguish the facts in this case from those in Oxendine and Carter and
that Bryant clearly violated BOP regulations when creating his legal mate-
rials.
The Fourth Circuit next examined Muth and Robbin's claim of qualified
immunity by noting that previous Supreme Court decisions in Anderson v.
Creighton2 4 and Harlow held that government officials' subjective beliefs
are irrelevant in determining whether their actions deserve qualified immu-
nity. Instead, the inquiry must focus on what a reasonable official in the
same position would believe. For a government official to be held liable,
the unlawfulness of an action must be apparent under pre-existing law. The
court cited Anderson for the proposition that a government official's illegal
action does not necessarily constitute a constitutional violation due to the
possibility of the official's reasonable, though errant, conclusions regarding
the legality of his action. Therefore, in deciding whether qualified immunity
exists, even if a violation of a right occurred, a court must determine
whether an official's actions were reasonable. The court concluded that
Muth and Robbins did not violate any constitutional right knowable to a
reasonable person because they acted under the clear authority of BOP
regulations and thus were entitled to qualified immunity. The court explicitly
noted that prison officials did not deny Bryant his legal materials permanently
and that the delay in retrieving them was due in part to their length and the
cryptic manner that Bryant used to encode the information on his disks.
Although the Fourth Circuit reviewed Bryant on the grounds of qualified
immunity, the case principally addresses limitations on prisoners' right of
access to courts. Bryant limits prisoners' right of access to courts by holding
that even though inmates are entitled to the opportunity to carry out legal
work as a necessary means of access to the courts, they are not entitled to
of prisoner's handwritten legal materials constitutes violation of constitutional right of access
to courts).
222. 509 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1975).
223. See Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding accusation
that prison officials confiscated legal materials and denied writing supplies sufficient to establish
claim of violation of constitutional right of access to courts).
224. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
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do so in a way that violates legitimate prison regulations. The court determined
that Bryant had no constitutional or statutory right to contraband legal
materials; therefore, Muth and Robbins clearly were entitled to qualified
immunity because they did not violate any of Bryant's civil rights in confis-
cating the contraband legal materials.
Prisoners do not have a right to unlimited resources desirable for securing
access to courts. 52s Prison authorities may sometimes restrict prisoners' rights
of access to legal resources when necessary to promote legitimate administra-
tive concerns.2 6 One such resource that Bryant denies them is unlimited access
to prison computers. However, the Bryant court's further approval of con-
fiscating a prisoner's prepared legal materials appears to extend the power of
prison authorities beyond previous cases involving the right of access to
courts. 227 Although the prisoner in this case eventually received a print-out
of his legal work, Bryant v. Muth serves as a warning to prisoners that they
should prepare legal work only on authorized media or otherwise risk con-
fiscation of their materials.
F. Prisoners' Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claims
Prisoner must establish both a serious deprivation of a
basic human need and a deliberate indifference to prison
conditions on the part of prison officials to establish a
claim of cruel and unusual punishment.
Strickler v. Waters
989 F.2d 1375 (4th Cir. 1993)
Although convicted prisoners forfeit many rights as a condition of their
confinement, 22 convicted prisoners do retain several basic rights. For example,
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution establishes an
incarcerated person's freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. 229 Because
routine discomfort is part of the price that an inmate pays for violating the
law,230 an inmate must show both a serious deprivation of a basic human
225. See Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1985)
(concluding that Constitution does not require that prison make typewriters available to
inmates).
226. See Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 606 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding prohibition of
access to main law library permissible due to legitimate security concerns during post-riot
lockdown); Cookish v. Cunningham, 787 F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding temporary
restriction of access to law library during brief quarantine period for security reasons justified).
But see DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442, 448 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding denial of access to
law library and inmate paralegals not justified by generalized security concern and plaintiff
prisoner's classification as security risk).
227. See supra note 211 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which confiscation of
legal materials has constituted denial of access to courts).
228. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545-46 (1979).
229. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII (stating that "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
230. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
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need and a deliberate indifference to prison conditions on the part of prison
officials to establish a prima facia case that prison conditions are cruel and
unusual.2' An incarcerated person also has a right of access to the courts. 212
To establish a violation of this right, most federal courts of appeals require
an inmate to produce evidence that the denial of access to the courts has
caused actual injury 3 or specific harm2. Additionally, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that, where not reasonably
necessary, involuntary exposure of a prisoner's genitals to a prison official
of the opposite sex violates that inmate's constitutional rights . 2 5 In Strickler
v. Waters,236 the Fourth Circuit considered the conditions of incarceration at
the Portsmouth City Jail to determine whether (1) the double bunking of
inmates in the jail rose to the level of a cognizable Eighth Amendment
deprivation; (2) whether the law library at the jail was adequate to insure the
inmates' constitutional right of access to the courts; and (3) whether inad-
vertent exposure of the prisoners' genitals to guards of the opposite sex
constituted a constitutional violation sufficient to support a cause of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
On June 15, 1990, the Circuit Court for the City of Portsmouth sentenced
Robert Dale Strickler (Strickler) to a four-year, four-month prison term.
Because the Virginia Department of Corrections refuses to accept prisoners
with outstanding charges in local jurisdictions, Strickler remained at the
Portsmouth City Jail while awaiting an unrelated trial in the Virginia Beach
Circuit Court.
231. Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir. 1991).
232. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
233. See Shango v. Jurich, 965 F.2d 289, 292 (7th Cir. 1992) (requiring that inmate
demonstrate "detriment" in claim that prison officials denied access to courts); cf. Crawford-
El v. Britton, 951 F.2d 1214, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (requiring that inmate demonstrate adverse
litigation effect in claim that prison officials denied access to courts), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
62 (1992); Sowell v. Vose, 941 F.2d 32, 35 (Ist Cir. 1991) (requiring inmate to demonstrate
meaningful impediment to inmate's participation in legal process); Chandler v. Baird, 926 F.2d
1057, 1062 (11 th Cir. 1991) (requiring that inmate demonstrate adverse litigation effect in claim
that prison officials denied access to courts); Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 932 (6th Cir.
1985) (requiring inmate to demonstrate meaningful impediment to inmate's participation in
legal process); Holoway v. Dobbs, 715 F.2d 390, 392 (8th Cir. 1983) (same).
234. See Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989) (requiring that inmate show
specific instance in which facility denied inmate access to courts); Hudson v. Robinson, 678
F.2d 462, 466 (3rd Cir. 1982) (same); Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 357 (10th Cir. 1978)
(requiring dismissal of or other prejudice to inmate's case from denial of library facilities).
235. Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th Cir. 1981); see also Kent v. Johnson, 821
F.2d 1220, 1226 (6th Cir. 1987) (noting that two circuits recognizing right not to have one's
genitalia viewed by members of opposite sex do not detail constitutional origins of right);
Forts v. Ward, 471 F. Supp. 1095, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (granting injunction against prison's
positioning of male guards so that male guards could observe female prisoners undressing and
using toilets). But cf. Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 494-95 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that
casual observations of prisoners' genitalia by guards of opposite sex do not justify judicial
intervention).
236. 989 F.2d 1375 (4th Cir. 1993).
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Strickler alleged that the Portsmouth City Jail confined him in a seven-
cell block with a day room measuring six and one-half by thirty-eight feet.
Strickler stated that crowded conditions at the jail required some inmates to
double bunk or sleep on mattresses on the floor of the day room. Strickler
further claimed that prison officials limited the prisoners' exercise opportu-
nities to the day room despite the presence of the mattresses. Finally, Strickler
contended that climatological conditions inside the jail were often uncom-
fortable due to inadequate heating and ventilation.
Strickler also alleged that the Portsmouth City Jail law library's book
collection consisted only of the Virginia Code, the United States Code, and
Corpus Juris Secundum. Moreover, Strickler stated that prison officials limited
his use of the library to a period of once every five weeks, although he was
able to receive legal materials from the Portsmouth Circuit Court library
upon request.
Finally, Strickler contended that prisoners' genitals were exposed to female
corrections officers in a "back office" area where prisoners shower, use the
toilet, dress, and receive strip searches. Strickler did not dispute, however,
that shower curtains guarded the male prisoners' intimacy during showers,
and that a counter installed in the back room prevented female corrections
officers from viewing prisoners from the waist down. Further, Strickler did
not allege that a female corrections officer had ever encroached upon his
privacy.
Less than a month after his Virginia Beach trial, the Portsmouth City
Jail transferred Strickler to a state correctional facility. Filing suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, Strickler brought a number of claims alleging violations of his
constitutional rights arising from his 172-day confinement in the Portsmouth
City Jail. Strickler named as defendants Gary Waters, Sheriff of the City of
Portsmouth (Sheriff Waters); the Commonwealth of Virginia; the City of
Portsmouth; and the Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Corrections.
The Commonwealth of Virginia and the City of Portsmouth moved for a
directed verdict, while Sheriff Waters moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the defendants' motions, and Strickler appealed to the
Fourth Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit first considered Strickler's allegations that overcrowd-
ing in the prison violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. The Court began its analysis by noting that a
prisoner claiming an Eighth Amendment violation must establish both a
serious deprivation of a basic human need and a deliberate indifference to
this deprivation on the part of prison officials. Citing Lopez v. Robinson,27
the court reaffirmed its holding that in order to establish a constitutional
violation under the Eighth Amendment capable of withstanding a motion for
summary judgment, a prisoner must suffer serious medical and emotional
237. 914 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1990).
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deterioration as a result of prison conditions.238 The court then noted that it
could see no injury that Strickler had suffered as a result of conditions at
the Portsmouth City Jail. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit held that double
bunking inmates and limiting their exercise opportunities are not constitutional
violations in the absence of some evidence that the complaining prisoner
receives injuries from such practices. Moreover, the court ruled that because
prison officials provided blankets to the inmates during cold nights and fans
were operational during warm days, no evidence existed of unnecessary or
wanton exposure to extreme temperatures. Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that
the conditions at the Portsmouth City Jail failed to rise to the level of an
Eighth Amendment violation.
The Fourth Circuit next addressed Strickler's claim that the inadequacy
of the Portsmouth City Jail law library's book collection and visiting hours
denied his right of access to the courts. Initially, the court observed that
Strickler's confinement at the Portsmouth City Jail was only temporary.
Citing Magee v. Waters,2-9 the court then noted that Strickler failed to allege
that he wanted to research a specific problem or that he suffered an injury
due to the condition of the library. Although Strickler contended that had
the library been adequate, he probably would have found a legal theory to
free him from jail, the court responded that such conclusory allegations do
not show a specific injury sufficient to survive a motion for summary
judgement.
Relying on Chandler v. Baird,240 Sowell v. Vose,241 and Sands v. Lewis, 42
Strickler argued that under the factual allegations in his complaint, the court
should presume prejudice to his litigation. In responding to this argument,
the Fourth Circuit stated that the language Strickler relied upon in Chandler
was dicta and that the Eleventh Circuit specifically held in Chandler that an
inmate deprived of legal materials for a short time must show a resulting
injury. Furthermore, Sowell merely held in dicta that one might deem an
absence of all access to legal materials inherently prejudicial. Although the
Fourth Circuit conceded that Strickler could find arguable support for his
claim in a Ninth Circuit opinion, Sands v. Lewis, the court noted that no
other circuit has followed Sands, nor has the Ninth Circuit consistently
followed Sands. The Fourth Circuit noted that Bounds v. Smith,24 the
Supreme Court case upon which the Sands holding relies, merely held that
the Constitution requires access to the courts, not access to a law library.
Noting that Sands is best understood as dicta, the Fourth Circuit questioned
the Sands holding and declined to follow it. The court also ruled that because
the Portsmouth City Jail is a local facility with a transient population, it
need not provide the same resources as a state prison. Finally, the court held
238. Lopez v. Robinson, 914 F.2d 486, 490 (4th Cir. 1990).
239. 810 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1987).
240. 926 F.2d 1057 (11th Cir. 1991).
241. 941 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1991).
242. 886 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1989).
243. 430 U.S. 817 (1972).
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that a library containing the Virginia Code, the United States Code, and
Corpus Juris Secundum is adequate for a local facility.
As to Strickler's allegation that prison officials unconstitutionally re-
stricted his access to the law library, the Fourth Circuit merely reiterated its
holding in Magee that access to a library for one hour per week is adequate
for a temporary occupant of a penal facility. Moreover, the court added that
Strickler could receive materials from the Portsmouth Circuit Court library
and read them in his cell between library visits, thus insuring Strickler's access
to the courts.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit addressed Strickler's contention that the
possibility of female guards viewing prisoners' genitalia violated his consti-
tutional rights. Noting the presence of shower curtains and a counter that
protected the prisoners' genitals from the view of female guards and that
prison officials made efforts to allow prisoners to anticipate the presence of
female guards in the cell blocks, the court held that no constitutional
deprivation occurred. Moreover, the court upheld the district court's summary
judgment for the defendants on this issue because Strickler's genitals never
had been exposed to a female guard.
The Strickler holding does not break new ground or place the Fourth
Circuit in conflict with most federal jurisdictions, with the exception of the
Fourth Circuit's reaffirmation of an undefined constitutional right of prisoners
not to have their genitals exposed to prison officials of the opposite sex. In
Strickler, the Fourth Circuit expressly rejected the Ninth Circuit's renegade
holding in Sands v. Lewis2 " and ruled instead that the constitutional right of
access to the courts does not require access to a law library for short-term
jail inmates. Finally, Strickler reaffirmed the Fourth Circuit's commitment to
Lopez24s by deeming a motion to dismiss appropriate when an inmate cannot
show serious medical and emotional deterioration as a result of cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
2 4 6
G. Asset Forfeiture
Federal government may not condemn real property under
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act unless such property substantially is connected to the
criminal activity.
United States v. Two Tracts of Real Property
998 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1993)
The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970
affords the federal government the ability to condemn all legal interests in
real property used in the commission of a felony violation of a federal
244. Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989).
245. Lopez v. Robinson, 914 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1990).
246. Id. at 490.
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narcotics law. 247 Congress designed this forfeiture of real property to aid the
government in the attempts to win the war on drugs. The intent of the
forfeiture statutes is not to punish the criminal, but to protect the government
from financial loss. The "fundamental assumption underlying all civil for-
feiture statutes" is that "property devoted to an unlawful purpose is tainted
as an instrumentality of crime and therefore must be condemned." 24
As 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) demonstrates, the pertinent requirement for
forfeiture is that the property be used to facilitate the commission of a
violation of a federal narcotics law that is punishable by more than one year's
imprisonment. However, the statute expressly excludes any property that
facilitates the commission of such a crime without the knowledge or consent
of the owner of that property. The Fourth Circuit, like the First249 and Eighth
Circuits, 210 has interpreted this statute to require that the real property that
the Government seeks to condemn possess a "substantial connection" with
the underlying criminal activity.' Other Circuits have not followed the First,
Fourth and Eighth Circuits' strict construction of the statute. 212 However, as
247. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)
(1988). The statute provides that:
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property
right shall exist in them:
All real property ... in the whole of any lot or tract of land ... which is
used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the
commission of, a violation of this title punishable by more than one year's impris-
onment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the
extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by
that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent
of that owner.
Id.
248. United States v. Two Tracts of Real Property, 998 F.2d 204, 213 (4th Cir. 1993).
249. See United States v. 28 Emery St., 914 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1990) (denying forfeiture
of property).
250. See United States v. 3639-2nd St., N.E., 869 F.2d 1093, 1096-97 (8th Cir. 1989)
(requiring more than "incidental or fortuitous contact" to allow forfeiture).
251. See United States v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying "sub-
stantial connection" standard). In Schifferli, the Fourth Circuit stated that "[the term
'facilitate' implies that the property need only make the prohibited conduct 'less difficult or
more or less free from obstruction or hindrance."' Id. at 990 (quoting United States v. 3639-
2nd St., N.E., 869 F.2d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 1989)); see also United States v. Santoro, 866
F.2d 1538, 1542 (4th Cir. 1989) (inferring substantial connection requirement from "use or
facilitation" language in statute). Santoro involved an appeal by an owner of land that the
government successfully acquired through a § 881(a)(7) civil forfeiture proceeding. Id. at 1541.
The owner challenged both the constitutionality of the statute itself and the broad application
to all of his property rather than just his house. Id. at 1542-43. The Fourth Circuit upheld
the constitutionality of the statute, explaining that the forfeiture was civil rather than criminal
and that the property forfeited had to meet the substantial connection to the criminal activity
test. Id. In response to the owner's other argument, the Fourth Circuit simply stated that
Congress set no quantity limits on the forfeiture provision. Id. at 1542.
252. See United States v. One 1977 Lincoln Mark V Coupe, 643 F.2d 154, 157 (3d Cir.)
(requiring only that conveyances under § 881(a)(4) tend "in any way" to make drug trafficking
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the Eleventh Circuit commented, this different treatment of the "use or
facilitation" requirement in the statute is largely inconsequential. 213
In United States v. Two Tracts of Real Property,2 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether the civil forfeiture
of real property, provided for in § 881(a)(7), allowed the government to arrest
real property that was related to the criminal activity only because it provided
an easement across which the drug smugglers traversed while carrying contra-
band. In 1986, Kenneth Willis, Sr. (Willis Sr.) owned two tracts of land, one
of which landlocked the other. The landlocked parcel, therefore, became the
quasi-dominant tenement, forming a quasi-easement across the quasi-servient
tenement. In 1986, Willis Sr.'s son, Kenny Willis (Kenny) participated in a
drug smuggling operation. The smuggling scheme entailed unloading marijuana
at a marina located on the landlocked parcel, and then transporting the
contraband across the quasi-servient tenement in order to reach the highway.
Sometime between 1986 and 1991, Willis Sr. conveyed the quasi-servient
tenement (the parcel of land across which there had been a quasi-easement)
to Kenny. This transfer occurred after the drug smuggling incident. Upon
transfer to Kenny, the quasi-servient tenement became the servient tenement
for the easement retained by the property of Willis Sr.25 Kenny later subdivided
the parcel into four lots and conveyed two of the lots to a third party, whom
the court assumed to have been an innocent, good-faith purchaser. In 1991,
after his arrest, Kenny pled guilty to violating certain federal narcotics laws.
Pursuant to § 881(a)(7), the Government sought forfeiture of Kenny's remain-
ing two parcels of land because of those parcels' involvement in the drug
smuggling operation. Because Willis Sr. owned the land upon which the
marina was located, the Government did not attempt to compel forfeiture of
that landlocked parcel.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina
held that the Government had not presented probable cause for the forfeiture
of Kenny's real property and, consequently, refused to issue a probable cause
warrant. The district court reasoned that the parcel of land, by merely adjoining
the land upon which the smugglers unloaded the contraband and providing a
quasi-easement, was not so "substantially connected" to the commission of
the crime as to warrant seizure under § 881(a)(7). Four months later, the
easier), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981); see also United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive,
954 F.2d 29, 33 (2d Cir.) (requiring only "nexus" between drug activity and property), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992); United States v. 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490, 493-94 (7th
Cir. 1990) (requiring only that property had "more than an incidental or fortuitous connection"
to the underlying crime), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126 (1991); United States v. 4492 S. Livonia
Rd., 889 F.2d 1258, 1269 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that improper seizure did not bar forfeiture).
253. See United States v. 42450 Highway 441, 920 F.2d 900, 902-03 (11th Cir. 1991)
(stating that "this conflict among the circuits may be more semantic than practical").
254. 998 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1993).
255. See United States v. Two Tracts of Real Property, 998 F.2d 204, 209 n.6 (4th Cir.
1993) (stating that court would refer to servient tenement as quasi-servient tenement throughout
opinion in order to maintain clarity even though quasi-servient tenement became servient
tenement when there was no longer common owner of both parcels of land).
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district court granted Kenny's motion asking the court to cancel the is pendens
that the Government recorded against his property and to dismiss the com-
plaint. The Government appealed from this final order of judgment to the
Fourth Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit resolved the issue of whether the parcels of land
conveyed to Kenny were used, or intended to be used to commit, or to
facilitate the commission of, a felony when the smugglers carried the marijuana
across the land by holding that the land was not substantially connected to
the criminal activity. The court based its conclusion both on prior Fourth
Circuit opinions and the injustice of allowing the government to arrest these
parcels of land merely because Kenny received an interest in them after he
committed the crime.
Applying its reasoning from United States v. Santoro216 and United States
v. Schifferli, 7 the Fourth Circuit addressed the Government's two grounds
for appeal. According to the Government, travelling across the property with
such a large amount of marijuana provided a sufficient connection to the
commission of the crime to satisfy § 881(a)(7). Relying on Santoro, the court
emphasized the fact that the amount of contraband on the property has no
bearing on a court's decision of whether or not to grant a forfeiture. Referring
to both Santoro and Schifferli, the court stated that the Government's con-
tention asks the Fourth Circuit to adopt a rule that the court had already
rejected twice. The court also pointed to the fact that the quasi-servient parcel's
involvement in the smuggling operation was purely necessitous because tra-
versing the easement was the only means by which one could leave the
landlocked parcel. The court noted that the necessity of the smuggler's choice
of routes lessened the likelihood that the land contributed to .the criminal
activity in any way.
The Government's second 6ontention was that forfeiture was appropriate
because the quasi-servient tenement tended to shield from the road any activity
occurring at the marina which was located on the quasi-dominant tenement.
The Fourth Circuit responded that the Government's contention called for a
misapplication of dicta from Schifferli, which was, in addition, distinguishable
from the present case. The court stated that an obstruction's tendency to
conceal a crime does not inevitably lead to the forfeiture of that obstruction.
The court then emphasized intent as the essential distinguishing factor between
the two cases. For instance, in Schifferli, the Government compelled the
forfeiture of a dentist's office that the dentist had been using to conceal
intentionally his illegal activity concerning narcotics. The court stated that in
Schifferli the dentist's intent provided the sufficient connection with the crime.
In the present case, however, the court concluded that the land's physical
concealment of the marina was not a "connection" with the crime.
Finally, the court addressed the fact that Kenny did not acquire an interest
in the quasi-servient tenement until after the commission of the crime. The
256. 866 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1989).
257. 895 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1990).
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court continued that if Willis Sr. had known of and endorsed Kenny's
involvement in the criminal activity or if Kenny had acquired an interest in
the quasi-servient tenement before his involvement, the court might have held
differently. The court was careful to place a limitation on the holding of this
case: possessing a legal interest in property is not a prerequisite to forfeiture
under § 881(a)(7). The court did note, however, that courts must consider the
lack of such an interest in the property when applying the "substantial
connection" test.
In analyzing the justice of its holding, the Fourth Circuit stated that it
would have upheld the government's forfeiture if Kenny had owned the
property at the time he committed the crime. The court commented that
allowing the Government to arrest property merely because a previously
convicted criminal acquires an interest in that property after the commission
of the crime would be unjust, even though that property was indeed a part
of the commission of such crime.
Although differing with respect to how to interpret § 881(a)(7), the courts
have upheld and enforced this statute.218 The Fourth Circuit described this
case as a "rara avis," which refers to the fact that the criminal later obtained
an interest in the property upon which he had committed the crime. Such a
situation has not arisen before under § 881(a)(7). The court stated that the
typical situation involves a criminal who possesses a present property interest
in the real estate connected to the crime. Also, the Fourth Circuit's holding
appears consistent with a literal reading of § 881(a)(7). The statute provides
an exception to the government's right to arrest property that facilitates certain
crimes. This exception protects property that is used without the "knowledge
or consent" of the owner of that property. The property appears to fall within
the exception to the statute because at the time the criminal activity occurred
on the property, Willis Sr. owned that land and did not consent to the criminal
usage of his property. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit's opinion is consistent
with both applicable statutory and case law.
H. Takings
Cable Communications Policy Act does not give cable
companies a right to compel access to private utility
easements.
Media General Cable of Fairfax, Inc. v. Sequoyah
Condominium Council of Co-Owners
991 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1993)
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (Cable Act)2 9 provides
guidelines for the regulation of cable franchisees. Section 621(a)(2) of the
258. See supra notes 249-53 and accompanying text (discussing courts' enforcement of
§ 881(a)(7) through differing interpretations of necessary link between property and criminal
activity).
259. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1988).
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Act authorizes franchisees to construct cable systems "over public rights-
of-way, and through easements" that "have been dedicated for compatible
uses." 260 This language raises the possibility that the Cable Act created a
private cause of action through which a cable company may compel access
to private utility easements. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit has construed the statute to provide a private cause of
action. Specifically, in Centel Cable Television Co. v. Admiral's Cove
Associates, Ltd. ,261 the Eleventh Circuit applied the four-step test announced
in Cort v. Ash262 in determining that the Cable Act created an enforceable
right of access to easements dedicated for public use. 263 In Media General
Cable of Fairfax, Inc. v. Sequoyah Condominium Council of Co-Owners,
264
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that
this provision did not create a cause of action through which a cable
company could compel access to private utility easements.
In 1982, Fairfax County, Virginia granted Media General Cable of
Fairfax, Inc. (Media) a nonexclusive franchise to operate a cable television
system in the county. Media alleged that in 1988 certain residents of
Sequoyah Condominium requested cable service from Media. Sequoyah had,
by an agreement in 1982, contracted with a predecessor of AMSAT Com-
munication, Inc. (AMSAT) to provide cable television service by way of a
satellite master antenna television system. AMSAT held no cable franchise,
but provided television service via satellite and master antenna facilities
located on private property within residential complexes. From those facil-
ities, AMSAT's system transmitted television signals to residents' apartments
through wires located within the complexes.
In accordance with the Master Deed of the Sequoyah Complex, Se-
quoyah granted specific easements to utilities such as Virgina Power and
Electric Company, Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company, and
AMSAT. The grant in favor of AMSAT was exclusive with regard to cable
television. In 1989, pursuant to the Cable Act, Media requested that
Sequoyah allow Media to install its cable wires in the common areas of the
complex through the existing utility easements. Sequoyah refused on the
basis of the exclusivity of the agreement with AMSAT. Sequoyah's refusal
prompted Media to sue for declaratory and equitable relief.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
ruled that the Cable Act created a cause of action in favor of a cable
260. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 621(a)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (1988).
261. 835 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir. 1988).
262. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
263. The test to determine whether a federal statute creates a private cause of action first
considers whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose especial benefit Congress enacted
the statute. Second, the test inquires whether the legislative history indicates an intent to create
or deny such a remedy. Third, the test asks whether implication of a remedy to the plaintiff
would be consistent with the underlying purpose of the regulatory scheme. Finally, the test
examines whether the cause of action is one generally left to state law such that inference of
a federal cause of action would be inappropriate. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
264. 991 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1993).
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operator seeking access to compatible easements within its franchise area,
but that the cause of action could provide access only to compatible
easements dedicated for public use. The district court employed the United
States Supreme Court's analysis in Cort v. Ash to determine whether the
Cable Act created a private cause of action. Applying the Cort v. Ash
analysis, the Media General trial court concluded that Media, as a cable
operator, was clearly within the class for whose benefit Congress enacted
the cable statute. The court further found that the cause of action Media
asserted was not one generally left to state law and that the legislative
history and the underlying purpose of the Cable Act supported the inference
of a private cause of action. These determinations supported the conclusion
that the Cable Act created a private right of action under the Cort v. Ash
standard.
26 5
Having concluded that a right of access existed, the district court issued
a second opinion exploring the scope of the cause of action. The court
found that the Cable Act was applicable only to compatible easements
dedicated for public use and opined that the placement of Media's wires in
a private easement would constitute a compensable taking under the Fifth
Amendment.266
Media appealed, arguing that the Cable Act afforded Media the right
to compel access to any compatible easements designated for utilities. The
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the Cable Act
created a private cause of action and also agreed that the Cable Act did
not extend the cause of action to private easements. Finding that the
statutory language could not properly be construed to encompass private
easements, the Fourth Circuit did not reach the Fifth Amendment question
that such a construction might raise. In reaching this conclusion, the Fourth
Circuit adopted the tack used by the Third Circuit in Cable Investments,
Inc. v. Woolley, 267 which analyzed the specific language of the statute to
determine its scope before considering the constitutional ramifications of a
particular construction. The Fourth Circuit found that the construction
advanced by Media required the court to define the word "dedicated" in
the statute as synonomous with "designated" or "reserved." The court
held that the definition of "dedicated" used in property law was controlling
rather than the layman's definition because under a canon of statutory
construction, courts are to construe terms of art by reference to the art or
science involved.
Although the Fourth Circuit noted that examination of the statutory
language alone was sufficient to support the district court's conclusions, the
court added that the legislative history of the Cable Act provided persuasive
265. Media Gen. Cable of Fairfax, Inc. v. Sequoyah Condominium Council of Co-
Owners, 721 F. Supp. 775, 781 (E.D. Va. 1989).
266. Media Gen. Cable of Fairfax, Inc. v. Sequoyah Condominium Council of Co-
Owners, 737 F. Supp. 903, 909 (E.D. Va. 1990), aff'd, 991 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1993).
267. 867 F.2d 151, 154 (3d Cir. 1989).
evidence that Congress did not intend to give cable operators a right to
compel access to private easements. An earlier draft of the Cable Act would
have afforded precisely the remedy Media sought, and Congress's choice
not to enact that version of the Act strongly indicated that Congress intended
to confer no such right. 2 8 Finding that the Cable Act granted no right to
compel access to a private easement, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
determination of the Fifth Amendment takings question was unnecessary.
Senior District Judge Kaufman dissented in part and asserted his concern
that the Fourth Circuit had too quickly disposed of the Fifth Amendment
issue. Judge Kaufman's opinion highlights the uncertainty among circuits
concerning the relevance of the Fifth Amendment to the Cable Act. An
Eleventh Circuit panel split on the issue. While the majority of the Eleventh
Circuit rejected the contention that the Cable Act as interpreted by Admiral's
Cove violates the Takings Clause, 269 Judge Henley, a senior circuit judge of
the Eighth Circuit sitting by designation in the same case, expressed concern
that the treatment of the takings question in Admiral's Cove was inadequate.270
As Judge Kaufman's dissent indicates, the Media General majority opinion
adopts some, but not all, of the conclusions that other circuits have reached
on the appropriate construction of the Cable Act. In Cable Holdings of
Georgia, Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd. ,271 the Eleventh Circuit
suggested, but did not definitively state, that construing the Cable Act to
allow cable companies to compel access to private easements would violate
the Fifth Amendment.272 Invoking the canon of statutory construction that
courts should construe statutes to avoid constitutional questions, the Eleventh
Circuit construed the act narrowly to avoid the question. 273 The Fourth Circuit
stepped even more lightly around the takings question by first construing the
statutory language and never reaching the possibility of a construction that
would implicate the Fifth Amendment.
Although more limited in its commentary regarding the takings question,
the Fourth Circuit, like the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit274 and district courts in the Fourth Circuit, 275 largely adopted the
Eleventh Circuit's result in Admiral's Cove. These courts agree that the Cable
Act creates a private cause of action in favor of cable companies seeking
268. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4655, 4717.
269. Centel Cable Television Co. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d 905, 909-10
(I1th Cir. 1990).
270. Id. at 911 (Henley, J., concurring).
271. 953 F.2d 600 (11th Cir. 1992).
272. Cable Holdings of Georgia, Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 953 F.2d
600, 602 (11 th Cir. 1992).
273. Cable Holdings of Georgia, Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 953 F.2d
600, 602 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 182 (1992). But see Centel Cable, 902 F.2d at
910 (commenting that Cable Act is not violative of Fifth Amendment).
274. Cable Invs., Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 153-55 (3rd Cir. 1989).
275. Cable TV Fund 14-A, Ltd. v. Property Owners Ass'n Chesapeake Ranch Estates,
Inc., 706 F. Supp. 422, 428-29 (D. Md. 1989).
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access to utility easements, provided that the easements are dedicated for
public use.276
VII. ENVIRONMENTAL LAw
A. Contribution for Clean-up Costs under CERCLA
Lender is exempt from contribution for liability for clean-
up costs under CERCLA where the lender takes property
solely to protect security interest and acts promptly to
divest itself of the property.
United States v. McLamb
5 F.3d 69 (4th Cir. 1993)
Section 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (CERCLA)F holds past and present property owners
strictly liable for hazardous waste disposed on their property. Section 104 of
CERCLA directs that either the owners themselves or the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) clean up these sites.218
If the EPA cleans up the site, section 107(a) of CERCLA permits the
EPA to recover the cost of cleanup from all past and present property
owners.27 9 In addition, parties held liable under section 107(a) may seek
contribution from "any other person who is liable or potentially liable" for
cleanup costs under CERCLA3m Section 101(20)(A)(iii) of CERCLA excludes
from contribution lenders who meet two requirements.28' First, the lender must
not have participated in the management of the contaminated vessel or facility.
Second, the lender must have held "indicia of ownership" merely to protect
its security interest.282 To clarify the security interest exemption, the EPA
issued an interpretative rule defining instances when a lender may be held
liable as an owner or operator under CERCLA. 3
276. But see Ultronics, Inc. v. McMillin Fin., Inc., No. 89-55586, 1990 WL 11939, at *1
(9th Cir. Feb. 5, 1990) (declining to determine whether Cable Act creates private cause of
action).
277. 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1988).
278. Id. § 9604.
279. Id. § 9601.
280. Id. § 9613(f)(1).
281. Id. § 9601(20)(A)(iii).
282. Id. § 9607(a)(2).
283. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(d)(1) (1992) (stating that holder maintains indicia of
ownership after foreclosure primarily to protect security interest, when holder undertakes to
sell, resell, or release property, or to divest in reasonably expeditious manner); id. § 300(d)(2)
(stating that holder of indicia of ownership, who did not participate in management or
operation, may sell or release property, or take measures to preserve and protect property
prior to sale, and preserve exemption); see also David R. Berz & Peter M. Gillon, Lender
Liability Under CERCLA: In Search of a New Deep Pocket, 108 BANKING L.J. 4, 9 (1991)
(concluding that as interpretative rule, EPA rule is not binding on courts, state governments,
or individuals seeking contribution).
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In United States v. McLamb,2m the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit considered whether the security interest exemption under
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) exempted Wachovia Bank and Trust Company (Wach-
ovia) from liability for contribution, even though Wachovia purchased the
property in question as a sole bidder in a foreclosure sale. In addition, the
Fourth Circuit considered whether the statutory exemption requires "commer-
cially reasonable" behavior. The Fourth Circuit held that Wachovia was exempt
because the bank took possession of the property in question solely to protect
its security interest and acted reasonably promptly to divest itself of the
property. The Fourth Circuit also held that CERCLA does not require that a
lender act in a commercially reasonable manner for a § 101(20)(A) exemption
to apply.
During the 1970's, Otto Skipper dumped various hazardous materials onto
undeveloped property that he owned called "Potter's Pits." Included with this
waste was oil mixed with sand from a 1976 oil spill. Later, Skipper used
Potter's Pits as collateral for a loan from Wachovia. In 1979, Wachovia took
a security interest in 217 acres of rural, undeveloped land that included Potter's
Pits. In 1980, Skipper defaulted .on his loan, and Wachovia foreclosed by
exercising its rights as beneficiary of the deed of trust. On March 25, 1980,
Wachovia purchased the property as a sole bidder in a foreclosure sale. Several
days after purchasing the property in the foreclosure sale, Wachovia listed the
property with a local realtor. On October 8, Jimmy F. Cain and William
McLamb purchased the property and began to develop it into a residential
subdivision. At the time of purchase, Wachovia was unaware of the existence
of a prior oil spill or any other environmental damage.
In early 1983, the Brunswick County Health Department investigated the
property and notified Cain and McLamb in July that their property was
located on or near the site of the 1976 oil spill. The hazardous waste on this
property was never entirely cleaned up. In 1983, The EPA investigated the
property and conducted a removal action. Subsequently, the EPA sought
reimbursement from McLamb, Cain, Hubert and Ada Anderson, and Investors
Management Corporation (IMC). The Cains and the Andersons settled with
the EPA. The EPA obtained an entry of default from Skipper. Thereafter,
the McLambs and IMC remained the only parties seeking contribution from
Wachovia.
Prior to trial, Wachovia moved for summary judgment. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, granting Wachovia's
motion for summary judgment, held that the bank was exempt from CERCLA
liability contribution because it held the property in question in order to
protect a security interest. The McLambs and IMC subsequently appealed.
The appellants argued that Wachovia could not claim protection under the
security interest exemption because the bank became an owner when it
purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. Appellants also argued that
Wachovia failed to act in a commercially reasonable manner when the bank
284. 5 F.3d 69 (4th Cir. 1993).
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sold the property without disclosing the presence of the hazardous waste.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's granting of summary
judgment. The Fourth Circuit concluded that § 101(20)(A) of CERCLA did
not apply solely to the mortgagor and mortgagee relationship. Relying on
dicta from In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.,285 the Fourth Circuit interpreted the
phrase "indicia of ownership" to encompass more than "paper title."'  In
other words, the reviewing court must examine why the lender holds the
property in question. The Fourth Circuit also relied on Waterville Industries,
Inc. v. Finance Authority to conclude that even if a lender has acquired
real title, § 101(20)(A) applies as long as the lender makes a reasonably prompt
effort to divest itself of the property.
288
Applying this reasoning to McLamb, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
even though Wachovia acquired real title at the foreclosure sale, it was exempt
from CERCLA contribution because the bank held the property in question
only to protect a security interest. The Fourth Circuit found two important
circumstances in McLamb that supported this conclusion. First, Wachovia
immediately placed the property on the market after foreclosure. Second, the
record did not show that the bank purchased the property as an investment
or for any other profit motive. In addition, the record showed that Wachovia
had not participated in the management of the property. Finally, the Fourth
Circuit declined to address the applicability of 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 by stating
that the holding was reached independently of the regulation.
On the issue of whether § 101(20)(A) exemption status requires that a
lender exercise commercially reasonable behavior, the Fourth Circuit once
again relied on Waterville Industries. The court in Waterville Industries con-
cluded that the clear language of the statute declared that the right of
contribution depended .solely on the lender's status as an owner. Section
101(20)(A), however, defines as a nonowner one whose ownership merely
protects a security interest. The Fourth Circuit applied this reasoning to
McLamb and held that the statute on its face does not contain a commercial
reasonableness standard.
In McLamb, the Fourth Circuit interpreted Section 101(20)(A) of CERCLA
to protect lenders from liability, even those who acquired real title after
foreclosure. Such an approach rejects the holdings of the two leading cases"
that interpret Section 101(20)(A) to provide protection only to lenders in title
285. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
286. See In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668, 671 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that deed
holder did not participate in management, and thus was not "owner" for CERCLA purposes).
287. 984 F.2d 549 (1st Cir. 1993).
288. See Waterville Indus., Inc. v. Finance Auth., 984 F.2d 549, 553 (Ist Cir. 1993)
(stating that even though CERCLA does not provide for divestiture after foreclosure, implicit
"safety zone" exists in statute).
289. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md.
1986) (holding that Congress intended § 101(20)(A) to protect only common-law title mortgagees
holding title, and not real title acquired from foreclosure sale); Guidice v. BFG Electroplating
& Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 563 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (holding lender liable under CERCLA
when lender is successful bidder at foreclosure sale).
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theory states.m The Fourth Circuit assumed that lenders will hold legal title
to property in order to secure a loan and emphasized that a reviewing court
should focus on the reason that the lender holds title. In adopting such an
approach, the Fourth Circuit joined the Ninth and First Circuits in resolving
a problem created by the statutory language of CERCLA.
If courts interpreted the security interest exemption narrowly, then creditors
would run the risk of liability if acquiring title to foreclosed property was the
only way in which they could recover their losses from a default. Such liability
would be incurred even if the lender did not participate in the management
of the facility29' or if the lender constructed the loan agreement to accommodate
possible environmental contamination.2 92 The courts in In re Bergsoe and
Waterville Industries recognized this problem. The Fourth Circuit essentially
took the best of both opinions. From Bergsoe, it recognized the importance
of analyzing why the lender held title, 293 and from Waterville, the Fourth
Circuit looked to how diligently the lender attempted to divest itself of the
property.29 The approach adopted by the Fourth Circuit in McLamb ensures




Expert testimony concerning witness identification is
properly excludable where such testimony will not assist the
trier of fact.
United States v. Harris
995 F.2d 532 (4th Cir. 1993)
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that expert testimony is permissible
only if such testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence
290. See Note, Cleaning Up the Debris After Fleet Factors: Lender Liability and CERCLA 's
Security Interest Exemption, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1249, 1258 (1991) (arguing that § 101(20)(A)
was intended by Congress only to apply to those few jurisdictions that still embrace title theory
of mortgage law, but that CERCLA liability should attach once lender has purchased property
after foreclosure).
291. See Scott Wilson, When a Security Becomes a Liability: Claims Against Lenders in
Hazardous Waste Clean-Up, 38 HAsTINGs L.J. 1261, 1263 (1987) (arguing that after United
States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (1 1th Cir. 1990), CERCLA forces lender to know
of hazardous conditions, but not to level that involvement triggers CERCLA liability).
292. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990)
(concluding that if waste treatment operations of debtors are inadequate, risk of CERCLA
liability will be weighed into terms of loan, and that this will create incentives for debtors to
manage their waste effectively).
293. See In re Bergsoe Corp., 910 F.2d 668, 671 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that courts must
determine why lender holds indicia of ownership).
294. See Waterville Indus., Inc. v. Finance Auth., 964 F.2d 549, 553 (1st Cir. 1993)
(holding that as long as lender makes reasonable effort to divest itself of property, liability
should not apply because it protects bona fide lenders and owners who do not seek profit in
holding title to property); 40 C.F.R. § 300.1l00(d)(2)(i) (1992) (providing safe harbor for
lenders who list their foreclosed property within 12 months after acquisition).
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or determining a fact in issue.295 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has held that the admission of expert testimony is within the
sound discretion of the trial judge, and that Rule 702 excludes expert testimony
concerning matters of common knowledge. 29 Because the jury is capable of
deciding matters of common knowledge, expert testimony in this area does
not assist the jury. 297 Consistent with this rule, appellate courts have held that
a trial judge should allow expert psychological testimony on the accuracy of
eyewitness identification only under narrow circumstances. 298 In most situations,
however, appellate courts will leave the admissibility of this evidence within
the discretion of the trial judge.299 Against this background, the Fourth Circuit
in United States v. Harris"' considered whether a trial judge had properly
excluded expert testimony about witness identification of a defendant in a
prosecution for bank robbery.
Several witnesses accused the defendant, Robert Melvin Harris, of
robbing a branch of the Bank of Maryland with a knife on the afternoon
of February 5, 1992. Harris admitted that he was present in the bank twice
that morning, but he denied robbing the bank or being present in the bank
that afternoon. Two bank tellers and a branch manager were eyewitnesses
to the robbery. The three witnesses testified immediately after the robbery
that Harris had only been in the bank once that morning, but they later
testified that he had been in twice that morning to inquire about opening
an account.
The witnesses claimed that, at about 2:40 p.m., Harris and the branch
manager went to the new accounts desk to fill out an application. Leaving
295. FED. R. Evm. 702.
296. See Persinger v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 920 F.2d 1185, 1188 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding
that district judge correctly excluded expert testimony on issue of whether given amount of
weight was safe to lift).
297. See Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 789 F.2d 1052, 1055 (4th Cir. 1986) (deciding
that expert testimony within common knowledge of jurors does not assist the jury, but that
admission of such testimony will almost always be harmless).
298. See United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that
expert testimony on "feedback factor," which demonstrates that witnesses who discuss case
with each other, may unconsciously reinforce mistaken identifications may be proper in some
cases); United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 418-19 (3d Cir. 1985) (deciding that expert
testimony may help jury to understand effects of delay or stress on identification testimony);
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1985) (declaring that, under certain
circumstances, expert testimony on eyewitness reliability can assist jury); United States v.
Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1106 (6th Cir.) (holding that expert testimony may help jury understand
potential for error in witness identification of person of different race), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
868 (1984); State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208, 1221 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc) (allowing expert
testimony on phenomenon of unconscious transference or confusion of person seen in one
situation with person seen in another situation). But see United States v. Holloway, 971 F.2d
675, 679 (11th Cir. 1992) (deciding that expert testimony on eyewitness identification is per se
inadmissible), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1390 (1993).
299. But see United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1400-01 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding
that trial court abused its discretion in barring testimony concerning accuracy of witness
identification).
300. 995 F.2d 532 (4th Cir. 1993).
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Harris at the accounts desk, the branch manager went to her office, which
is connected to the teller stations, for a telephone call. At approximately
3:00 p.m., a robber approached one of the tellers, threatened her with a
knife, and demanded that she put money in a chef's hat that he pushed to
her. The teller gave the robber $3,400. The branch manager overheard the
demand, but another teller, stationed nearby, did not.
A bank surveillance camera photographed Harris sitting at the accounts
desk at 11:40 a.m. and at 3:00 p.m. Eight days after the robbery, one of
the tellers and the branch manager identified Harris as the robber from a
photospread, although the teller who handed the robber the money failed
to identify Harris as the robber from the photospread.
A grand jury indicted Harris in late February 1992. At Harris's first
trial in May of the same year, the jury was unable to reach a verdict. A
second trial occurred one week later. At the beginning of the second trial,
Harris's counsel attempted to discredit the three witnesses' testimony by
introducing expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification.
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland refused to
admit the evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, on the ground that
the testimony would not be helpful to the jury. The judge stated that
Harris's identification was not truly at issue, but that even if credibility
issues existed, the jury would not need an expert's assistance to resolve
them.
During the trial, the three bank employees testified that Harris was the
bank robber. They identified him through his appearance, demeanor, and
voice. The jury found Harris guilty of armed bank robbery, a violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2113(d). Harris moved for a new trial on the ground that the
trial judge improperly excluded the expert testimony. The court denied the
defendant's motion for the reasons stated at trial and added that the expert
testimony's prejudicial effects outweighed its probative value under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403. The district court sentenced Harris to seventy months
confinement.
Harris appealed, arguing that the district court erred in excluding the
expert testimony. According to Harris, the expert would have testified that
the witnesses' memories were not reliable because of factors such as stress,
discussions among the witnesses, Harris's previous appearance in the bank,
and distortions of the witnesses' memories.
The Fourth Circuit held that the trial judge's exclusion of the expert
testimony was proper under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which indicates
that expert testimony is permissible only if it assists the trier of fact in
understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue. Rule 702, the
Fourth Circuit noted, places the exclusion of evidence within the sound
discretion of the trial judge. Furthermore, expert testimony on the reliability
of eyewitness identification is usually of no assistance to juries.
However, the Fourth Circuit did recognize that expert testimony may
be admissible under narrow circumstances to show possible psychological
problems with identification testimony. For example, expert testimony might
be useful to explain the effects of stress on identification. Likewise, the
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Fourth Circuit noted that a problem such as identification after a long
delay might support the introduction of expert testimony.
The Fourth Circuit held that none of these narrow circumstances was
present in Harris's case. Usually, problems in witness identification concern
one witness under stress. Because three witnesses on three nonstressful
occasions had identified Harris, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the jury
had a vast amount of evidence on which to base its finding that Harris was
the bank robber. Moreover, the prosecution presented the surveillance and
arrest photographs to the jury for comparison to the defendant's in-court
appearance. Two of the three witnesses identified Harris in a photospread
eight days after the robbery, and all three witnesses identified the person
in the surveillance photo as Harris.
The Fourth Circuit also mentioned that defendant's counsel had the
opportunity to discredit the three witnesses' testimony on cross-examination
by pointing out the weaknesses and inconsistencies in their recollections.
Finally, the defense's notice to the court of the expert witness on the first
day of trial did not give the Government adequate notice of the intention
to use an expert witness. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held that the trial
judge properly excluded the evidence.
The Fourth Circuit's Harris opinion is generally consistent with decisions
of other circuits.3 0' For example, in United States v. Curry,0 2 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that a trial court
did not err by refusing to admit expert testimony on the credibility of
eyewitnesses.30 3 The Seventh Circuit noted that, in the case before it,
eyewitnesses did not provide the only testimony against the defendant and
that cross-examination revealed possible flaws in the eyewitness testimony.) 4
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Thevis 05 held that evidentiary
rulings on the admission of expert testimony are within the discretion of
the trial judge.3 6
Although the Harris opinion does not authorize per se exclusions of
expert testimony on witness identification,30 7 Harris gives trial judges broad
discretion to disallow such testimony. Those wishing to introduce expert
301. See United States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296, 1300 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that
evidentiary rulings on admission of expert testimony are within broad discretion of trial judge);
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that expert testimony
on witness identification is permissible under narrow circumstances); United States v. Smith,
736 F.2d 1103, 1106 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868 (1984).
302. 977 F.2d 1042 (7th Cir. 1992).
303. United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1052 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1357 (1993).
304. Id.
305. 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982).
306. United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008
(1982).
307. See United States v. Holloway, 971 F.2d 675, 679 (11th Cir. 1992) (deciding that
expert testimony on eyewitness identification is per se inadmissible), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1390 (1993).
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testimony on witness identification will have to show that an expert can aid
jurors. If strong identification evidence independent of eyewitnesses exists,
the Fourth Circuit provides the trial judge even greater leeway in disallowing
an expert's testimony. In general, litigants wishing to introduce this type of
expert testimony will have to prevail on the issue at the trial level because
the Fourth Circuit appears hesitant to tamper with the trial judge's discre-
tion.
IX. HEALTH/MEDICAID
A. State Funding Under EPSDT Provisions of Medicaid Act
EPSDT provisions of the Medicaid Act require
participating states to fund medically necessary organ
transplants for qualified recipients under the age of
twenty-one.
Pereira by Pereira v. Kozlowski
996 F.2d 723 (4th Cir. 1993)
Under the Medicaid Act, a state that elects to participate in the Medicaid
program becomes eligible to receive federal funds to cover a portion of the
costs of medical services that it provides.30 8 One requirement for eligibility
is that the state must provide "early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and
treatment services" (EPSDT) for qualified recipients under the age of
twenty-one.3 9 Section 1396b(i)(1) states that federal funds are not available
for organ transplants unless the state has promulgated written standards for
coverage of those procedures.310 In the last five years, the United States
Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have held that §
1396b(i)(1) allows the state to decide not to provide funds to Medicaid
recipients under the age of twenty-one for medically necessary organ trans-
plants.3 ' In Pereira by Pereira v. Kozlowski,312 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the state does not have such
discretion because the EPSDT provisions of the Medicaid Act require a
participating state to fund a medically necessary organ transplant for a
qualified recipient under the age of twenty-one.
308. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396s (1988).
309. Id. § 1396d(a)(4)(B) (Supp. I 1989). The term "early and periodic screening, diag-
nostic, and treatment services" includes screening services and all health care necessary to
correct or ameliorate illnesses and other conditions discovered by those screening services,
whether or not such treatment is covered under the state's Medicaid plan. Id. § 1396d(r)(5).
310. Id. § 1396b(i)(1) (1988).
311. See Dexter v. Kirschner, 972 F.2d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that state
funding of organ transplants under Medicaid is discretionary); Meusberger v. Palmer, 900
F.2d 1280, 1282 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that state need not fund medically necessary organ
transplant under its Medicaid plan); Ellis by Ellis v. Patterson, 859 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1988)
(holding that legislative history reveals that Congress intended states to have discretion as to
funding organ transplants under Medicaid plan).
312. 996 F.2d 723 (4th Cir. 1993).
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In Pereira, the plaintiff, Natalia Pereira, was a three-year-old qualified
Medicaid recipient with terminal cardiac dysfunction. Through her parents
acting as next friends, the plaintiff brought suit against the Virginia De-
partment of Medical Services in an attempt to compel the Commonwealth
to provide funds for a medically necessary heart transplant. The plaintiff
argued that the EPSDT provisions of the Medicaid Act mandate that the
state fund all medically necessary treatment for qualified recipients under
the age of twenty-one. The Commonwealth resisted payment and argued
that § 1396b(i)(1) of the Medicaid Act gives the states complete discretion
as to which transplants they will fund."' The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiff. The district court held that the EPSDT provisions override
state discretion concerning organ transplants, thereby obligating the Com-
monwealth to provide funds for a qualified recipient's medically necessary
organ transplant.
On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that § 1396b(i)(1) affirmatively
grants the states absolute discretion as to whether to provide funds for
organ transplants. That section provides that the federal government will
not contribute to the cost of an organ transplant unless the state has
promulgated written standards regarding the coverage of such procedures. 1 4
The Commonwealth argued that it was not required to provide funds for
a heart transplant because Virginia had promulgated plans for kidney and
cornea transplants only.
The Fourth Circuit, in an opinion by Circuit Judge Luttig, affirmed
the District Court's judgment, but based its decision on different grounds.
The court expressly rejected the Commonwealth's assertion that § 1396b(i)(1)
gives states complete discretion as to what types of organ transplants their
Medicaid programs cover. Construing this provision in the context of the
rest of § 1396b(i), the Fourth Circuit determined that subsection (1) provides
only that the federal government will not make payments for organ trans-
plants unless the state has promulgated certain written requirements. Because
subsections (2) through (14) of § 1396b(i) serve merely as limitations on the
federal government's obligation to provide funds, the court reasoned that
to construe subsection (1) as doing anything more than its neighboring
subsections would violate the most fundamental principles of statutory
construction. Therefore, the court concluded that § 1396b(i)(1) does not
confer absolute discretion on the state to decide which organ transplants it
will fund under its Medicaid program.
Turning to the EPSDT provisions, the Fourth Circuit held that Congress,
by means of those provisions, imposed on the states an obligation to fund
all medically necessary procedures for qualified recipients under the age of
twenty-one, including organ transplants. Reconciling the EPSDT provisions
with § 1396b(i)(1), the court explained that § 1396b(i) merely allowed the
313. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(i)(1) (1988).
314. Id.
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federal government to deny a state funding for EPSDT-mandated procedures
if the state was not in compliance with the requirements of § 1396b(i).
Thus, the EPSDT provisions required Virginia to pay for the plaintiff's
transplant; § 1396b(i)(1) offered the Commonwealth no relief.
In reaching its decision, the Fourth Circuit explicitly declined to follow
the Eighth and Ninth Circuits' rulings that § 1396b(i)(1) confers absolute
discretion upon the states as to whether to fund organ transplants. The
Pereira court, discounting the Commonwealth's reliance on Ellis by Ellis v.
Patterson,3"' stated that the Eighth Circuit based its decision solely upon
an ambiguous legislative history rather than on a construction of the statute
itself. In addition, the Eighth Circuit decided the Ellis case prior to the
passage of the EPSDT provisions of the Medicaid Act, a fact that led the
Pereira court to question whether the Eighth Circuit would reach the same
result today.
Circuit Judge Hamilton concurred specially in the Pereira court's de-
cision. His concern was that one could construe the court's decision as
requiring a state to fund all tnedically necessary organ transplants for all
qualified Medicaid recipients, regardless of age. Because such a holding
would place an enormous drain on the Medicaid system, Judge Hamilton
emphasized that the Pereira holding was a narrow one that applied only to
qualified Medicaid recipients under the age of twenty-one.
By rejecting the approach of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, the Fourth
Circuit created a split of opinion on the issue of whether the Medicaid Act
requires a state to provide funds to a qualified recipient for a medically
necessary organ transplant. 316 At the time of its decision, the Fourth Circuit
stood alone in holding that the state was required to make such payments.
Within two months of the Pereira decision, however, the Eleventh Circuit
reached the same conclusion.
In Pittman by Pope v. Secretary, Florida Department of Health &
Rehabilitative Services,317 the Eleventh Circuit distinguished the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits' rulings on the issue on the ground that those courts had
not considered the EPSDT provisions.1 8 Following the Fourth Circuit's
ruling in Pereira, the Eleventh Circuit held that § 1396b(i)(1) does not
confer discretion on the state as to which organ transplants to fund.31 9 Even
if that section conferred such discretion, the Eleventh Circuit stated that
315. 859 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1988).
316. See Dexter v. Kirschner, 972 F.2d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that state has
absolute discretion as to funding of organ transplants under Medicaid plan); Meusberger v.
Palmer, 900 F.2d 1280, 1282 (8th Cir. 1990) (same); Ellis by Ellis v. Patterson, 859 F.2d 52,
55 (8th Cir. 1988) (same); see also Miller by Miller v. Whitburn, No. 93-1976, 1993 WL
492632, at *1 (7th Cir. Dec. 1, 1993) (recognizing split in decisions but declining to resolve
issue because not properly before court).
317. 998 F.2d 887 (11th Cir. 1993).
318. Pittman by Pope v. Secretary, Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 998
F.2d 887, 891 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993).
319. Id.
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the EPSDT provisions would override that discretion, thereby requiring a
state to fund a medically necessary organ transplant for a qualified Medicaid
recipient under the age of twenty-one.
320
Pereira and Pittman seem to indicate that the 1989 enactment of the
EPSDT provisions of the Medicaid Act implicitly overruled the decisions
of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. At least when a minor is the intended
organ recipient, the EPSDT provisions, under the construction of the Fourth
and Eleventh Circuits, obligate the state to pay for the procedure . 2, When
an adult recipient is involved, however, the EPSDT provisions do not
apply.3 22 In such situations, the court must construe § 1396b(i)(1) to deter-
mine whether the state has the discretion to refuse to fund such procedures.
It is on this point that the circuits have split.
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits hold that the legislative history of
§ 1396b(i)(1) indicates that Congress intended the states to have discretion
as to this funding;3 23 the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits construe the section
itself to provide nothing more than a set of conditions that the state must
meet in order to qualify for federal funds.3 24 Circuit Judge Hamilton's
special concurrence clearly indicates, however, that the Pereira holding
should be limited to its facts. 32 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, has yet to
resolve whether a state must provide funds for the medically necessary
organ transplant of a qualified adult Medicare recipient.
B. Requirement of Notice of Amendments to State Medicaid Programs
Fourth Circuit upholds HFCA determination that
amendments to state's Medicaid programs cannot take
effect until state has published notice.
State of North Carolina, Department of Human Resources v.
United States Department of Health and Human Services
999 F.2d 767 (4th Cir. 1993)
The State of North Carolina voluntarily participates in the federal
Medicaid program. State participation mandates compliance with federal
statutory guidelines regarding the administration of the program. Title XIX
of the Social Security Act 26 requires any state that participates in Medicaid
to submit to the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) a statement
320. Id. at 892.
321. See id. (holding that EPSDT provisions mandate that state pay for organ transplant
for Medicaid recipient under twenty-one); Pereira by Pereira v. Kozlowski, 996 F.2d 723, 725-
26 (4th Cir. 1993) (same).
322. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(B) (Supp. 1 1989) (providing EPSDT services for indi-
viduals eligible for Medicaid and under twenty-one years old).
323. Dexter v. Kirschner, 972 F.2d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 1992); Ellis by Ellis v. Patterson,
859 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1988).
324. Pittman by Pope v. Secretary, Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 998
F.2d 887, 891 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993); Pereira, 996 F.2d at 725.
325. Pereira, 996 F.2d at 727-28.
326. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396s (1988).
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describing that state's plan for administering the program. 27 Any subsequent
amendments to the state's plan must obtain HCFA approval.3 28 Amendments
that propose a "significant change in [the state's] methods and standards
for setting payment rates for services" cannot take effect until the state has
published notice of the change.
29
In State of North Carolina, Department of Human Resources v. United
States Department of Health and Human Services,30 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed an HCFA administrator's
decision that the notice requirement applied to a Medicaid amendment that
North Carolina had adopted without providing such notice. In accordance
with the notice requirement, North Carolina could not implement the
amendment retroactively because the state had failed to provide the requisite
notice. The Fourth Circuit held that the HCFA administrator had correctly
determined that North Carolina's Medicaid amendment 331 was a significant
change to the state's Medicaid program that triggered the state's obligation
to comply with the federally mandated notice requirements. The court
rejected North Carolina's argument that the State's failure to give public
notice in this instance constituted harmless error.
In affirming the agency's decision that the change was significant, the
Fourth Circuit noted that an agency's interpretation of its own regulation
deserved considerable deference. Applying this principle, the court opined
that HCFA's determination of the "significance" issue was an agency
finding of fact that a court must accept if the agency supported that finding
with substantial evidence.3 32 North Carolina cited an obsolete regulation that
required public notice only for changes that would alter Medicaid payments
by one percent or more under a state plan.3 33 North Carolina urged that
327. Id. § 1396a.
328. 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(1)(ii) (1992).
329. Id. §§ 447.205(a), (d), 447.253(h).
330. 999 F.2d 767 (4th Cir. 1993). Powell, Associate Justice (Retired), United States
Supreme Court (sitting by designation), announced the opinion of the court.
331. The amendment, designated SPA 90-14, proposed changes in North Carolina's
payment methodology. The portion of the amendment at issue before the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) excluded state-operated nursing facilities from a limitation previously
applicable to all nursing homes located within the state. The previous limitation was known
as the "80th percentile limitation." The HCFA administrator approved the substance of the
amendment but denied North Carolina's request to have the exclusion from the 80th percentile
limitation effective as of April 1, 1990. The administrator reasoned that the change constituted
a significant change in the methods or standards of setting payment rates and triggered the
notice requirement. The administrator approved the amendment effective November 1, 1990
because North Carolina complied with the notice requirement on October 31, 1990.
SPA 90-14 also proposed to replace the prospective payment methodology previously used
to calculate Medicaid rates for state-operated facilities with a cost-based payment methodology.
That portion of the amendment was not at issue before the Fourth Circuit.
332. 42 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(4) (1988).
333. See 42 C.F.R. § 447.205(a) (1981) (providing that only changes in state's Medicaid
program that would alter payments by one percent or more triggered notice requirement). The
amended regulations provide no such description of what constitutes a significant change in a
state's program and triggers the notice requirement. Id. §§ 447.205(a), (d), 447.253(h) (1992).
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any state Medicaid amendment should not constitute a "significant change"
under the new HCFA regulation unless it would have been so found under
the previous regulation. In support of this construction, North Carolina
pointed out that HCFA had amended the regulations to provide states
increased flexibility in administering their Medicaid plans a a4 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had previously accepted this
reasoning when it determined that a Mississippi Medicaid amendment elim-
inating reimbursement for legal fees was not a significant change requiring
advance notice.335 The Fourth Circuit did not reject the soundness of the
Fifth Circuit's determination of the administrative intent behind HCFA's
new regulation. The Fourth Circuit did decide, however, that the proposition
that HCFA amended the regulations to achieve greater flexibility for states
did not compel the conclusion that the HCFA administrator's construction
in the North Carolina case was unreasonable.
North Carolina also argued that even if the amendment constituted a
significant change, the state's failure to provide advance public notice merely
constituted harmless error. The Fourth Circuit rejected North Carolina's
harmless error argument based on the language of the federal regulations.
The court found that the regulations contained no language that would
support the injection into the regulations of a harmless error exception. The
court described HCFA's regulations as not unduly burdensome and noted
that the regulations provide important procedural protections to both ben-
eficiaries and providers of medical services.
In contrast with the Fifth Circuit, which adopted a per se rule that
state Medicaid amendments considered less than significant under the pre-
vious regulations would not be significant under the new regulations, the
Fourth Circuit rejected the per se rule and deferred to the agency's inter-
pretation of its regulations. As interpreted by HCFA, the new regulation
may encompass state changes that did not formerly trigger the notice
requirement.
C. Reimbursement from Medigap Policies
VA hospitals may receive reimbursement from Medicare
supplement policies when the Medicare system does not
reimburse the hospital.
United States v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Maryland, Inc.
989 F.2d 718 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 302 (1993)
In 1986, as part of the Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act, Congress enacted the Veterans' Benefits Act (VBA) 3 6 Before passage
334. 46 Fed. Reg. 47,964, 47,967 (1981).
335. Mississippi Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, 701 F.2d 511, 522-23 (5th Cir. 1983).
336. 38 U.S.C. § 1729 (Supp. III 1991) (amending and renumbering 38 U.S.C. § 629
(1988)). The Veterans' Benefits Act states in relevant part:
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of the VBA, states and insurance companies could avoid reimbursing
Veterans' Administration (VA) hospitals for care provided to veterans.
337
Private billing hospitals performing the same services, however, would
receive reimbursement from either state funds, such as worker's compen-
sation, or the patient's insurance policy. Congress sought to end this
discriminatory treatment of VA hospitals by enacting the VBA.3 s
By 1992, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fourth,
and Sixth Circuits had upheld the application of 38 U.S.C. § 1729 (VBA)
to state funds that discriminated against the VA. 339 In United States v. Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Maryland, Inc. ,a4 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit becane the first court of appeals to address
the issue of contractual discrimination. The Fourth Circuit specifically
considered whether VA hospitals could receive reimbursement from Medicare
supplement (medigap) policies when the VA hospital did not first receive
benefits from the Medicare system itself.
In Blue Cross, eleven veterans received free medical care at the De-
partment of Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Martinsburg, West Virginia,
for nonservice-connected disabilities. Each veteran met the Medicare eligi-
bility requirements and also held a Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS)
medigap policy. When the United States sought reimbursement from BCBS,
(a)(1) [I]n any case in which a veteran is furnished care or services under this chapter
for a non-service-connected disability . . ., the United States has the right to recover
or collect the reasonable cost of such care or services (as determined by the Secretary
[of Veteran Affairs]) from a third party to the extent that the veteran (or the
provider of the care or services) would be eligible to receive payment for such care
or services from such third party if care or services had not been furnished by a
department or agency of the United States.
(i)(1)(A) The term "health-plan contract" means an insurance policy or contract,
medical or hospital service agreement, membership or subscription contract, or similar
arrangement, under which health services for individuals are provided or the expense
of such services are paid.
Id. The definition excludes Medicare and Medicaid coverage. Id. Additionally, "[N]o law of
any State . . . and no provision of any contract . . ., shall operate to prevent recovery or
collection by the United States under this section." Id. § 1729(f).
337. See United States v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Md., Inc., 989 F.2d 718, 720
(4th Cir.) (noting that insurance companies could avoid reimbursing VA hospitals because
veterans received free medical care from these facilities), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 302 (1993).
338. H.R. REP. No. 300, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 789 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
756, 1264.
339. See United States v. Ohio, 957 F.2d 231, 233 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that Ohio
statute is discriminatory because private hospitals do not provide free medical treatment and
state's claim that private nonbilling hospital would receive treatment similar to VA hospital
ignores economic reality); United States v. Maryland, 914 F.2d 551, 555 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding
that VA hospitals could receive reimbursement under Maryland Criminal Injuries Compensation
Act); United States v. New Jersey, 831 F.2d 458, 464 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that Tenth
Amendment does not bar limited preemption by Veterans' Benefits Act of New Jersey statute
that would otherwise deny reimbursement to VA hospitals).
340. 989 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1993).
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however, the company refused, stating that its medigap policy covered only
medical expenses that first triggered the Medicare system. a41 The United
States claimed that BCBS's refusal to pay violated the nondiscrimination
provision of the VBA.3 42 The United States District Court for the District
of Maryland agreed that BCBS's nonpayment violated the nondiscrimination
clause of the VBA and granted summary judgment for the United States.
On appeal, BCBS claimed that the federal prohibition against Medicare
reimbursements to VA hospitals, rather than a private contract term, created
the impediment to reimbursement from medigap policies. BCBS further
argued that a medigap policy is not a "health-plan contract" subject to the
nondiscrimination provisions of the VBA.
The Fourth Circuit rejected these arguments and affirmed the district
court's ruling on both counts. First, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with
BCBS's narrow interpretation of the Baucus Amendment . 43 BCBS claimed
that the Baucus Amendment requires medigap reimbursements for deduc-
tibles or coinsurance amounts only when Medicare also must reimburse the
individual.3"4 The court, however, distinguished between the entitlement to
Medicare benefits and the actual ability to collect those benefits. Because
Medicare pays only after the individual exhausts all other group plans and
applicable state funds, the court recognized that the entitlement to Medicare
benefits could exist even though Medicare does not reimburse the individ-
ual.34 The Fourth Circuit noted that medigap plans would reimburse poli-
cyholders when worker's compensation funds, instead of Medicare, covered
the main medical expenses. The court found no reason to treat the VA
differently when it acted as the primary payer instead of Medicare. After
considering the statutory language, the Fourth Circuit rejected BCBS's
assertion that federal law limited medigap payments to situations in which
Medicare actually reimbursed the patient.
The Court of Appeals then turned to whether the operation of BCBS's
medigap plan discriminated against the VA. Because no circuit yet had
addressed contractual discrimination under the VBA, the court examined
cases finding state statutory discrimination against VA hospitals 46 Relying
341. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395f(c), 1395n(d), 1395y(a)(2)-(3) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (providing
that VA hospitals are ineligible for Medicare payments because they are operated by federal
agency and do not bill their patients).
342. 38 U.S.C. § 1729 (Supp. III 1991).
343. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss(g)(1) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (defining medigap policy as "a
health insurance policy ... offered by a private entity to individuals who are entitled to have
payment made under this subchapter [Medicare]") (emphasis added).
344. See 38 U.S.C. § 1729(i)(1) (explaining that VA hospitals may not seek reimbursement
from either Medicare or Medicaid for free medical services provided to veterans).
345. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2) (stating that Medicare pays only after person exhausts
other group health or worker's compensation plans).
346. See United States v. Ohio, 957 F.2d 231, 233 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that Ohio
statute is discriminatory because private hospitals do not provide free medical treatment and
because state's claim that private nonbilling hospitals are treated similarly to VA hospitals
ignores economic reality); United States v. Maryland, 914 F.2d 551, 554 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding
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on this precedent, the Fourth Circuit held that BCBS must determine
eligibility for veterans as if they had received medical care at a private
billing hospital.
Because the VBA's contractual discrimination clause appears to conflict
with a provision of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
Model Regulation to Implement the Individual Accident and Sickness In-
surance Minimum Standards Act (NAIC standards), the Fourth Circuit
briefly discussed the relevance of the NAIC standards to the present case.
The NAIC standards govern the issuance and operation of medigap policies.
Only states that adopt these standards may authorize insurance companies
to sell medigap policies in their state.3 47 One of the discretionary NAIC
standards allows medigap policies to exclude VA hospitals from reimburse-
ment. Without deciding whether NAIC standards have the force of law,
the Fourth Circuit held that the nondiscrimination mandate of § 1729 of
the VBA is controlling because it expresses Congressional intent and effec-
tively preempts the permissive NAIC standard. Therefore, the court found
BCBS's policy discriminatory based on its clause denying reimbursement
for any services provided in a federal hospital.
Next, the Fourth Circuit examined BCBS's claim that a medigap policy
is not a "health-plan contract" within the meaning of the VBA. BCBS
alleged that the exclusion of Medicare benefits from § 1729's nondiscrimi-
nation clause also requires the exclusion of medigap policies. Based on its
holding that BCBS had discriminated contractually against the VA, the
appellate court held that Congress's distinction between state and federal
statutory discrimination has no relevance to the inclusion of medigap policies
in the definition of health-plan contracts. The Fourth Circuit also rejected
BCBS's efforts to read the VBA's definition of a health-plan contract
narrowly. The court cited the Senate Report, which states that Congress
intended a broad construction of the definition of health-plan contracts.
3 48
The court also rejected the related argument that Congress intended to
limit the scope of the term "health-plan contract" to primary payers and
to exclude supplemental policies. First, the court stated that the term
included particularized insurance policies, such as dental and optical plans,
which are not considered primary payers. Second, while Congress did place
clear limits on the definitions of health-plan contracts and medigap policies,
Congress never expressly excluded the definition of a medigap policy from
the definition of a health-plan contract.
The Fourth Circuit proceeded to restate its view that actual Medicare
reimbursements are not a necessary trigger for medigap benefits. Excluding
Medicare from the VBA's nondiscrimination provision, according to the
that Congress intended to eliminate discrimination in practice as well as discrimination that
appears on face of state statute); United States v. New Jersey, 831 F.2d 458, 464 (3d Cir.
1987) (holding that New Jersey cannot automatically deny all VA claims).
347. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss(a)(2), (g)(2) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
348. See S. REP. No. 146, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 633 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
42, 576 (stating that committee intended broad construction so as to require broad coverage).
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court, has no effect on the inclusion of medigap policies within the definition
of a health-plan contract. Instead, the Fourth Circuit viewed the Medicare
exclusion as a congressional attempt to eliminate unnecessary transfers of
federal funds between federal agencies.
Finally, the court of appeals considered whether Congress's failure to
amend the nondiscrimination provision of the VBA to include a specific
reference to medigap policies indicated that Congress exempted medigap
policies from the nondiscrimination provision. The Fourth Circuit noted
that Congress added a specific reference to medigap policies in a similar
provision dealing with health care for current members of the armed
forces. 49 Congress failed to pass bills in both 1990 and 1991 that would
have added the same language to the VBA.3S0 The Fourth Circuit, however,
rejected BCBS's contention that the failure to amend § 1729 in a similar
manner showed that Congress wanted to exclude medigap policies from the
nondiscrimination provision. The court stated that the failure to amend
§ 1729 also could signify that Congress believed the language of the non-
discrimination provision already included medigap policies. Congress's in-
action, therefore, did not clearly exclude medigap policies from the definition
of a health-plan contract. The court also relied on the legislative history to
show that Congress had wanted to clarify, not broaden, the definition of
a health-plan contract by adopting the proposed language. Therefore, the
rejection of the language offered little support to BCBS's claims. After
considering BCBS's arguments, the Fourth Circuit defined a health-plan
contract as a policy that either provides health services or reimburses an
individual for the expenses of health care. 35' Under this definition, a medigap
policy is a health-plan contract under the VBA.
Since the Fourth Circuit decided Blue Cross, the Third Circuit has
followed the decision's rationale in another case involving medigap poli-
cies.352 Although the other circuits have yet to rule on this issue, the Fourth
Circuit's approach appears consistent with the statutory language. 53 The
Fourth Circuit decision also is consistent with earlier cases applying § 1729
to state statutory discrimination.3 54 The most significant result of the Blue
Cross decision is that the VA now may seek reimbursement from insurance
carriers who currently are not reimbursing VA hospitals. Presently, only
twenty of seventy-three BCBS organizations reimburse VA hospitals.3 5 Thus,
349. 10 U.S.C. § 1095(a)(1) (1988).
350. S. 1271, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1991); S. 2455, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1990).
351. See 38 U.S.C. § 1729(i)(1) (Supp. III 1991) (defining "health-plan contract" as
agreement that either provides health services or pays expenses of health services).
352. United States v. Capital Blue Cross, 992 F.2d 1270, 1274 (3d Cir. 1993).
353. See 38 U.S.C. § 1729 (Supp. III 1991) (amending and renumbering 38 U.S.C. § 629
(1988)).
354. See supra note 346 and accompanying text (explaining that Fourth Circuit followed
reasoning of state statutory discrimination cases).
355. United States v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Md., Inc., 989 F.2d 718, 727-28 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 302 (1993).
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insurance companies and their counsel should consider this additional cost
in establishing premiums for their medigap policies.
D. Relief under EMTALA
Persons seeking relief under EMTALA may seek judicial
relief despite state law requiring arbitration of malpractice
claims.
Brooks v. Maryland General Hospital, Inc.
996 F.2d 708 (4th Cir. 1993)
In 1985, Congress enacted the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act (EMTALA) as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act.
356
The Act came in response to a growing concern that hospitals were "dump-
ing" patients unable to pay, by either refusing to provide emergency medical
treatment or transferring patients to other institutions before stabilizing their
emergency conditions.117 Prior to EMTALA, injuries attributable to such
conduct were not actionable because under traditional state tort law, hos-
pitals did not have a legal duty to provide emergency care. To prevent
"patient dumping," Congress enacted EMTALA, which imposes on hos-
pitals a duty to screen uniformly and treat all individuals seeking treatment
for an emergency medical condition based on the hospital's own capabilities
and standards.358
In Brooks v. Maryland General Hospital, Inc.,359 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered, for the first time,
whether a plaintiff seeking relief under EMTALA must first pursue arbi-
tration that state law requires for medical malpractice claims. The Fourth
Circuit concluded that an EMTALA action may proceed without adhering
to such a requirement. The plaintiff, Robert Brooks, complaining of acute
weakness and a sudden inability to walk, sought treatment at the emergency
356. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (Supp. 1991). The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act states that "if any individual comes to the emergency department and a request is
made on the individual's behalf for examination or treatment for a medical condition, the
hospital must provide for an appropriate medical screening examination ... to determine
whether or not an emergency medical condition ... exists." Id. § 1395dd(a). Moreover, if the
hospital determines that an emergency medical condition exists, the hospital has a duty to
provide either "(A) within the staff and facilities available at the hospital, for such further
medical examination and such treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical condition,
or (B) for the transfer of the individual to another medical facility in accordance with
subsection (c) of this section." Id. § 1395dd(b). The Act's only exception to these requirements
is if the patient refuses treatment or refuses transfer. Id.
357. Id. § 1395dd(c)(2)(A)-(B); see also Baber v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872,
873 n.l (4th Cir. 1992) (describing practice of "patient dumping"); Melissa K. Stull, Anno-
tation, Construction and Application of Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(42 U.$.C.S. § 1395dd), 104 A.L.R. FED. 166, 175 (1991) (stating that Congress enacted
EMTALA in response to national epidemic of patient dumping).
358. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)-(b) (Supp. 1991).
359. 996 F.2d 708 (4th Cir. 1993).
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room of Maryland General Hospital (MGH) in Baltimore on October 5,
1989. Over six hours passed before MGH's medical staff first examined
Brooks. He received no medical treatment or evaluation at that time. After
another three and one-half hours, the MGH medical staff transferred him
to the University of Maryland Medical System's (UMMS) emergency room,
where he received a CAT scan. UMMS's medical staff did not read the
results of the CAT scan for three more days because of technical difficulties.
Brooks claimed that ihe unwillingness of both hospitals to diagnose and
stabilize his condition led to treatment delays that caused him permanent
spinal cord damage, requiring surgery and lengthy rehabilitation. He brought
suit against both hospitals and the responsible professionals and alleged a
claim under EMTALA for failure to adequately screen for and stabilize his
emergency medical condition.
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland held that
Brooks's EMTALA claims came under the Maryland Health Care Malprac-
tice Claims Act (Maryland Malpractice Act),316 which required a claimant
to pursue arbitration before filing a malpractice claim in court. The district
court also held that EMTALA did not preempt the state law arbitration
requirement. Because Brooks had not first sought arbitration of his claims,
the district court dismissed his complaint. Brooks appealed.
The defendants' motion to dismiss Brooks's EMTALA claim raised the
issue of whether the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because
of Brooks' failure to comply with the Maryland Malpractice Act's arbitration
requirement. Both in the district court and on appeal, Brooks and the
defendants framed the issue in terms of whether EMTALA "preempted"
the procedural requirements of the Maryland Malpractice Act.
The Fourth Circuit questioned whether any state law, substantive or
procedural, could defeat a federally created cause of action absent incor-
poration of the state law in the federal act. But before addressing this issue,
the Fourth Circuit considered whether Brooks's EMTALA claim was a
malpractice claim under the terms of the Maryland Malpractice Act and,
therefore, in conflict with the Act's arbitration requirements.
The Fourth Circuit first addressed the scope of EMTALA. The court
interpreted EMTALA as imposing two duties on every hospital that has
both a Medicare provider agreement with the Health and Human Services
Department and an emergency room: (1) to provide all patients with "an
appropriate medical screening" for the existence of an emergency medical
condition, and (2) to stabilize the condition or to transfer the patient to
another facility if medically warranted. The court found that while a hospital
must uniformly screen all emergency room patients regardless of financial
status, this duty to screen extends only to the extent of the hospital's
capabilities. The Fourth Circuit, taking note of its prior decision in Baber
v. Hospital Corp. of America,36" ' held that EMTALA was not a malpractice
360. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-01 (1989 & Supp. 1992).
361. 977 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1992).
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statute and that Congress intentionally left the development of malpractice
liability to state law. 62 The court concluded that EMTALA did not create
liability for malpractice based on a community standard of care; rather
EMTALA sought to remedy disparate treatment of patients.
The Fourth Circuit next considered the scope of the Maryland Mal-
practice Act. According to the court, the Maryland law was a response to
a different health care crisis than the one that EMTALA addressed. The
Maryland statute, according to the Fourth Circuit, sought to cap the
escalating costs of health care attributable to increased medical malpractice
litigation. The purpose of the arbitration requirement was to expedite the
resolution of claims, thereby lowering both costs and insurance premiums.
Under the Act, all "claims, suits, and actions" brought against a health
care provider for medical injury must proceed through arbitration.3 63 "Med-
ical injury" means an injury arising or resulting from the rendering or
failure to render health care.36
The Fourth Circuit found that, despite the broad scope of this language,
the Maryland courts had limited the applicability of the Act to traditional
malpractice claims arising from a breach of a health care provider's duty
to comply with a standard of care. The court also found that the Maryland
legislature's recent amendments to the Act further evidenced the limitation
in scope. The amendments provided that a health care provider would not
be liable under the Act unless the provider's care failed to meet a community
standard of care.36 Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Maryland
Malpractice Act applied only to claims arising from an alleged breach of
the community standard of care.
The Fourth Circuit found that Brooks had limited his EMTALA claim
to the disparate treatment he received from the defendants. Having determined
that the Maryland Malpractice Act applied only to claims for a breach of the
community standard of care, the Fourth Circuit held that the Maryland
Malpractice Act did not cover the conduct alleged as the basis of Brooks's
EMTALA claim. The court found no requirement that Brooks seek arbitration
before proceeding with his EMTALA claim in court. Consequently, the court
remanded his claims against the hospitals to the district court for further
proceedings.
By finding that the Maryland Malpractice Act did not cover an EMTALA
claim, the Fourth Circuit avoided the difficult task of resolving the question
of whether EMTALA preempts the state malpractice law. However, in what
appears to be dicta, the court analyzed the defendants' claim that the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of Brooks's failure to comply
with the state-mandated arbitration procedures. The Fourth Circuit held that
362. See Baber v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 880 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that
EMTALA is no substitute for state law medical malpractice actions).
363. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-02 (1989 & Supp. 1992).
364. Id. § 3-2A-01(f).
365. Id. § 3-2A-02(c), amended by Act of Apr. 13, 1993, ch. 9, 1993 Md. Laws 529.
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a substantive state limitation may not apply ex proprio to a federal cause of
action because '[the elements of, and the defenses to, a federal cause of
action are defined by federal law."' 36 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the
real issue presented in Brooks was not whether EMTALA preempted state
law, but rather whether the federal law incorporated, expressly or impliedly,
a state-mandated procedure that defeated the federal right in the case of
noncompliance. In analyzing this issue, the court raised questions regarding
provisions of the Maryland Act that conflicted with EMTALA. Such conflicts
suggested that the federal act did not incorporate the state law requirements.
However, the Fourth Circuit chose to leave these questions unanswered, "ruling
that the Maryland Act, even if incorporated or tolerated by EMTALA, does
not cover an EMTALA claim." 367
The decision of the Fourth Circuit in Brooks is consistent with its own
reasoning in Baber and with most other courts' interpretations of the scope
and purpose of EMTALA. For example, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit held that EMTALA does not create a
federal cause of action for traditional state-based claims of negligence or
malpractice. 316 The District of Columbia Circuit found that allegations of
misdiagnosis, without more, constituted malpractice claims, and as such, were
not cognizable under the federal act. 69 EMTALA claims address disparate
treatment within an individual hospital, whereas traditional state-based mal-
practice claims involve deviations from a broader community standard.
X. LABOR LAW
A. Rehabilitation Act
Employer's imperfect accommodation of employee's
handicap does not amount to constructive discharge.
Johnson v. Shalala
991 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1993), petition for cert. filed,
62 U.S.L.W. 3149 (U.S. Aug. 16, 1993) (No. 93-248)
Plaintiffs seeking to establish discharge in wrongful termination cases find
this relatively easy to do when employers affirmatively act to end the em-
ployment relationship. Employees who leave prior to formal termination,,
on the other hand, have the more difficult job of establishing "constructive
discharge. 3 70 The federal courts generally apply a single standard for
constructive discharge in all types of employment discrimination cases within
366. Brooks v. Maryland Gen. Hosp., Inc., 996 F.2d 708, 714 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 375 (1990)).
367. Id. at 715.
368. Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
369. Id.
370. See Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975)
(stating that employer who constructively discharges employee is just as liable for illegal
conduct as employer who formally discharges).
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their respective jurisdictions.3 7' The federal courts, however, are split over
what elements a former employee must prove to establish constructive
discharge. A majority of courts of appeals require the former employee to
prove only that the employer deliberately created working conditions that
were so intolerable that a reasonable employee would be compelled to
resign.a72 A minority of courts of appeals require the former employee to
prove both that the employer created intolerable working conditions and
that the employer made a deliberate effort to force the employee to quit.
3 73
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit follows the
minority approach.3 74 In Johnson v. Shalala,a75 the Fourth Circuit considered
the issue of when an employer's failure to accommodate an employee as
the Rehabilitation Act of 197376 (Rehabilitation Act) requires amounts to
constructive discharge of that employee.
The plaintiff, Dr. Sharon Johnson, worked at the National Institutes
of Health (NIH) from 1984 to 1986 as head of a group of scientists
responsible for reviewing applications for biomedical research grants. John-
son suffered from numerous ailments, including idiopathic CNS hyper-
somnolence, which is a form of narcolepsy, and cardiac arrhythmia. John-
son's narcoleptic condition required that she sleep nine or more hours per
371. See Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1079 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting
that doctrine of constructive discharge is same in all employee discrimination claims).
372. See Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 344 (10th Cir. 1986) (stating that test for
constructive discharge is whether employer by illegal discriminatory acts has made working
conditions so difficult that reasonable person in employee's position would be compelled to
resign); Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that test for
constructive discharge is whether employer knowingly permitted conditions so intolerable that
reasonable person in employee's shoes would resign); Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d 1380,
1381 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that finding of constructive discharge depends upon whether
reasonable person in employee's position would have felt forced to quit because of intolerable
and discriminatory working conditions); Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119
(lst Cir. 1977) (stating that trier of fact, to find constructive discharge, must be satisfied that
new working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that reasonable person in
employee's situation would have felt compelled to resign); Young v. Southwestern Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that constructive discharge occurs when
employer deliberately makes employee's working conditions so intolerable that employee is
forced into involuntary resignation).
373. See Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating that
constructive discharge exists when employer renders employee's working conditions intolerable
in order to force employee to quit job and that employer's actions must be taken with intention
of forcing employee to quit).
374. See Goldsmith v. Mayor of Baltimore, 987 F.2d 1064, 1071-72 (4th Cir. 1993)
(enunciating requirement that plaintiff show both intolerable working conditions and deliberate
effort by employer to force employee to quit to establish constructive discharge); EEOC v.
Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 944 (4th Cir. 1992) (same); Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d
1009, 1013 (4th Cir. 1991) (same); EEOC v. Service News Co., 898 F.2d 958, 962 n.l (4th
Cir. 1990) (same); Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985) (same),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986).
375. 991 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1993), petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3149 (U.S. Aug.
16, 1993) (No. 93-248).
376. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796(i) (1988 & Supp. IIl 1991).
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night and take short naps during the day. As a result, Johnson often fell
asleep during meetings that she was conducting. She also had difficulty
arriving at work at a fixed time, as she frequently had to pull over for
fifteen minute naps during her daily one hour commute to work.
On August 22, 1985, Johnson requested flexible starting and quitting
times and authorization to change her scheduled work hours more frequently
than the permitted two times per year. Dr. Asher Hyatt, Johnson's imme-
diate superior, requested that she provide medical documentation in support
of her requests. Johnson's physician wrote that a car pooling arrangement
would make Johnson's requests unnecessary, but noted that he understood
that Johnson sometimes needed to work late. NIH's new agency-wide
"flextime policy," which permitted Johnson to vary her arrival time by up
to fifteen minutes, partially satisfied the first of Johnson's requests. Hyatt
responded to Johnson's remaining request by recommending that she car
pool and by permitting her to change her work hours four times per year.
However, Hyatt made no adjustment to Johnson's work schedule to accom-
modate a car pooling arrangement. Johnson joined a car pool, but car
pooling made her drive longer than before on days when it was her turn
to drive. Johnson's inability to commute with the car pool every day because
of her irregular work hours also complicated her situation.
In February 1986, Johnson submitted a request to stay in a Bethesda,
Maryland hotel at government expense during a three day meeting. Hyatt
denied her request. On April 7, 1986, Johnson requested five weeks of leave
without pay to begin on April 9. Johnson accompanied her request with a
letter from her psychologist. The psychologist wrote that Johnson suffered
from extreme physical and psychological exhaustion, which he attributed to
Johnson's long commute and work-place stress. Dr. Friedman, Johnson's
second-level supervisor, approved Johnson's request for leave without pay,
conditioned upon her completion of some requested work prior to leaving.
Johnson had several conflicts with Hyatt over sick-leave benefits shortly
thereafter. Johnson finally completed the work and began her leave without
pay on April 22, 1986. Johnson's supervisors later extended Johnson's leave
at her request.
On June 4, 1986, Dr. Johnson applied for disability retirement benefits.
The next day Hyatt prepared a falsified evaluation, backdated to April 1,
1986. The evaluation stated that Johnson's work had been unsatisfactory.
Hyatt testified at trial that he did not believe this to be the case, but that
he prepared the falsified evaluation to assist Johnson in obtaining disability
retirement. On June 6, 1986, James Pike, another of Johnson's superiors,
wrote Johnson a letter, apparently also to assist Johnson in obtaining
disability retirement. The letter advised Johnson that she must submit to a
psychiatric examination prior to returning to work. Johnson reluctantly
complied.
On August 5, 1986, Johnson met with an official at NIH to discuss
possible reassignment. The official offered Johnson a lower position, which
Johnson declined. Johnson resigned on August 20, 1986, and the government
subsequently awarded her disability retirement benefits. Johnson eventually
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filed this lawsuit, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964177 (Title VII) and the Rehabilitation Act.
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland rejected
Johnson's Title VII claim a 78 The district court, however, finding that NIH
did not reasonably accommodate Johnson's handicap and constructively
discharged her by failing to act in the face of known intolerable conditions,
upheld Johnson's Rehabilitation Act claim.17 9 The district court awarded
Johnson $57,638.39 in backpay, $106,526.63 in attorney's fees, and ordered
her reinstatement at NIH. The government appealed, arguing that the district
court applied an erroneous standard in concluding that NIH constructively
discharged Johnson. Specifically, the government challenged the district
court's finding that Johnson's employers acted deliberately to force her to
resign. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment.
The court of appeals began its discussion by identifying the two elements
necessary for a plaintiff to establish a claim of constructive discharge:
intolerable working conditions and a deliberate effort on the part of the
employer to force the employee to quit. A plaintiff can demonstrate a
deliberate effort to force the employee to quit by presenting either actual
or circumstantial evidence of the employer's intent to drive the employee
from the job. The court admitted that the latter method of establishing
deliberateness did not readily translate to Rehabilitation Act cases because
there were no similarly situated groups of individuals with similar handicaps
with whom to compare Johnson's treatment.
Even so, the Fourth Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that
NIH constructively discharged Johnson because Johnson's supervisors knew
of her need for altered working conditions, but failed to accommodate her.
The court stated that such a standard sweeps too broadly, threatening to
convert every failure to accommodate under the Rehabilitation Act into a
potential-claim for constructive discharge. The court expressed concern that
such a standard would encourage employees to quit their positions without
resorting to congressionally-provided mediatory remedies. This result would
cause employees to lose the advantages of continuity and understanding
that come from remaining at the job site and would cause the government
to lose productivity. The court also expressed concern that unnecessary
termination of the employment relationship would harden the parties' po-
sitions, making them unable to resolve their disputes without judicial inter-
vention.
In applying its constructive discharge standard to the facts of Johnson,
the court concluded that Johnson's evidence was insufficient to show
deliberate intent to drive her from her position, even though the govern-
377. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
378. See Johnson v. Sullivan, 824 F. Supp. 1146, 1157-58 (D. Md. 1991) (discussing denial
of Title VII claim), rev'd, Johnson v. Shalala, 991 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1993), petition for cert.
filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3149 (U.S. Aug. 16, 1993) (No. 93-248).
379. Id. at 1157.
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ment's efforts to accommodate Johnson fell short of the Rehabilitation
Act's requirements. The court noted that NIH responded to Johnson's
requests, even if Johnson frequently found the responses unsatisfactory. In
summary, the court concluded that the evidence Johnson put forth dem-
onstrated a lack of flexibility or magnanimity on the part of her supervisors,
but not a deliberate intent to force Johnson from her job.
The court of appeals went on to state that its holding in this case was
not a sweeping one and that a complete failure to accommodate, in the
face of repeated requests, might suffice to show the deliberateness necessary
to establish constructive discharge. In this case of partial or imperfect
accommodation in the context of an employment relationship that was
difficult for everyone involved, however, Johnson failed to prove construc-
tive discharge.
The'Fourth Circuit's opinion in Johnson neither alters its frequently
enunciated standard for constructive discharge nor reconciles the split of
opinion among the courts of appeals regarding the appropriate standard.
Rather, Johnson merely extends the requirement that plaintiffs show a
deliberate effort by their former employers to force them to quit to cases
in which employers have statutorily defined obligations to accommodate
employees' handicaps. Plaintiffs making claims under the Rehabilitation Act
are likely to find proving constructive discharge more difficult in the Fourth
Circuit than in circuits that follow the majority approach. 80 Additionally,
employers who fail to accommodate the requests of handicapped employees
fully may find themselves less vulnerable to suits for constructive discharge
in the Fourth Circuit. The court in Johnson, however, leaves to future
decisions the questions of what plaintiffs must prove to establish constructive
discharge in Rehabilitation Act cases and how far employers must go to
accommodate handicapped workers.
B. Fair Labor Standards Act
Fourth Circuit distinguishes between police officers who
are management personnel and are not entitled to
backpay under the overtime policies of the FLSA and
those officers who are entitled to backpay.
Shockley v. City of Newport News
997 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1993)
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)38' presents a dilemma for many
local governments. While good fiscal practice and fiduciary accountability
to taxpayers require the localities not to pay public servants for work they
have not performed, the FLSA requires localities to pay overtime to salaried
380. See supra note 372 and accompanying text (discussing constructive discharge standard
majority of courts of appeals follow).
381. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
FOR THE CIVIL PRACTITIONER
employees or, else, allow those employees to miss work without penalty.38 2
In many cases, localities that established overtime policies before Congress
passed the FLSA have failed to modify those policies in a timely fashion
in order to bring them into accord with the FLSA. a8 a As a result, public
servants in those localities have eagerly lined up at the doors of courthouses
to bring suits for overtime pay; and courts have been steadily, but cautiously,
granting backpay for overtime to some of those employees? 84 The courts
have made decisions in these cases, always with the awareness that policies
the localities established in a good faith effort to protect taxpayers now
could possibly bankrupt some localities."'
Management and administrative personnel cannot claim the benefits of
FLSA's overtime policies. 3 6 As a result, localities have defended pay policies
in some suits by arguing that the personnel in question, the plaintiffs, fall
within this exemption from FLSA provisions.38 7 In deciding whether an
employee fits under the category of managerial employee, a court must
determine whether more than fifty percent of an employee's time is spent
on duties that require the employee to supervise other workers. 8  To
determine whether an employee can be labeled an administrative worker, a
court must determine whether more than fifty percent of the employee's
time is spent working with data, drawing conclusions from that data, and
acting, with great discretion, on the basis of that data.389
In Shockley v. City of Newport News,a90 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered exactly these issues. Thirty-two
former and current police officers, claiming a right to back pay for overtime
worked since September 1987, brought this action against the City of
382. 29 U.S.C. §§ 207, 213; see Paulitz v. City of Naperville, 781 F. Supp. 1368, 1374
(N.D. 11. 1992) (finding threat of discipline of employees disqualified employees from salaried
status).
383. Paulitz, 781 F. Supp. at 1374.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 1370. The provisions of FLSA do not distinguish between private and public
sectors. Id.
386. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-213(a)(1).
387. See Michigan Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 992 F.2d
82, 86 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding that ambiguous sick leave policy that might have permitted
compensation reductions for absences did not jeopardize salaried status of supervisors); Smith
v. City of Jackson, 954 F.2d 296, 299 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that district chiefs and battalion
chiefs are exempt administrative employees); Atlanta Professional Firefighters Union, Local
134 v. City of Atlanta, 920 F.2d 800, 807 (lth Cir. 1991) (finding that fire department
captains qualified for FLSA's administrative exemption); Abshire v. County of Kern, 908 F.2d
483, 490 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding employees were not paid on salary basis and therefore are
not exempt from FLSA overtime pay provisions); Lacey v. Indiana State Police Dep't, 810 F.
Supp. 244, 247 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (holding that chemists employed by police department were
not salaried because they were subject to pay reductions for minor infractions, such as tardiness
or discourteousness).
388. See Smith, 954 F.2d at 299 (applying test of managerial status to firefighters).
389. See Atlanta Professional Firefighters Union, 920 F.2d at 804 (applying test for
administrative status to fire chiefs).
390. 997 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1993).
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Newport News (City). The plaintiffs worked in the following capacities:
patrol sergeants, storefront operation sergeant, support unit sergeant, crim-
inal investigations squads sergeants, narcotics unit teams sergeant, ethics
and standards lieutenant, and media relations sergeants. The City argued
that all of the plaintiffs were bona fide administrative or executive personnel,
and, therefore, they were exempt from FLSA overtime provisions. The
plaintiffs argued that they were not administrative or executive workers
because they did not fall within either part of the two-prong test that would
exempt them from FLSA provisions. First, the plaintiffs argued that the
City maintained a policy allowing the City to dock plaintiffs' pay for part-
day absences, as well as for failing to report absences. Second, the plaintiffs
stated that they did not carry out duties primarily administrative or mana-
gerial in nature.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
disagreed with the plaintiffs' second contention and found that all of them
performed duties that were essentially administrative, managerial, or both.
However, the district court agreed with the plaintiffs on the issue of the
City's policy of docking pay for part-day absences. The district court decided
that such a policy allows for a reduction in pay based on quantity and
quality of work, creating an hourly-wage employee out of even an employee
whose duties are 100% managerial.3 91
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with some of the factual conclusions the
trial court made, but affirmed most of the lower court's decision. The
Fourth Circuit stated that no evidence existed in the record to support the
trial court's finding that the officers could be fined for part-day absences.
The plaintiffs had offered as evidence only a memorandum to the officers
from the chief of police that contained an inaccurate description of the
City's actual policy. But the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's
conclusion that the officers were salaried employees on the ground that city
policy allowed deduction in pay as a penalty for failure to report absences.
The Fourth Circuit noted that the FLSA does not permit an employer to
decrease the pay of a salaried employee for variations in quantity or quality
of work. The only exception to this general prohibition permits penalties
exacted for an employee's violation of a major safety policy. An example
of a major safety policy is a ban on smoking at explosives plants, oil
refineries, or coal mines. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the officers
were not salaried employees because they were subject to disciplinary fines.
Although the court found that all of the plaintiffs were hourly-wage
employees entitled to overtime pay, it also found that they became salaried
employees after September 6, 1991, when the Department of Labor prom-
ulgated regulations specifically allowing local governments to dock the pay
of employees who were absent without leave. However, to prove that the
plaintiffs were exempt from FLSA pay provisions, the City would have to
391. Paulitz v. City of Naperville, 781 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (N.D. I1. 1992).
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show not only that the employees were salaried, but also that the employees'
duties were primarily administrative or managerial. The Fourth Circuit
devoted the remainder of its decision to a job-by-job analysis to determine
whether the now-salaried officers were still exempt from the FLSA's pay
provisions. The test for managerial employees requires that the court deter-
mine whether more than fifty percent of an employee's time is spent on
duties that require the employee to supervise other workers. The test for
administrative workers requires that the court determine whether more than
fifty percent of the employee's time is spent working with data, drawing
conclusions from that data, and acting, with great discretion, on the basis
of that data.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the patrol sergeants, the storefront
operation sergeant, the support unit sergeant, the criminal investigations
squads sergeants, and the narcotics unit teams sergeant all performed
supervisory duties, which exempted them from the FLSA pay provisions.
The Fourth Circuit noted that all of these officers supervised other officers
and spent time in the field primarily in order to evaluate and supervise
lower-ranking officers. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
holding that the ethics and standards lieutenant qualified for the adminis-
trative exemption, but reversed the district court's holding that the media
relations sergeants also qualified for the administrative exemption. The
ethics and standards lieutenant spent most of her duty hours investigating
misconduct by other officers. The Fourth Circuit pointed to the facts that
she also made recommendations as to how the City should dispose of
complaints against officers and that her supervisors followed her recom-
mendations about ninety percent of the time. These facts indicated that she
had sufficient discretion to qualify her as an administrative worker. How-
ever, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the media relations sergeants per-
formed work that did not give them discretion. These sergeants spent most
of their duty hours screening calls to the chief of police, releasing infor-
mation to the press, and developing an ongoing news broadcast called
"Crime of the Week." The media relations sergeants used discretion only
in their work on the television broadcast.
The district court concluded that the patrol lieutenants and crime
analysis sergeants qualified for exemption from FLSA's overtime pay re-
quirements because their work involved a combination of executive and
administrative duties. The Fourth Circuit noted that one type of work may
be "tacked" onto the other for FLSA purposes. The Fourth Circuit,
complaining that the district court had not pointed to any facts to support
its conclusion, remanded the question of the status of these employees.
In Shockley, the Fourth Circuit avoided discussing any of the larger
policy issues that surround FLSA, but it seemed to wield the scalpel of
FLSA with some precision, apparently in an effort to minimize damage to
the City's purse while still being fair to the police officers. Most of this
decision dealt with the issue of whether a disciplinary pay policy disqualifies
an employee from treatment as a salaried worker. So far the circuit courts
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seem to agree that such a policy 4isqualifies employees from salaried
status.39 2 Shockley puts the Fourth Circuit in accord with the other circuits
that have examined the question of overtime policies for government em-
ployees.
393
C. National Labor Relations Act
Fourth Circuit upholds ALU's findings and conclusions
that employer committed unfair labor practices in refusing
to rehire former employees because of their pro-union
activities.
NLRB v. Low Kit Mining Co.
3 F.3d 720 (4th Cir. 1993)
Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (Act) deems as an unfair
labor practice an attempt on the part of an employer to coerce employees
in the exercise of their rights under section 7 of the Act and to discriminate
in regard to hiring by encouraging or discouraging participation in a labor
organization. a94 Section 7 of the Act guarantees employees the right to
organize and participate in labor organizations.
39 5
In 1941, the United States Supreme Court held in Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. NLRB 96 that an employer engages in an unfair labor practice when the
employer refuses to hire an employee solely because of that employee's
affiliations with a labor organization. 397 TAe Court based this determination
on section 8(a)(3) of the Act, which provides that an employer engages in
392. See Klein v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Ctr., 990 F.2d 279, 286 (7th Cir.
1993) (finding improper discipline of employee disqualified employee from salaried status).
But see Michigan Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 992 F.2d 82,
85-86 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding that ambiguous sick leave policy that might have permitted
compensation reductions for absences did not jeopardize salaried status of supervisors).
393. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 954 F.2d 296, 299 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that district
chiefs and battalion chiefs are exempt administrative employees); Atlanta Professional Fire-
fighters Union, Local 134 v. City of Atlanta, 920 F.2d 800, 805 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding that
fire department captains qualified for FLSA's administrative exemption); Abshire v. County
of Kern, 908 F.2d 483, 488-90 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding employees were not paid on salary
basis and therefore are not exempt from FLSA pay overtime provisions).
394. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1), (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1988).
395. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act provides
employees with:
[T]he right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and ... the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to
the extent that -such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in
a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3)
of this title.
Id.
396. 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
397. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941).
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an unfair labor practice if the employer discourages membership in any
labor organization by discrimination in regard to hire. w39 In 1983, in NLRB
v. Transportation Management Corp.,3 99 the Supreme Court established a
two-step test to determine whether an employer's motivation in discharging
an employee is improper under the Act. 400 Under the Transportation Man-
agement test, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) must establish
that an anti-union animus prompted the employer's action in firing the
employee. 40 ' Once the NLRB establishes its case, the burden shifts to the
employer to show that regardless of any illegal motivation, the employer
would have taken the same course of action.
4 0 2
In NLRB v. Low Kit Mining Co.,403 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit considered whether to enforce an order of the NLRB
adopting the recommended factual findings, conclusions of law, and rem-
edies of the Administrative Lav Judge (ALJ). 40 The ALJ found, inter alia,
that the Low Kit Mining Company (Low Kit) committed unfair labor
practices in refusing to rehire former employees because of their pro-union
activities. Finding that substantial evidence existed to support the NLRB's
findings, the Fourth Circuit granted the NLRB's application for enforcement
of its order.
In December 1990, Logan Coal and Export Company (Logan) leased
the mineral rights to bituminous coal mined on Spangler Mountain in
Kanawha County, West Virginia. J.G. Leasing 'had a contract with Logan
to mine the coal and a subcontract with Spangler Coal Company (Spangler)
for Spangler to supply the labor. Spangler's mine superintendent, Dwayne
Atkins, recruited employees to work the mine. During recruitment inter-
views, Atkins intimated that he wanted the mine to run on a non-union
basis and that the lessors of the mineral rights would terminate the contract
if the workers unionized.
Spangler hired twenty to twenty-five workers, but did not withhold
taxes or social security from their paychecks. Atkins told the employees
that Spangler could not afford to pay these taxes. Several employees then
contacted a United Mine Worker's Association (Union) organizer to inquire
about joining the Union. Alan Nichols, a Spangler employee, began soliciting
Union memberships in February 1991, and fifteen employees signed mem-
bership cards.
The Union informed Spangler that it was organizing Spangler employees.
Atkins responded by informing the employees that the mine would close if
they joined the Union and that he would know which employees attended
the Union meeting. Nichols told Atkins he was soliciting Union memberships
398. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988).
399. 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
400. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 401 (1983).
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. 3 F.3d 720 (4th Cir. 1993).
404. Low Kit Mining Co., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (1992).
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and would not give the cards to the Union because he did not want to lose
his job. On March 15, 1991, Spangler fired seven employees, including
Nichols, for lack of work. These seven employees had signed the Union
membership cards, had a good work record, and were well-qualified. The
seven fired employees picketed the mine, the other employees observed the
line, and Atkins rehired the seven employees after a week.
The Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB against
Spangler for the March 15 firing. The Union charged Spangler with coercive
conduct, including interrogating interviewees, threatening to fire employees
and close the mine, and creating the impression of surveillance. The NLRB
issued a complaint on May 7, 1991. Throughout this process, the Union
continued organizing Spangler's workers. On April 12, 1991, the Union
filed a petition with the NLRB to represent certain Spangler employees in
collective bargaining negotiations with management. Atkins sent a letter
dated April 29, 1991, to Spangler employees that confirmed an oral promise
to give the employees a raise and insurance benefits. Whether Spangler
made this promise before the Union filed its petition on April 12 was in
dispute.
The NLRB held a representation election at Spangler on May 17 to
determine whether the Union would have the right to represent the employees
in the negotiations. The Union lost the election by three votes, twelve to
nine. On May 22, the Union filed objections to the election alleging that
Spangler's promise of a raise and insurance benefits was a bribe that
disrupted the election. The NLRB scheduled a hearing in September for
both the unfair labor practice complaint and the election objections.
On July 8, Spangler laid-off Nichols and three other employees (Dis-
criminatees) because of poor coal sales. Neither the NLRB nor the Union
attacked these lay-offs. Beasley, Spangler's foreman, replaced Atkins as
mine superintendent in July. Spangler. terminated operations on August 17
because of poor sales. Logan's president established Low Kit, named Beasley
president and mine superintendent, and began operations on August 19.
Before the scheduled September hearing, Low Kit and the Union reached
a settlement agreement that required Low Kit to stop engaging in coercive
conduct and to send "Expungement Letters" to the employees discharged
in March informing them that their discharge would not be used as a basis
for future personnel actions. For undisclosed reasons, the agreement did
not require Low Kit to recall any of the Discriminatees. The NLRB approved
the agreement on September 25, 1991. Low Kit did not send out the
Expungement Letters as required.
The Discriminatees tried to return to work in August and September,
but Beasley told them that Low Kit was not hiring at that time. Beasley
also told the Discriminatees that they needed to fill out new employment
applications. One Discriminatee completed a new job application, but Low
Kit did not recall him. However, Low Kit hired five new employees during
that time. The Union filed a second unfair labor practice charge against
Low Kit on November 22, 1991, alleging harassment and discrimination
against Union sympathizers. The regional director for the NLRB vacated
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the settlement agreement on January 10, 1992, and issued a consolidated
complaint alleging that in refusing to recall the four Discriminatees, Low
Kit discriminated in regard to the hiring of its employees in violation of
sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
The ALJ found that Low Kit violated the Act by failing to recall the
Discriminatees because of their pro-union sympathies. The ALJ also found
that Low Kit violated the settlement agreement by not sending the Expunge-
ment Letters. The ALJ recommended setting aside the settlement agreement.
Because Low Kit was Spangler's successor in interest and knew of the
complaint pending before the NLRB when it took over, the ALJ found
that Low Kit should be held responsible for Spangler's unfair labor practice
violations committed before the settlement agreement. The ALJ recom-
mended that Low Kit be required to stop the illegal conduct and stop
interfering with the employees' statutory rights to participate in union
activities. The ALJ recommended setting aside the representation election
held on March 17, 1991. The ALJ also recommended reinstating the
Discriminatees with back pay as a remedy for unfair labor practices com-
mitted after the agreement. The NLRB adopted the ALJ's findings with
minor modifications and petitioned the Fourth Circuit for enforcement of
its order.
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Low Kit presented three objections to
the ALJ's findings. First, Low Kit alleged that the ALJ erred in finding
that Low Kit committed unfair labor practices by refusing to recall the
Discriminatees. Second, Low Kit alleged that the ALJ erred in finding that
Low Kit discriminated in regard to hire against the Discriminatees. Third,
Low Kit alleged the ALJ erroneously recommended vacating the results of
the employees' votes in the Union representation election.
Low Kit advanced two theories for its argument that the ALJ was
incorrect in finding unfair labor practice in refusing to recall the Discrimi-
natees. First, Low Kit argued that an employer has a duty to recall former
employees only when the employer improperly discharged the employees.
Low Kit alleged that because the NLRB did not challenge Spangler's original
discharge of the employees, the NLRB could not find that Low Kit had a
duty to recall them.
The Fourth Circuit looked to the Supreme Court's opinion in Phelps
and stated that the reason for the original discharge is irrelevant when an
employer refuses to rehire a former employee because of that employee's
union activities. The decision not to hire someone based on that person's
union activities is an unfair labor practice unto itself. The court found that
the NLRB sufficiently alleged the unfair labor practice of discrimination in
regard to hire because of anti-union animus and, therefore, held that the
reason for the employee's original discharge was irrelevant.
Second, Low Kit argued that the NLRB's complaint did not give
adequate notice of the specific labor practice challenged. The Fourth Circuit
rejected Low Kit's argument that the complaint only gave notice of a failure
to reinstate the Discriminatees and held that the complaint clearly alleged
a violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act in refusing to recall the
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Discriminatees because of anti-union animus. The Fourth Circuit determined
that because section 8(a)(3) specifically refers to "discrimination in regard
to hire," Low Kit had adequate notice of the challenged labor practices.
With respect to Low Kit's second objection, that the ALJ was incorrect
in finding that Low Kit discriminated in regard to hire against the Discri-
minatees, Low Kit also advanced two theories. First, Low Kit alleged that
the decision to hire other workers was not discriminatory because none of
the Discriminatees filled out new job applications. Second, Low Kit alleged
that the new employees were more qualified than the Discriminatees.
The Fourth Circuit applied the principles of Transportation Management
to Low Kit. The court used the Transportation Management two-step test
to determine whether Low Kit's motivation in refusing to rehire the Discri-
minatees was improper under the Act. Under the first step, the NLRB must
establish that Low Kit's decision not to rehire the Discriminatees was
motivated by anti-union animus. The court found that substantial evidence
supported the NLRB's finding that Low Kit refused to rehire Discriminatees
because of their pro-union sympathies. Specifically, the court found that
the record demonstrated that Low Kit was aware of pro-union activities,
the membership cards, and the picket line; Low Kit told the Discriminatees
it was not hiring when in fact it was hiring new employees; and Low Kit
hired the new employees on referral from employees who had crossed the
picket line, thus displaying anti-union sympathies. Because the NLRB es-
tablished that anti-union animus motivated Low Kit's decision not to rehire
the discriminatees, the court then considered step two of the test.
Step two of the Transportation Management test requires Low Kit to
offer persuasive evidence that it would have hired the new employees
regardless of its anti-union animus. Low Kit argued that none of the
Discriminatees applied for a job and the new employees were more qualified
than the Discriminatees. The court found that substantial evidence existed
to support the NLRB's finding that these arguments were pretextual. Spe-
cifically, Low Kit did not require any other Spangler employee to fill out
a new job application as a prerequisite to employment by Low Kit, one of
the Discriminatees had filled out an application yet he was not hired for a
position for which he was qualified, and the Discriminatees were qualified
for four of the five positions for which Low Kit hired new employees.
With respect to Low Kit's third objection, that the ALJ wrongly
recommended vacating the results of the employees' vote in the Union
representation election, the Fourth Circuit held that the issue was not ripe
for judicial review. Although the NLRB ordered a second election, the court
stated that the order requiring a second election would not be reviewable
until the NLRB orders Low Kit to comply with the results of the second
election.
The Fourth Circuit followed previous Fourth Circuit cases in deciding
Low Kit.40 1 The decision of the Fourth Circuit in Low Kit is also in accord
405. See NLRB v. General Wood Preserving Co., 905 F.2d 803, 818 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting
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with the decisions of other jurisdictions. 4 6 The Supreme Court decision in
Transportation Management governs all cases involving questions of em-
ployer motivation in alleged unfair labor practices under the Act. Other
circuits have used the two-step test to determine the propriety of employer
motivation in unfair labor practice cases.4 07 Two circuit courts have ad-
dressed the specific issue of refusal to recall former employees s.4 0 The Fourth
Circuit's decision in Low Kit is in agreement with these other circuits.
XI. PENSIONs/ERISA
A. Review of Decisions of Fiduciaries Under ERISA Plans
Although courts will accord great deference to the
determinations of private insurance companies as
fiduciaries under ERISA plans, courts will show less
deference to insurers with potential conflicts of interests.
Doe v. Group Hospitalization & Medical Services
3 F.3d 80 (4th Cir. 1993)
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) regulates the
management and administration of employer-furnished health insurance plans.
Specifically, the Act requires disclosure of information relating to ERISA
plans, imposes standards of conduct for fiduciaries of these plans, and
establishes procedures for the resolution of disputes arising under ERISA
plans. 409 Under 29 U.S.C. § 1051, health insurance plans do not qualify as
vested benefits. 410 Therefore, an employer may alter health benefits at any
time so long as modifications comply with ERISA requirements and the plan's
terms.4"
that employer is not required to hire former employee of predecessor, but if successor does not
hire such employee because of employee's pro-union activities or employer's anti-union animus,
then successor, by discrimination in regard to hire, commits unfair labor practice).
406. See infra note 408 (listing cases holding refusal to rehire employee because of
employer's anti-union animus is unfair labor practice).
407. See Davis Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 2 F.3d 1162, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (applying
Transportation Management test to case of employees allegedly discharged for pro-union
activities); Birch Run Welding & Fabricating, Inc. v. NLRB, 761 F.2d 1175, 1181 (6th Cir.
1985) (holding that lay-offs motivated by anti-union animus are unfair labor practice); NLRB
v. Industrial Erectors, Inc., 712 F.2d 1131, 1140 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that anti-union animus
motivated lay-offs).
408. See Elastic Stop Nut Div. of Harvard Indus. v. NLRB, 921 F.2d 1275, 1281 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (holding that refusal to hire employees of predecessor who belong to union because
of anti-union animus is unfair labor practice); NLRB v. Jakel Motors, Inc., 875 F.2d 644, 646-
48 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that refusal to recall employees because of anti-union animus is
unfair labor practice).
409. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988).
410. Id. § 1051.
411. Id.
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Moreover, ERISA allows firms to contract with private insurance carriers
to offer health insurance plans.4 2 The insurance carrier may assume respon-
sibility for both administering the plan and settling disputes regarding coverage
under the plan. Under these circumstances, the insurance company also
undertakes a fiduciary obligation to employees participating in the plan.
43
When disputes regarding a fiduciary's determination arise under ERISA, courts
generally show considerable deference to the fiduciary's findings and intervene
only in cases of abuse.4 14 However, when the fiduciary has a potential conflict
of interest, the courts grant less deference to the fiduciary's judgment.
415
In Doe v. Group Hospitalization & Medical Services,4 6 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered the propriety of an
insurance carrier's denial of coverage under an amendment to its contract with
a law firm. The dispute arose after doctors diagnosed one of the firm's
attorneys with multiple myeloma in December 1991. A month later, the doctors
recommended that the attorney undergo a procedure that included massive
radiation treatment and chemotherapy followed by a bone marrow transplant.
In March 1991, the carrier, Blue Cross, denied coverage to the attorney on
the basis of an amendment to the carrier's contract with the law firm. The
amendment, dated November 30, 1990, explicitly excluded coverage for bone
marrow transplants and expenditures related to bone marrow transplants. The
attorney and law firm filed this suit, claiming that the amendment was invalid
because Blue Cross did not adopt it in accordance with the original contract.
Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that the amendment violated the contract's
requirement that Blue Cross wait at least one year and give sixty days notice
before amending the agreement. The plaintiffs also contended that even if
Blue Cross did comply with the terms of the contract, the amendment's
language misled the plaintiffs about the scope of the changes in coverage.
The Fourth Circuit first considered the plaintiffs' argument that Blue
Cross failed to follow the time provisions for amending the contract. The
court noted that the law firm executed the original contract with Blue Cross
in January 1989. Eight months later, Blue Cross amended the contract to
reduce the amendment notice requirement from sixty to thirty days. The
Fourth Circuit explained that because the contract required Blue Cross to wait
one year before amending, this first amendment took effect in January 1990.
In November 1990, Blue Cross amended the contract a second time, excluding
coverage of bone marrow transplants and expenditures related to bone marrow
transplants. The court held that this amendment became effective thirty days
later and, therefore, applied when the attorney requested coverage in January
1992.
412. Id. § 1002(1).
413. Id. § 1002(21)(A).
414. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989) (holding "deferential
standard of review is appropriate when a trustee exercises discretionary powers").
415. Id. at 115 (holding fiduciary's conflict of interest is relevant in considering possible
abuse of discretion).
416. 3 F.3d 80 (4th Cir. 1993).
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The court next turned to the plaintiffs' alternative contention that the
amendment's language regarding coverage was misleading. The plaintiffs ar-
gued that the amendment described its purpose as a clarification of coverage
and did not adequately explain that the amendment actually limited coverage.
The Fourth Circuit disagreed, noting that the law firm signed the original
contract, which recognized Blue Cross's right to change health insurers, the
firm continued to pay premiums after receiving notice of the amendment, and
the firm relied on the change in coverage in arranging insurance from other
sources.
The Fourth Circuit next considered whether the amendment's language
supported Blue Cross's decision to deny coverage for the transplant, chemo-
therapy, and radiation treatment. The court noted that because the insurance
company assumed the role of settling coverage questions, the company became
a fiduciary under ERISA.4 7 The court reviewed the appropriate standard of
review for fiduciary decisions and determined that the carrier's potential
conflict of interest entitled the carrier's determination to less deference than
the court would accord a disinterested fiduciary.
In determining the proper standard of review, the court distinguished
between two roles the insurer might hold. First, because Blue Cross adminis-
tered the health plan for the lav firm, the court found that Blue Cross
assumed a fiduciary obligation with respect to decisions in its administrative
capacity. Second, the court considered whether Blue Cross also assumed a
role in dealing with coverage questions. The court noted that Blue Cross's
denial of coverage should receive deference only if the contract delegated
authority over coverage questions to Blue Cross. The court found that the
firm did delegate authority to determine eligibility for coverage to Blue Cross.
However, because the coverage question in this case directly affects the financial
interests of Blue Cross, the court held that Blue Cross's conflict of interest
should lessen the deference the court affords Blue Cross's decision to deny
coverage.
The court of appeals finally turned to the question of whether the second
policy amendment excluded coverage for the treatment sought. The court
reviewed the purpose of each procedure. Chemotherapy and radiation treat-
ment are the primary procedures for treating the attorney's condition. The
bone marrow transplant follows the chemotherapy and radiation because these
procedures substantially weaken a patient's bone marrow. In other words, the
transplant itself does not treat the patient's condition. Instead, it merely repairs
damage incidental to the condition's treatment.
The Fourth Circuit recognized that the second amendment clearly excluded
the bone marrow transplant from coverage. The court then considered whether
the chemotherapy and radiation treatment also were incidental to the trans-
plant. The court examined the word "related" and held that it applied only
to expenses that support excluded procedures. An expense "supports" a
procedure when the expense arises as a necessary supplement to the procedure.
417. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1988).
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Because the chemotherapy and radiation treatment do not support the bone
marrow transplant, but instead constitute independent procedures, the court
found that the contract and second amendment did not exclude the chemo-
therapy and radiation treatment. In support of its position, the court observed
that the contract's terms provided coverage for the chemotherapy and radiation
treatment.
In summary, the Fourth Circuit noted that an insurance carrier may
assume two separate fiduciary obligations, each giving rise to separate duties,
toward its beneficiaries and their employers. The court also followed prior
decisions in this area of the law by holding that a fiduciary standing in a
position of conflict of interest receives less deference on its coverage decisions
than the deference generally granted to a disinterested fiduciary. The court's
decision reflects a propensity to scrutinize more closely decisions by carriers
delegated the responsibility of determining the scope of coverage, but the
decision also highlights the importance of closely monitoring changes in the
terms of one's health insurance policy.
B. United Mine Workers of America 1974 P.ension Plan
Denial of worker benefits under UMW 1974 Pension Trust
is proper when the Trustees determine that the worker
received injuries while en route to work and not as a result
of a "mine accident."
Lockhart v. United Mine Workers of America 1974 Pension Trust
5 F.3d 74 (4th Cir. 1993)
The United Mine Workers of America 1974 Pension Plan (1974 Pension
Plan) allows a worker to receive a disability pension upon retirement if the
worker becomes "totally disabled ... as a result of a mine accident. '418 A
worker who meets the requirements of the 1974 Pension Plan must submit an
application for the disability pension to the Director of the United Mine
Workers of America Health and Retirement Funds Field Service Office.
4 1 9 If
the Field Service Office denies the application for a disability pension, the
worker can apply to the Trustees (Trustees) of the United Mine Workers of
America 1974 Pension Trust (1974 Pension Trust) for review of the applica-
tion.4 20 If the Trustees deny the application, the worker is entitled to seek
relief in federal court under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. 42'
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,422 the United States Supreme Court
418. See UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA HEALTH AND RETIREMENT FUNDS, 1974
PENSION PLAN AND TRUST: SUMMARY PLAN DESCRIPTION 12 (1989) (describing requirements for
obtaining disability pensions).
419. Id. at 9.
420. Id. at 10.
421. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)
(1988) (allowing beneficiary to bring civil action to enforce his rights under terms of plan).
422. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
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provided the appropriate standard of review for such cases, holding that a
reviewing court must use an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a
denial of benefits if the benefit plan gives the administrator discretion to
determine eligibility.
42 3
In Lockhart v. United Mine Workers of America 1974 Pension Trust,
424
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether
the Trustees of the 1974 Pension Trust properly denied an application for a
disability pension under the 1974 Pension Plan. Clarence Lockhart (Lockhart)
operated a coal tipple for Amherst Industries, Inc. (Amherst) in Huntington,
West Virginia. On January 17, 1976, Lockhart parked his car in an empty
lot that Amherst employees regularly used, but which was not on company
property. In order to reach the coal tipple from the lot, Lockhart had to
climb between several railroad cars blocking his path to his work site. As
Lockhart climbed between two railroad cars, they began to move and Lockhart
fell underneath the moving cars. Both of his legs were severed.
Lockhart resumed work nine months after the accident, continuing work
until Amherst shut down the coal tipple in February of 1989. On November
16, 1989, Lockhart, asserting that he became "totally disabled as a result of
a mine accident," applied for a disability pension from the 1974 Pension
Trust. When the Director of the United Mine Workers of America Health
and Retirement Funds Field Service Office denied the application, Lockhart
appealed to the Trustees of the 1974 Pension Trust. The Trustees upheld the
denial on the ground that Lockhart's injury occurred while he was en route
to work and not as a result of a "mine accident." Lockhart, alleging that the
Trustees arbitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably denied his application for
a disability pension, then brought suit in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of West Virginia.
After a remand to the Trustees failed to resolve the issue, the district
court granted Lockhart's motion for summary judgment. The district court's
determination centered on the similarities between the facts of Lockhart's case
and those of Donald Harless, to whom the Trustees gave a disability pension.
Finding the two cases indistinguishable, the district court concluded that the
Trustees acted arbitrarily and capriciously in granting a pension to one worker
while denying it to the other.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit determined that an abuse of discretion
standard is applicable when a benefit plan awards discretionary authority to
a fiduciary to determine eligibility for benefits or to interpret the terms of the
plan. Consequently, the Lockhart court used the abuse of discretion standard
to analyze the language of the 1974 Pension Plan, the rules and regulations
promulgated under the 1974 Pension Plan, and the consistency with which
the Trustees interpreted provisions of the 1974 Pension Plan.
The Fourth Circuit began by examining the language of the 1974 Pension
Plan. After noting that the 1974 Pension Plan failed to provide a definition
423. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989) (holding that
courts should review denial of benefits only for abuse of discretion).
424. 5 F.3d 74 (4th Cir. 1993).
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of "mine accident," the Lockhart court concluded that Lockhart could not
use the plain meaning of the language of the 1974 Pension Plan to support
his contention that the Trustees abused their discretion in determining that
Lockhart's injury occurred while he was en route to work.
The Lockhart court next analyzed the rules and regulations that the
Trustees promulgated to provide guidance for the implementation of the 1974
Pension Plan. Based on these guidelines, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a
worker would be in a "mine accident" if injured while preparing for the day's
work, but not if injured while going to or returning from work. The Lockhart
court subsequently concluded that the Trustees used a rational interpretation
of the guidelines of the 1974 Pension Plan to determine that Lockhart was
en route to work and, therefore, not injured in a "mine accident." Therefore,
the Trustees did not abuse their discretion in denying benefits to Lockhart.
Finally, Lockhart alleged, and the district court agreed, that his case is
indistinguishable from that of Donald Harless (Harless), to whom the Trustees
granted a disability pension. Harless had just changed into his work clothes
in the company bathhouse and was going to a lamphouse to retrieve his lamp,
which he needed for his job, when he fell on an icy parking lot. Finding that
the accident occurred while Harless was retrieving a lamp, a task required by
his employer before he could begin his day's work, the Trustees granted
Harless a disability pension. In contrast, the Trustees concluded that Lockhart
was not performing a task required by his employer in preparation for the
day's work. Based upon its analysis of the two cases, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the Trustees acted within their discretion in distinguishing the
Harless case from Lockhart's.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the denial of Lockhart's application
for a disability pension did not violate the language, rules, or regulations of
the 1974 Pension Plan. Having also found that the denial was consistent with
prior decisions by the Trustees, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's
grant of summary judgment in Lockhart's favor and remanded the case for
an entry of summary judgment against Lockhart.
The decision in Lockhart makes clear that the Fourth Circuit agrees that
a court should accord an administrator or fiduciary of a benefit plan a great
deal of deference when the administrator interprets the language, regulations,
and applicable precedent concerning the benefit plan. The abuse of discretion
standard and the Fourth Circuit's refusal to substitute its own interpretations
for those of the Trustees are representative of this view. The Fourth Circuit's
approach is in accord with both its own precedent 421 and cases from other
425. See Doe v. Group Hospitalization & Medical Servs., 3 F.3d 80, 85 (4th Cir. 1993)
(determining reviewing court cannot disturb reasonable interpretation by fiduciary with author-
ized discretion); Davis v. Burlington Indus. 966 F.2d 890, 894-95 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding that
reviewing court must defer to reasonable interpretation of plan by fiduciary with authorized
discretion when provision ambiguous); De Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1188 (4th Cir.
1989) (finding that court cannot replace fiduciary's reasonable interpretation of disputed pro-
vision with one of own); Holland v. Burlington Indus. 772 F.2d 1140, 1149 (4th Cir. 1985)
(same), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901, and cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986); cf. Cotter v. Eastern
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circuits that have addressed this issue. 426 Particularly analogous is the Third
Circuit's decision in Moats v. United Mine Workers of America Health &
Retirement Funds 27 In Moats, an employee injured himself in an auto accident
on his employer's property as he was leaving work, but the Trustees denied
his application for a disability pension after determining the injury was not
the result of a "mine accident."'42 The Third Circuit, reviewing a judgment
of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
that the Trustees acted arbitrarily and capriciously, held that the Trustees
rationally interpreted the applicable provisions and guidelines and, therefore,
reversed the lower court.4
29
XII. Surs AoAiNsT GOVERNMENT
A. State Actor
Regional Federal Home Loan Bank is not a state actor for
purposes of civil rights actions.
Andrews v. Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta
998 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1993)
Courts hearing civil rights cases often face the question of whether the
action complained of qualifies as "state action" by virtue of the defendant's
connection to a government, whether local, state, or federal43 0 If a court finds
sufficient connection to the government, the court can order a remedy for a
successful plaintiff, probably injunctive relief. If the court finds insufficient
Conference of Teamsters Retirement Plan, 898 F.2d 424, 427 (4th Cir. 1990) (extending deference
given to fiduciary to interpretation of provisions regarding filing procedure).
426. See Clark v. Washington Teamsters Welfare Trust, 8 F.3d 1429, 1431 (9th Cir. 1993)
(following Firestone to allow rational interpretation to control unless decision of trustees was
arbitrary and capricious); Finley v. Special Agents Mut. Benefit Ass'n, Inc., 957 F.2d 617, 621
(8th Cir. 1992) (following De Noble); Wells v. United States Steel & Carnegie Pension Fund,
Inc., 950 F.2d 1244, 1248 (6th Cir. 1991) (following Firestone); Boyd v. Trustees of the United
Mine Workers Health & Retirement Funds, 873 F.2d 57, 59 (4th Cir. 1989) (following Firestone
to apply abuse of discretion standard to decisions by Trustees under 1974 Pension Plan); Jung
v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 1985) (allowing rational interpretation of plan
provisions by trustees to control); Miles v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension &
Retirement Fund Employee Pension Benefit Plan, 698 F.2d 593, 601 (2nd Cir.) (noting that
court cannot substitute its own judgment for reasonable interpretation by trustees), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 829 (1983); Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 654 F.2d 650, 655 (9th Cir. 1981)
(same); Gordon v. ILWU-PMA Benefit Funds, 616 F.2d 433, 439 (9th Cir. 1980) (same).
427. 981 F.2d 685 (3rd Cir. 1992).
428. Moats v. United Mine Workers of Am. Health & Retirement Funds, 981 F.2d 685,
686 (3rd Cir. 1982).
429. Id. at 688-90.
430. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrIrUIONAL LAW § 16.1, at 526 (4th
ed. 1991) (noting that while most cases involving state action resemble each other factually,
cases divide into those that claim violation of constitutional rights and those which involve
statutory rights).
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ties to the government, the plaintiff cannot succeed in a civil rights action.43'
In Andrews v. Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta,4 2 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether a regional
Federal Home Loan Bank acted as an arm of the federal government when
the Bank discharged an employee. The plaintiff in Andrews worked as a
field examiner for the Charlotte, North Carolina office of the Federal Home
Loan Bank of Atlanta (Bank) until 1987, when the Bank fired him. The
plaintiff alleged that the Bank fired him for criticizing a change in the
Bank's asset-classification policy. The Bank alleged it had fired Andrews
for behavior that compromised an examination and for failure to cooperate
with an inquiry into that behavior.
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Board), an independent agency
of the federal government, appointed an Ombudsmen Committee (Com-
mittee) at Andrews's request. The Committee upheld Andrews's termination.
Andrews then brought suit in state court, alleging violations of his First
and Fifth Amendment rights and appending various state claims. The Bank
removed the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District
of North Carolina, which granted a motion for summary judgment for the
Bank. The district court rejected Andrews's claim that the Bank had violated
his constitutional rights of free speech and due procesi on the ground that
the Bank was not a state actor. The court also dismissed the state claims
on the ground that a federal statute pre-empted them.
433
On appeal, Andrews argued that his termination amounted to state
action because the Bank acted as an agent or instrumentality of the federal
government. The Board supervised the Bank during the period when the
Bank fired Andrews. 434 In addition, examiners such as Andrews did not
work as civil servants of the federal government until 1985, when a 1989
statute returned the examiners to civil service. 43s However, Andrews was not
a civil servant when the Bank fired him. The Fourth Circuit upheld the
district court decision after comparing the facts in Andrews to the four fact
431. Id. A plaintiff might press a civil rights claim by directly asserting violation of a right
if the plaintiff alleges the defendant was a federal actor. Id. However, if the plaintiff alleges
the defendant was a state actor, the plaintiff must assert violation of the right in question as
well as violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The analysis is largely the same in both
cases. Id.; see Warren v. Government Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 611 F.2d 1229, 1232 (8th Cir.)
(holding that standard for finding federal government action under the Fifth Amendment is
same as that for finding state action under Fourteenth Amendment), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 847
(1980).
432. 998 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1993).
433. See Federal Home Loan Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989)
(granting directors of Federal Home Loan Banks power to select, employ, and fix compensation
of employees and to dismiss at pleasure such employees).
434. But see Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub.
L. No. 101-73, § 703(a), 103 Stat. 183, 415 (repealing 12 U.S.C. § 1437 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989),
which established supervision of Bank by Board).
435. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, § 301, 103 Stat. 277, 279 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1462a(g)(4)(B)(i) (1988 & Supp.
I 1989)) (returning examiners to civil service).
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patterns in which courts have found state action on the part of otherwise
non-governmental entities. The four exceptions apply when: (1) the govern-
ment orders or compels specific conduct; (2) the government delegates to a
private party responsibility for conduct that would be unconstitutional if
the government itself performed the action; (3) a private party exercises
powers that the state traditionally reserves to itself; or (4) the state enforces
one right or set of rights at the behest of one party and, in so doing,
violates the rights of another party.
The Fourth Circuit first noted that the Bank is one of twelve regional
banks Congress established to provide services to savings and loans. How-
ever, despite the Bank's federal charter, the Bank receives no federal
funding, exists as a solely-owned corporation of the Bank's member insti-
tutions and distributes profits to shareholders. The Fourth Circuit stated
that these are hallmarks of a private institution. Because the Bank provided
private banking services and its employees were not federal employees, the
Fourth Circuit viewed the Bank as a private entity rather than a part of
the federal government.
Applying the four tests, the Fourth Circuit found no grounds for treating
the Bank as a state actor. First, no government coercion existed because
the Board did not coerce the Bank into firing Andrews. The Board only
became involved in the decision at the insistence of Andrews himself, long
after the termination occurred. The Fourth Circuit stated that, although the
Bank's charter allows the Bank to terminate employees at will, the charter
does not compel the Bank to do so. Second, although the government might
examine banks as a prudential matter, the Constitution does not require
the government to do so, and therefore the government did not delegate a
constitutional duty by allowing regional Bank employees to examine the
thrifts. Third, because the government did not regulate the thrift industry
until 1932, the Bank's examination functions are not traditionally and
exclusively public functions. Finally, according to the Fourth Circuit, the
Bank fired Andrews and the Board became involved only at the invitation
of Andrews. According to the Fourth Circuit, the Board's decision not to
interfere with the Bank's decision could not qualify as an act of the federal
government.
The Fourth Circuit also rejected Andrews's appeal of the dismissal of
his state claims. The court reasoned that Congress intended that federal law
fully pre-empt state law in defining the discretion that the Bank may exercise
in the discharge of Bank employees.436 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held
that to allow Andrews's state claim for wrongful termination would conflict
with the discretion Congress accorded the Bank and that the district court
did not err in dismissing plaintiff's state claim.
Decisions defining what constitutes state action are very fact specific,
and the field, overall, remains somewhat unsettled. 43 7 The Andrews court,
436. 12 U.S.C. § 1432(a).
437. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 430, § 12.1(a), (b).
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however, appears not to have strayed far from the general approach taken
by other federal courts.438 The issue of whether an entity functions as a
government actor commonly arises in cases involving organizations founded
by federal charters. Courts commonly have held, in such cases, that the
presence of a charter alone is insufficient to create a state actor, even when
the government heavily regulates the industry involved. 43 9 Plaintiffs in such
cases fail if they cannot show a deep involvement of the government or the
intertwining of government and organizational interests.
440
B. Sovereign Immunity
County department of social services is a state entity
entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from
section 1983 suits.
Bockes v. Fields
999 F.2d 788 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994)
The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution protects an
unconsenting state from suit in federal court by citizens of a different
state. 441 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has extended the
protection of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity beyond the specific
language of the amendment. The Court has barred suits against states in
federal court brought by citizens of the defendant state. 442 In Ford Motor
438. See, e.g., Flagg Bros, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 153 (1978) (finding no state
action in acquiesence by state in private debt collection effort); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 359-60 (1974) (finding no 9tate action in termination of electric service by
heavily regulated, privately-owned utility, enjoying at least partial monopoly); Wheat v. Mas-
sachusetts, 994 F.2d 273, 275-76 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that hospital was not state actor solely
because hospital received Medicare and Medicaid funds and was subject to state regulation).
439. See, e.g., Bishop v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank of Wichita, 908 F.2d 658, 663
(10th Cir. 1990) (holding that no state action existed in spite of federal charter and heavy
regulation of industry); Redd v. Federal Land Bank of St. Louis, 661 F. Supp. 861, 864 (E.D.
Mo. 1987) (holding that despite federal charter, acts of Federal Land Banks are not acts of
federal government for constitutional purposes), aff'd, 851 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1988); LPR Land
Holdings v. Federal Land Bank of Saint Paul, 651 F. Supp. 287, 290 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (holding
bank, as private corporation, lacked sufficient government involvement to function as state
actor); DeLaigle v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, 568 F. Supp. 1432, 1439 (S.D. Ga. 1983)
(same).
440. See, e.g., Bishop, 908 F.2d at 663; Redd, 661 F. Supp. at 864; DeLaigle, 568 F.
Supp. at 1439.
441. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI (stating that "[t]he judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign
state").
442. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974) (affirming rule that Eleventh
Amendment bars suits against state when state treasury will pay portion of damages); Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890) (holding that Eleventh Amendment bars suit against state by
citizen of that state even if case involves federal question).
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Co. v. Department of Treasury,443 the Supreme Court further granted
immunity to state agencies when the plaintiff would recover money from
the state treasury."4
In Bockes v. Fields,44 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit considered whether a county department of social services is a state
entity entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court.
Specifically, the Fourth Circuit considered whether the plaintiff could main-
tain a section 1983 suit against a Virginia county for the personnel decisions
of the Grayson County Board of Social Services (Local Board).
446
In Bockes, the plaintiff, Nancy Bockes, alleged that the Local Board"
47
fired her without due process of law. Bockes had served as Director of the
Grayson County Department of Social Services (Department) for thirteen
years. However, the Local Board fired her in June 1990 without notice or
a pretermination hearing. Bockes filed a grievance with the Virginia De-
partment of Social Services, and a grievance panel ordered the Local Board
to reinstate her as Director and give her one-half of her backpay.448 Bockes
then filed a section 1983 suit to recover the rest of her backpay and damages
for pain and suffering.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia
held that the Local Board deprived Bockes of due process by failing to
provide a pretermination hearing. The district court ruled as a matter of
law that the Local Board and Department possessed immunity from suit
under the Eleventh Amendment. The court, however, held Grayson County
liable for the Local Board's actions because the Local Board acted in an
official policymaking role by firing Bockes. The United States Supreme
Court had held in an earlier case449 that only county officials with "official
policymaking authority" could make the county liable in a section 1983
action.40 The district court reached this conclusion because the Grayson
443. 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
444. Ford Motor Co. v. Department .of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) (requiring
courts to make Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity determination by looking to see if
action is, in essence, one to recover money from state).
445. 999 F.2d 788 (4th Cir. 1993).
446. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (providing for federal jurisdiction when person under color
of state law deprived United States citizen of constitutional rights).
447. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-1.1, -14, -38 to -43 (Michie 1991) (establishing adminis-
tration of Virginia's social services through state and local boards). A Commissioner of Social
Services manages the Department of Social Services with the advice of a nine-member State
Board of Social Services. Id. § 63.1-1, -14. Each city and county appoints a board with at least
four members to oversee the local department of social services. Id. § 63.1-40. A local
superintendent manages the daily affairs of the department. Id. § 63.1-59, -67.1 to -67.7.
448. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-26, -37, -61 (Michie 1991) (placing local boards under
ultimate authority of state board). Although local employees serve at the pleasure of the local
board, the State Board establishes minimum entrance and performance standards for employees
that the local board must follow when hiring and firing employees. Id. § 63.1-26. The employee
also retains the right to institute a grievance proceeding. Id. § 2.1-114.5:1.
449. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (rejecting
application of respondeat superior to county sued in § 1983 suit).
450. Id.
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County Board of Supervisors could hire and fire Local Board members and
exercised local control over all personnel matters. Furthermore, the Hand-
book for Local Boards of Social Services stated that a Local Board is a
policymaking body. Therefore, the district court believed it could attribute
the firing of Bockes by the Local Board to the Grayson County Board of
Supervisors.
Bockes appealed the district court's decision that the Local Board and
Department were immune from suit. Additionally, Grayson County cross-
appealed the district court's decision holding it liable for the actions of the
Local Board. The defendants also maintained that Bockes received due
process from the Board.
The Fourth Circuit first addressed Bockes's appeal. The court considered
the significance of Virginia's Public Officials Liability Self-Insurance Plan.
The Plan created a trust fund to cover the liability of subscribing agencies
incurred in the discharge of their duties. The Commonwealth paid eighty
percent of the premiums and, therefore, would be liable for $8,400 of
Bockes's award. The Fourth Circuit noted that the United States Supreme
Court has barred suits aginst states in federal court when the state treasury
pays a portion of the liability. Bockes argued, however, that the court
should consider other factors in determining whether a local agency is a
state entity for Eleventh Amendment purposes. In two earlier cases, the
court of appeals had considered the agency's degree of autonomy, the
treatment of the agency under state law, and the local or statewide nature
of the agency's work. 41 Although the Fourth Circuit agreed that these other
factors are relevant when the plaintiff does not seek damages, the court
held that if the state treasury must pay a portion of the plainfiff's damages
no further inquiry is necessary.
Next, the Fourth Circuit considered whether the plaintiff could recover
from Grayson County for the acts of the Local Board under a section 1983
claim. The Fourth Circuit rejected the reasoning of the district court because
the Local Board fired Bockes under authority conferred by the state, not
the county. Grayson County's Board of Supervisors did not establish a
personnel policy for the Local Board. Instead, the State Board published a
personnel handbook requiring the Local Board to apply merit criteria in
personnel decisions and establishing the grievance procedure for Bockes and
others to follow. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit refused to hold the county
liable under section 1983. Based on these holdings denying Bockes the ability
to sue any of the defendants in federal court, the Fourth Circuit did not
decide the issue of deprivation of due process. The court held that the
remedy that the grievance panel provided was sufficient.
451. See Keller v. Prince George's County, 827 F.2d 952, 963-64 (4th Cir. 1987) (listing
several factors for lower court to examine on remand to determine if Prince George's County
Department of Social Services is arm of state); Ram Ditta v. Maryland Nat'l Capital Park &
Planning Comm'n, 822 F.2d 456, 457-58 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting four factors and stating that
monetary considerations are most important).
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While this opinion does not break any new ground in Eleventh Amend-
ment law, the Fourth Circuit does close a potential loophole that existed in
several earlier opinions. 4 2 In Bockes, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed that if
the state treasury covers any portion of the potential damages from a suit,
a plaintiff may not bring the suit in federal court. Although this holding
differs slightly from the reasoning of other circuits that also use other
factors to resolve Eleventh Amendment problems, the difference is insignif-
icant. 453 Each circuit recognizes that the most important issue is funding,
and the Fourth Circuit's decision is consistent with that reasoning. The
Fourth Circuit's analysis accurately applies Supreme Court precedent to
resolve the question surrounding the state's insurance plan.
454
C. Federal Tort Claims Act
Fourth Circuit refuses to equitably toll the statute of
limitations under the Federal Tort Claims Act when the
plaintiff has knowledge of the claim.
Muth v. United States
1 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 1993)
The United States government is ordinarily immune from suit unless
the government clearly accepts liability for specific claims .4 5  The Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity.
456
Claimants may recover damages from the federal government in certain
situations for which the FTCA provides.
457
452. See Keller, 827 F.2d at 963-64 (listing several factors for lower court to examine on
remand to determine if Prince George's County Department of Social Services is arm of state);
Ram Ditta, 822 F.2d at 457-58 (noting four factors and stating that monetary considerations
are most important).
453. See Austin v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 677-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining
that if judgment against SIIS would necessarily affect state treasury then this determination
would lead to conclusion that SIIS is state agency, but agency could still receive immunity if
other factors indicated that state controlled agency's operations); Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit
Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659, 664 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that while recovery of
judgment from state treasury is not dispositive factor, it is most significant). But see Kovats v.
Rutgers, the State Univ., 822 F.2d 1303, 1310 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that funding alone does
not solve immunity question; court should examine other factors as well).
454. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974) (affirming rule that Eleventh
Amendment bars suits against state when state treasury will pay portion of damages); Ford
Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) (requiring courts to make
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity determination by looking to see if action is, in essence,
one to recover money from state).
455. See Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484, 501 (1967) (stating that Government is immune
from suit and defining conditions under which it may be sued); United States v. Sherwood,
312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (stating that United States is sovereign and must consent to be sued).
456. Martin v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 535, 537 (S.D. Cal. 1977). See generally 28
U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1988).
457. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 2674-80 (1988). Claimants may institute a claim against
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One limitation on the use of the FTCA is that a plaintiff must present
an administrative claim to an appropriate federal agency within two years
of the date that the cause of action accrues. 4 8 A cause of action accrues
when a plaintiff knows, or by exercising due diligence, should know the
existence of the injury and the cause thereof.4 9 The purpose of the two-
year limitation for bringing a claim under the FTCA is to promote timely
presentation of claims.4 6 Courts should construe the statute of limitations
under the FTCA strictly so as not to expand the waiver of sovereign
immunity further than Congress intended.
4 6'
A plaintiff may attempt to avoid the statute of limitations and extend
the time allowed for filing a claim by asking the court to apply the doctrine
of equitable tolling. Plaintiffs may invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling
when the defendant deliberately misleads the plaintiff, and the plaintiff
relies on the defendant's misrepresentation.462 However, a complainant must
be particularly deserving and must exercise due diligence before a court will
toll the statute of limitations.43
In Muth v. United States, 4" the Fourth Circuit considered the validity
of a claim arising under the FTCA. The principle issue in Muth was when
a cause of action accrues under the FTCA for the purpose of commencing
the statute of limitations. Other issues the court addressed in Muth were
the requirements that an individual must satisfy to bring a claim under the
FTCA, the propriety of adjudicating issues raised for the first time on
appeal, and the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.
the United States for injury resulting from the "negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment." Id.
§ 2675(a). The claimant first must present her claim to the appropriate federal agency and the
agency must deny the claim. Id. However, the Government is not liable for interest prior to
judgment or for punitive damages. Id. § 2674.
458. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1988) (setting out statute of limitations); Gould v. United
States Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 905 F.2d 738, 741 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (citing
§ 2401(b)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1025 (1991).
459. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120 (1979) (stating that plaintiff's claim
accrues at time of plaintiff's injury); Gould, 905 F.2d at 742 (stating that cause of action
accrues when plaintiff discovers or should have discovered existence and cause of injury);
Gilbert v. United States, 720 F.2d 372, 374 (4th Cir. 1983) (same).
460. See Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117 (stating that Congress's purpose in enacting § 2401(b)
was to encourage prompt presentation of claims).
461. See id. at 117-18 (stating that courts should not construe statute of limitations to
extend waiver of sovereign immunity "beyond that which Congress intended"); Honda v. Clark,
386 U.S. 484, 501 (1967) (stating that courts construe statutes waiving sovereign immunity
strictly); Gould, 905 F.2d at 744 (noting that Kubrick provides "clear admonition" that courts
should construe carefully statute of limitations under FTCA).
462. See English v. Pabst Brewing Co., 828 F.2d 1047, 1049 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that
plaintiff must show that defendant misled plaintiff and that reliance on this misrepresentation
resulted in plaintiff's failure to file timely claim).
463. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (noting that
courts are not likely to allow equitable tolling when plaintiff does not exercise due diligence);
English, 828 F.2d at 1049 (stating that equitable tolling applies when defendant wrongfully
conceals existence of cause of action from plaintiff).
464. 1 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 1993).
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The plaintiffs in Muth, D.P. Muth and J.P. Muth, acquired twenty acres
of land in West Virginia from the United States over the course of four
decades, beginning in 1948. These twenty acres are located near the center
of the West Virginia Ordnance Works (WVOW), an 8,000 acre complex that
produced trinitrotoluene (TNT) from 1942 to 1945. In 1981, after receiving
reports that certain areas of the WVOW were contaminated with by-products
of the TNT manufacturing process, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) listed the WVOW on its National Priorities List. The EPA designated
the United States Army's Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency (USATHMA)
to investigate the WVOW and to remedy any problems. The USATHMA
investigated the WVOW from 1984 to 1986 and concluded in a 1986 report
that the water wells located on the Muth property showed no signs of
contamination, although areas within one-quarter of a mile of the Muth
property were contaminated. A 1988 and 1990 supplemental investigation also
concluded that the Muth property was not contaminated.
From September 1988 to July 1989, D.P. Muth wrote at least three letters
to the government indicating that he had knowledge of the former use of his
property and that property adjacent to and surrounding his property was
contaminated, and, therefore, he believed that his property was useless. Muth
mailed the first letter on September 19, 1988 to both the EPA and the Army,
requesting that the Army investigate Muth's property for contamination. In
this letter, Muth stated that he was aware of the contamination of sites
located around his property and that his property once had been the location
of a facility used in the TNT production process. Muth also stated that he
attempted to sell the property, but was not successful because the property
was not desirable for any industry.
The EPA and the Army responded to Muth in early November 1988.
Both agencies stated that Muth's property was not contaminated and that no
potential existed for future contamination from nearby sites. The Army
reminded Muth that the State of West Virginia had provided him with the
1986 report which contained the results of the well samples that the USATHMA
had taken.
The Army received another letter from Muth on December 5, 1988,
requesting that the Army provide a letter stating that the property was not
a "hazardous situation." The USATHMA also received a letter, dated January
9, 1989, requesting copies of the analysis of soil and groundwater samples
from Muth's property. In the December 1988 letter, Muth stated that the
Mason County Development Authority advised him that it considered any
property of the WVOW undesirable for any purpose and that his real estate
agents advised him of the difficulty of disposing of his property because of
the contamination found on the WVOW. Muth reiterated the difficulties he
encountered in selling the property in a letter to Senator Byrd, also dated
January 9, 1989.
After July 1989, Muth continued to correspond with the Army and
elected representatives. Through this correspondence, Muth reasserted the
contention that his property was worthless and attempted to convince the
Army to purchase his property. Muth filed an administrative complaint with
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the Army on July 19, 1991, alleging that as a result of the negligent
contamination of the WVOW in the 1940s, his property diminished in value
to the point where the property was economically worthless. The Army denied
Muth's claim on September 25, 1991, and Muth. filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. J.P. Muth
did not file an administrative claim, but joined D.P. Muth in the district
court action.
Arguing that the FTCA's two-year statute of limitations had expired, the
United States made a motion for summary judgment in the district court
action. The plaintiffs argued that the action was timely because they exercised
due diligence in discovering the injury. Also, the plaintiffs argued that the
principle of equitable tolling extended the time in which to file the claim.
In resolving the issue, the district court first dismissed J.P. Muth from
the case for failure to file an administrative claim. Then, the court held that
D.P. Muth knew of the facts constituting his cause of action more than two
years before he filed his administrative claim. The court also refused to
equitably toll the statute of limitations. Consequently, the district court
granted the government's motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiffs appealed, alleging that the district court erred in dismissing
J.P. Muth from the case, in finding that the FTCA's statute of limitations
expired before D.P. Muth filed his administrative claim, and in refusing to
equitably toll the statute of limitations. Regarding the plaintiffs' first conten-
tion, the Fourth Circuit held that the FTCA required that both D.P. Muth
and J.P. Muth file a proper administrative claim. The court therefore affirmed
the district court's dismissal of J.P. Muth for failure to file such a claim.
The Fourth Circuit next addressed the claim that D.P. Muth's adminis-
trative claim was timely because he acted with due diligence. D.P. Muth filed
his administrative claim with the Army on July 19, 1991. Therefore, if his
claim accrued prior to July 19, 1989, the statute of limitations barred the
action. According to the court, Muth possessed information in the form of
the 1986 USATHMA report that provided him with facts and circumstances
that should have alerted him to the possibility of a violation of his legal
rights and that injury to his property existed. Moreover, the court found that
the correspondence between Muth and the government showed that Muth
knew that his property was undesirable for any industry and that the
contamination of adjacent properties caused this injury. The court, therefore,
found that Muth knew of both the injury to his property and the cause
thereof by February 1989 at the latest, and it affirmed the district court's
holding that the FTCA's statute of limitations barred Muth's claim.
The Fourth Circuit refused to address Muth's argument that the statute
of limitations did not run because there was a continuing injury. Muth did
not raise the continuing injury theory in the district court action, and the
general rule is that courts will not consider issues raised for the first time on
appeal. 46 Muth failed to offer evidence of exceptional circumstances that
would justify departure from the general rule."
465. See National Wildlife Fed. v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313, 318 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that
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Finally, the Fourth Circuit refused to equitably toll the statute of limi-
tations for Muth. The court found that Muth did not take independent steps
to verify that he had a claim against the United States once he became aware
of the possibility that such a claim existed. Muth's failure to actively inves-
tigate the basis for his claim led the court to the conclusion that Muth did
not exercise due diligence. Moreover, the court found that the United States
did not intentionally mislead Muth or conceal information from him about
the condition of the WVOW or about the potential injury to his property.
The Fourth Circuit therefore affirmed the district court's decision not to toll
the statute of limitations.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Muth is in accord with the decisions of
other circuits.4 7 Muth follows the rule that courts should construe the FTCA's
statute of limitations strictly.4 Complainants, therefore, should not delay in
filing an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency once they
become aware of a cause of action arising under the FTCA.
XIII. TAX
A. Estate Tax
Charitable remainder is not deductible from gross estate
when executor's discretionary power to make gifts from the
property to noncharitable beneficiaries is not limited by an
ascertainable standard.
Estate of Marine v. Commissioner
990 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1993)
Section 2055 of the Internal Revenue Code allows a deduction from a
decedent's taxable estate for gifts to "any corporation organized and operated
exclusively for ... scientific ... or educational purposes." 469 However, the
charitable remainder must be "presently ascertainable, and hence severable
courts ordinarily do not consider issues first raised on appeal); Stewart v. Hall, 770 F.2d 1267,
1271 (4th Cir. 1985) (same); Maynard v. General Elec. Co., 486 F.2d 538, 539 (4th Cir. 1973)
(same).
466. See National Wildlife Fed., 859 F.2d at 318 (stating that in limited circumstances,
courts make exceptions to general rule that courts do not consider issues first raised on appeal).
467. See Bradley v. United States, 951 F.2d 268, 271 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that FTCA's
statute of limitations barred plaintiff's medical malpractice claim); Outman v. United States,
890 F.2d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that FTCA's statute of limitations barred claim
because plaintiff knew of his injury and its cause five years before he filed his administrative
claim); Barren v. United States, 839 F.2d 987, 992 (3d Cir. 1988) (reversing district court finding
that plaintiff's claim was not time-barred); Sexton v. United States, 832 F.2d 629, 637 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (holding that statute of limitations barred plaintiff's FTCA claim); Green v. United
States, 765 F.2d 105, 108 (7th Cir. 1985) (same).
468. See supra note 461 and accompanying text (discussing rule that courts should construe
FTCA's statute of limitations strictly).
469. 26 U.S.C. 9 2055(a)(2) (1988).
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from the non-charitable interest." 470 In Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States,47
the United States Supreme Court held valid a will establishing a trust for the
widow and authorizing the trustees to use the trust to "maintain her [the
widow] in as much comfort as she now enjoys," 472 while providing gifts to
charities after the widow's death. Because the Court found a fixed standard
existed, the amount of the charitable remainder was presently ascertainable
at the date of the testator's death. 473 The Court held the standard of "as
much comfort as she now enjoys" to be a standard factually fixed and easily
reduced to monetary terms.474 In Merchants National Bank of Boston v.
Commissioner s47 however, the Supreme Court held that a will establishing a
trust for the widow and authorizing the trustee to invade the corpus at his
discretion to support the widow by taking into account her "welfare, comfort
and happiness, ' 476 while also providing that on the widow's death all but
$100,000 would go to named charities, failed to adhere to a fixed standard.
The Court ruled that this charitable remainder was not presently ascertainable
and, therefore, not deductible as a charitable gift. 477 The Court distinguished
Merchants from Ithaca Trust by noting that no fixed standard existed to
restrict the trustee's discretion to invade the corpus.4 78
In Estate of Marine v. Commissioner47 9 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether the discretion that a codicil
to a decedent's will vested in the decedent's representatives made the charitable
remainder unascertainable and not deductible as a charitable gift. The codicil
allowed the representatives to make posthumous gifts to certain individuals
who helped the decedent during his life. Finding that the codicil granted too
much discretionary power to the representatives, the Fourth Circuit held the
charitable remainder unascertainable and, therefore, not deductible as a
charitable gift.
In 1970, Dr. David N. Marine retired at the age of forty-six. Dr. Johannes
Bartels, a friend, took care of Marine during his retirement because Marine
was an alcoholic. Concerned about Marine's mental capacity and physical
condition, Bartels petitioned a state court to appoint a guardian for Marine.
The court appointed two guardians, Bartels and attorney Wailer S. Hairston.
Hairston's law partner, William H. Price, II, subsequently replaced Hairston.
Marine executed a will in 1981 leaving, inter alia, $5,000 to his house-
keeper and the remainder of his estate to be divided equally between Princeton
University and Johns Hopkins University. In 1982, Marine executed a codicil
470. Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(a) (as amended in 1986).
471. 279 U.S. 151 (1929).
472. Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 154 (1929).
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. 320 U.S. 256 (1943).
476. Merchants Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256, 257-58 (1943).
477. Id. at 263.
478. Id. at 261.
479. 990 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1993).
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to his will that deleted the bequest to his housekeeper and added the clause
at issue in this case. The clause read, "I empower my Personal Representa-
tives, in their sole and absolute discretion, to compensate persons who have
contributed to my well-being or who have been otherwise helpful to me
during my lifetime ... ." Marine died in 1984. His personal representatives
made two bequests under the codicil-$10,000 to the housekeeper and $15,000
to Bartels. In 1985, the representatives filed the federal estate tax return and
listed the remainder over to the universities as a deduction from the gross
estate.
In 1988, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) informed
the estate that the deduction for charitable gift was not allowable because the
value of the charitable remainder was not presently ascertainable on the date
of Marine's death. The Commissioner also stated that, had the charitable
remainder been ascertainable, the representatives of the estate had the discre-
tionary power to divert all or a portion of the charitable remainder to
noncharitable use. Because of this possibility, the Commissioner ruled that the
charitable remainder was not deductible.
Marine's personal representatives filed a petition in the tax court chal-
lenging the Commissioner's decision to disallow the deduction. The tax court
held that the charitable remainder was not presently ascertainable at the time
of death; therefore, the deduction was not allowed. The representatives of
Marine's estate appealed the tax court's decision to the Fourth Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit applied the principles of Ithaca Trust to Marine. Ithaca
Trust requires that the amount going to charity be ascertainable at the date
of death. To be presently ascertainable, a fixed standard must exist to limit
the trustee's power to divert the corpus from the charitable remainder. In
Marine, the Fourth Circuit found no fixed standard acting as a restriction on
Marine's representatives' discretionary power to invade the corpus of the trust.
The court found that the trust did not limit the representatives' discretion as
to the number of persons they should compensate or how to determine who
had been "helpful" to Marine or who had "contributed to his well-being."
The Fourth Circuit then compared Marine to Merchants. In Merchants,
the Supreme Court found that no fixed standard could measure the widow's
"happiness." Therefore, the charitable remainder was unascertainable at the
date of death. The Marine court ruled that the charitable remainder was not
presently ascertainable at the date of death because no fixed standard existed
to measure "contribution," "well-being," and "helpful." That only two people
received money under the codicil was of no consequence to the court. The
court stated that, at the date of death, the number of people who were to
receive money was unknown. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held that the
charitable remainder was not presently ascertainable and, therefore, not de-
ductible as a charitable gift.
The Fourth Circuit distinguished Marine from two previous cases in which
the Fourth Circuit found the charitable remainders were presently ascertainable
and, therefore, deductible.4 The decision of the Fourth Circuit in Marine is
480. See Greer v. United States, 448 F.2d 937, 949 (4th Cir. 1971) (holding that legal right
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in accord with the decisions of other jurisdictions. 11 When a calculable, fixed
standard limits the possibility of invasion of the corpus of the trust, courts
have held the charitable remainder to be presently ascertainable.42 However,
when the trustee, at his discretion, may invade the corpus of the trust, courts
have held that the charitable remainder is not presently ascertainable and,
therefore, not deductible from the decedent's taxable estate.
483
B. Notice of Tax Deficiency
Notice by mail of a tax deficiency is unnecessary if the
taxpayer receives actual notice.
Balkissoon v. Commissioner
995 F.2d 525 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 473 (1993)
In an effort to promote the efficiency of the Internal Revenue Service
(I.R.S.), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
construed liberally Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) section 6212(a). This section
authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to send notice of a tax deficiency to
the taxpayer by way of certified or registered mail.4 United States Courts of
Appeals for the Third, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have decided
that this provision requires the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commis-
sioner) to provide only actual notice of deficiency and that the method of
giving notice is unimportant if the taxpayer has sufficient time to file a petition
with the Tax Court.485 Moreover, two seemingly conflicting Fourth Circuit
of trustee to invade corpus of trust to maintain standard of living was sufficiently restricted to
render charitable remainder presently ascertainable); Commissioner v. Robertson's Estate, 141
F.2d 855, 858 (4th Cir. 1944) (noting that because of history of legatee's lifestyle, possibility
of diminution of charitable remainder was so remote as to be negligible).
481. See Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 578 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 1978)
(holding that when no ascertainable standard limits trustee's power to divert funds from corpus,
charitable remainder deduction is not allowable); City Trust Co. v. United States, 497 F.2d
716, 718 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that "as necessary for the proper care, comfort, welfare and
happiness," along with other subjective considerations, rendered charitable remainder unascer-
tainable).
482. See Estate of McCoy v. United States, 511 F.2d 1090, 1094 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding
that "extreme need . . .. for health reasons or otherwise," is sufficiently ascertainable to
determine potential invasion of corpus of trust for life beneficiary); Hartford Nat'l Bank and
Trust Co. v. United States, 467 F.2d 782, 786 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that will authorizing
invasion of corpus of trust for "physical welfare" of beneficiaries renders charitable remainder
presently ascertainable); supra note 480 and accompanying text (providing Fourth Circuit cases
holding that standards of "prior lifestyle" and "standard of living" sufficiently restrict trustee's
power to invade corpus of trust).
483. See supra note 481 (providing cases holding that when no ascertainable standard exists
to restrict trustee's discretion-to invade corpus, charitable remainder is unascertainable).
484. I.R.C. § 6212(a) (1986).
485. See Scheidt v. Commissioner, 967 F.2d 1448, 1450-51 (10th Cir.) (holding that
Commissioner must only provide actual notice of deficiency without prejudicial delay), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 811 (1992); Pugsley v. Commissioner, 749 F.2d 691, 692-93 (11th Cir. 1985)
(same); Clodfelter v. Commissioner, 527 F.2d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1975) (same), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 979 (1976); Sorrentino v. Ross, 425 F.2d 213, 215 (5th Cir. 1970) (same); Berger v.
Commissioner 404 F.2d 668, 672-74 (3d Cir. 1968) (same), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 905 (1969).
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opinions, United States v. Ball4m and Powell v. Commissioner,4 have created
confusion as to the procedures that this section requires. The Ball court held
that I.R.C. section 6212(a) required notice to the taxpayer by registered mail
and that a failure to follow the statute was "fatal to a jeopardy assessment."4 8
However, almost thirty years later, the Powell court construed the same section
to apply only when the I.R.S. was unable to, or did not, provide actual notice
to the taxpayer. The Powell court held that actual notice is sufficient in all
cases and thus followed the modem trend that promotes substance over
procedure.
In Balkissoon v. Commissioner,49 the Fourth Circuit considered whether
I.R.C. section 6212(a) was mandatory or permissive. The court also considered
whether certain stipulations that bound the parties to the result of another
case were enforceable. Finally, the court decided whether the Commissioner
correctly assessed additions and interest charges against two taxpayers.
In Balkissoon, Gloria and Basdeo Balkissoon mailed their federal income
tax return for 1981 on August 20, 1982, months after the April 15 deadline.
The I.R.S. received this return on August 30, 1982. On the return, the
Balkissoons claimed deductions based upon the losses of two partnerships in
which they were limited partners. The Commissioner ruled that these deductions
were impermissible and sent the Balkissoons a notice of deficiency by regular
mail on May 5, 1986. The Balkissoons received this letter and, therefore, had
actual notice of the deficiency determination. The Balkissoons petitioned the
Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency and subsequently entered
into a stipulation of settlement with the Commissioner. The stipulation stated
that the disposition of Zimmerman v. Commissioner,4 91 which dealt with claims
of identical deductions by other limited partners in the same partnerships,
would bind the parties. In Zimmerman, the Tax Court found that the
deductions were impermissible because the partner had not intended to make
a profit from the partnerships.
Five months later, the Tax Court ordered the Balkissoons to comply with
the stipulations or to show cause why the entering of a decision against them
would not be in the interests of justice. The Balkissoons asserted that expert
testimony would show that the losses were deductible and that the plaintiff in
Zimmerman did not present similar evidence. They further contended that the
Zimmerman plaintiff's failure to present such evidence compelled the court to
allow them to present their own defense. The Tax Court, however, refused
to alter the stipulations and set the case for trial on the amount of deficiency.
At trial, the Tax Court held that I.R.C. section 6212(a) requires only actual
486. 326 F.2d 898 (4th Cir. 1964).
487. 958 F.2d 53 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 440 (1992).
488. United States v. Ball, 326 F.2d 898, 901 (4th Cir. 1964).
489. Powell v. Commissioner, 958 F.2d 53, 56 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 440
(1992).
490. 995 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1993).
491. 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 927 (1987).
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notice and that the Balkissoons had to pay a portion of the additions and
interest charges that the Commissioner had assessed.
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the Balkissoons attacked the deficiency
assessment on three grounds. First, they asserted that the notice of deficiency
was inadequate under Ball, which indicated that I.R.C. section 6212(a) is
mandatory. The Fourth Circuit, however, reformulated its interpretation of
the statute by construing the section to be operative only when the taxpayer
received no actual notice. Because the Balkissoons had actual notice, the failure
of the Commissioner to follow I.R.C. section 6212(a) was harmless error.
Second, the Balkissoons contended that the Tax Court should not have
enforced the stipulations because the plaintiff in Zimmerman had not ade-
quately defended the Balkissoon's interests. The Fourth Circuit found this
argument to be completely without merit. The court enforced the stipulations,
reasoning that the Balkissoons fell far short of proving that justice required
interference with the stipulations.
Third, the Balkissoons argued that the Tax Court's order did not deal
specifically with the additions and interest payments on the deficiency assess-
ment. This omission, the Balkissoons contended, made these penalties unen-
forceable. The Fourth Circuit dealt with this argument in similar summary
form, finding that the Balkissoons did not present enough evidence to overcome
the presumption of correctness afforded to the Commissioner's assessment.
As a result, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the orders of the Tax Court.
The Balkissoon decision reinforces the common sense notion that actual
notice is sufficient to inform a taxpayer of a deficiency assessment. I.R.C.
section 6212(a) is no longer mandatory, but remains in force as an additional
protection to ensure that the Commissioner makes a good faith effort to
provide all affected taxpayers with notice of deficiency assessments. With this
decision, the Fourth Circuit joined the Third, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits, all of which approved the Commissioner's expedient solution to a
costly, time-consuming, and somewhat redundant requirement.
C. Recoverability of Attorney Fees in Tax Claims
Section 7430 of the Internal Revenue Code precludes
recovery of attorney fees when taxpayers fail to exhaust
administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief.
In re Grewe v. United States
4 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1056 (1994)
The Equal Access to Justice Act 92 allows recovery of reasonable attorney's
fees except in proceedings in which section 7430 of the Internal Revenue Code
applies. 493 Section 7430 covers awards of certain costs under the Internal
492. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of U.S.C. including 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
493. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(e) (1988).
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Revenue Code,494 and section 7430(a) sets out the extent of that coverage. 49s
Section 7430(a) includes "any administrative or court proceeding which is
brought by or against the United States in connection with the determination,
collection or refund of any tax, interest or penalty under this title. . .."496
In In re Grewe v. United States,491 the Fourth Circuit determined that the
proceeding in question fell within the jurisdiction of section 7430. Therefore,
Grewe could not recover attorney's fees because the Equal Access to Justice
Act excepted tax matters and because the Internal Revenue Code required the
exhaustion of administrative procedures before resort to a judicial determi-
nation.
Henry Robert Grewe and his wife Cathy Anne Grewe failed to pay income
taxes for 1977-1980. In 1989, they filed a petition in bankruptcy and discharged
their federal tax liability. In 1992, the Internal Revenue Service sought to
recover the discharged debt. The Grewes petitioned the bankruptcy court to
reopen their case and filed a complaint against the Internal Revenue Service
without pursuing any remedy within the agency. After discovering that the
Grewes's debts had been discharged, the Internal Revenue Service conceded
that the couple was no longer liable, and the bankruptcy court entered
judgment for the Grewes.
The couple then sought to recover attorney's fees under the Equal Acces
to Justice Act. The Internal Revenue Service argued that the Internal Revenue
Code should apply to recovery because the Grewes had not exhausted admin-
istrative remedies. The district court found in favor of the Grewes, and the
bankruptcy court entered judgment for the Grewes. The Internal Revenue
Service appealed, and the Fourth Circuit considered the proper application of
Internal Revenue Code section 7430(a).
The Fourth Circuit first considered the phrase "under this title." Applying
a rule of construction limiting phrases only to the last antecedent, the court
determined that "under this title" applied to the phrase "any tax, interest or
penalty" and not to "any administrative or court proceeding." Thus, the
court found that section 7430 applies to any proceeding brought in connection
with a tax, interest or penalty arising under Title 26.
Second, the court determined that the proceedings in question were brought
"in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax ......
The district court had found that the proceeding arose from the Internal
Revenue Service's violation of a bankruptcy court discharge of debt and not
from a tax matter. The Fourth Circuit preferred a broader construction of
"connected." The court held that the Grewes' lawsuit against the Internal
Revenue Service "stemmed" from an attempt to collect taxes and so was
"connected" with the collection of those taxes within the meaning of section
7430(a).
494. 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
495. 26 U.S.C. § 7430(a) (1988).
496. 26 U.S.C. § 7430(a) (1988).
497. 4 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 1993).
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Third, the court considered whether proceedings in a bankruptcy court
are included in section 7430(a)'s phrase "administrative or court proceedings."
The Internal Revenue Code defines "court proceeding" as "any civil action
brought in a court of the United States (including the Tax Court and the
United States Claims Court)." 49 Because bankruptcy courts are not independ-
ent courts, but are adjuncts of district courts, and because district courts are
clearly "court(s) of the United States," the Fourth Circuit determined that
Congress also considered bankruptcy courts as "court(s) of the United States."
The Grewes' action in bankruptcy court, then, was a court proceeding under
section 7430(a).
Finally, the court addressed whether the Grewes could recover attorney's
fees. Because the Grewes' action against the Internal Revenue Service fell
under section 7430 of the Internal Revenue Code, the Equal Justice Act did
not apply by its own terms, and the Grewes could seek recovery only under
the Internal Revenue Code. Under the provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code, the Grewes could not recover attorney's fees because they had failed
to exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking a judicial remedy, as the
Code requires. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit denied the Grewes' request for
attorney's fees.
Other courts have held that a bankruptcy court is not a "court of the
United States" within the meaning of section 7430.499 These courts base their
holdings on the belief that the phrase "courts of the United States" excludes
non-Article III courts.0 This view gains support from the fact that two non-
Article III courts, the Tax Court and the United States Claims Court, are
explicitly included in the terms of the statute. 501 The inference is that other
non-Article III courts are excluded. This issue has divided the judiciary, but
the Fourth Circuit held in Grewe that the bankruptcy court's nature as an
adjunct of the district court for jurisdictional purposes is determinative and
that the bankruptcy court is therefore a "court of the United States" within
the meaning.of section 7430 of the Internal Revenue Code.
XIV. VOnNG
A. Voting Rights Act
District court's denial of town's redistricting plan is
improper unless such proposal fails to meet the standards
under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
Hines v. Mayor and Town Council of Ahoskie
998 F.2d 1266 (4th Cir. 1993)
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as Congress amended in
1982,502 ensures all citizens of voting age the right to vote, regardless of
498. 26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(6) (Supp. IV 1992).
499. See In re Brickell Inv. Corp., 922 F.2d 696, 699-700 (lth Cir. 1991) (holding that
bankruptcy court was not "court of the United States" and so did not have jurisdiction to
award attorney's fees); In re Davis, 899 F.2d 1136, 1140 (lth Cir. 1990) (same); Matter of
Becker's Motor Transport, Inc., 632 F.2d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that bankruptcy
court is not "court of the United States" and so is not prohibited from issuing declaratory
relief from federal tax liability).
500. Brickell, 922 F.2d at 699-700; Davis, 899 F.2d at 1139.
501. Brickell, 922 F.2d at 701.
502. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
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race, color, or language. 03 Specifically, Section 2 forbids "vote dilution,"
or a political system that submerges a minority voting group in a white
majority district where 'white voters generally vote as a bloc for white
candidates, thereby ensuring defeat for minority candidates.: 4 To prevail in
an action under Section 2, a plaintiff must satisfy the three-pronged test
that the United States Supreme Court set forth in Thornburg v. Gingles.s50
If the plaintiff succeeds in the district court, the defendant generally has
the opportunity to devise a new voting plan that complies with the Act.
5 6
Once the defendant formulates such a plan, Section 5 of the Act mandates
that the defendant submit the plan to the Department of Justice for
preclearance.5 0 7
Following approval from the Department of Justice, the plan goes
before the district court, which either may approve the new plan or reject
it as violative of Section 2 and promulgate a plan of its own. 08 A court of
appeals often must review the decision of the district court.5 9 In McGhee
v. Granville County,5 '0 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit stated the principles that should guide such review.-1' Primarily, the
Fourth Circuit recognized that a reviewing court should give great deference
to a legislative body's effort to fashion a scheme that will ensure equal
access to the political process. 1 2 The court should not impose its own plan
upon the voting district simply because the court believes that its plan is a
more equitable remedy than that proposed by the legislative body; rather,
the court should reject that body's proposal only if it fails to meet the
standards of Section 2.1
503. Id. § 1973(a).
504. See id. § 1973(b) (forbidding political process from denying minorities right to partic-
ipate in political process and to elect representatives of their choice); see also S. REp. No. 417,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.S.C.A.N. 177, 205 (stating that § 1973(b)
allows challenges to illegal dilution of minority vote).
505. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). The plaintiff in a Section 2 claim must prove (1) that the minority
group in question is sufficiently large and geographically compact to comprise a majority in a
single-member district, (2) that the group is politically cohesive, and (3) that the white majority
votes as a bloc, enabling it consistently to defeat the minority candidate. Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).
506. See White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1973) (recognizing that reapportionment
is matter for legislative determination and that judicial relief is appropriate only when legislature
fails to reapportion after adequate opportunity to do so).
507. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
508. See Weiser, 412 U.S. at 794-95 (stating that judicial relief is appropriate only when
legislature fails to reapportion after adequate opportunity to do so).
509. See, e.g., Smith v. Brunswick County, Va., Bd. of Supervisors, 984 F.2d 1393, 1394
(4th Cir. 1993) (holding that district court erred in rejecting redistricting plan); McGhee v.
Granville County, 860 F.2d 110, 112 (4th Cir. 1988) (same); United States v. Dallas County
Comm'n, 850 F.2d 1433, 1440 (11th Cir. 1988) (rejecting district court's remedial plan as
violative of Voting Rights Act), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989).
510. 860 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1988).
511. McGhee v. Granville County, 860 F.2d 110, 117-18 (4th Cir. 1988).
512. Id. at 115.
513. Id.
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In vote dilution cases, appellate courts often confront the issue of
whether the district court erroneously rejected a constituency's attempt to
comply with the Voting Rights Act.114 In Hines v. Mayor and Town Council
of Ahoskie,515 the Fourth Circuit reviewed the rejection of such a proposal
by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina. Ahoskie, North Carolina, had a total population of 4,531, of
which 50.5 percent was black. The voting age population totaled 3,343,
comprising 45.6 percent black voters and 54.4 percent white voters. Prior
to this litigation, the town elected its Mayor and five Town Council members
through an at-large election. Because the white majority voters tended to
vote in a cohesive bloc for white candidates, only two of seven black
candidates in the history of Ahoskie won a race against a white candidate
for a seat on the Town Council.
The plaintiffs, black citizens of Ahoskie, challenged the at-large election
system, alleging that it violated Section 2 by diluting the black vote and by
denying black citizens an equal opportunity to elect representatives of their
choice. In response, the town stipulated that the at-large system violated
Section 2 and devised a plan that divided the town into two districts, one
with a significant black majority and the other with a significant white
majority. Each district would elect two Town Council members. An at-
large vote of the entire town would elect the fifth member. The town
submitted this plan to the Department of Justice, which granted preclear-
ance.
The district court denied the town's motion for summary judgment of
approval. Reasoning that the at-large election of the fifth Town Council
member would, given historical voting patterns, effectively give white voters
three "safe" seats, the court held that the proposed plan did not provide
the complete remedy that the Voting Rights Act mandated. The court then
rejected the plaintiffs' alternative plans. One plan divided the town into
five districts of 900 citizens each, three of which contained a black majority
and the other two a white majority; the other plan provided for three
districts, one overwhelmingly black, another overwhelmingly white, and the
third containing a 55 percent black voting age population. Instead of
adopting either of these remedies, the court fashioned its own relief. It
adopted the town's proposal to divide into two districts, each electing two
Town Council members. However, the court eliminated the fifth seat. An
at-large election would continue to determine the Mayor, who retained his
power to break deadlocks on the Council. Both parties appealed this
decision.
The Fourth Circuit held that the lower court erred in not approving
Ahoskie's original plan in its entirety. In response to the plaintiffs' conten-
514. See Smith v. Brunswick County, Va., Bd. of Supervisors, 984 F.2d 1393, 1394 (4th
Cir. 1993) (holding that district court erred in rejecting redistricting plan); McGhee, 860 F.2d
at 112 (same).
515. 998 F.2d 1266 (4th Cir. 1993).
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tion that the district court should have accepted their proposal to establish
five single-member districts, the Fourth Circuit stated that such a plan would
effectively cancel out the voting strength of the majority. The court con-
strued the Voting Rights Act to mandate only that minorities have an equal
opportunity to participate in the election of representatives. According to
the court, the Act does not require overproportional representation of
minorities, which would result if the court created three districts with a
substantial black majority. To approve such a plan would give the votes of
minorities greater weight than those of the majority voters and would
establish a districting plan solely for the purpose of segregating citizens on
the basis of race, a practice that the Supreme Court found unconstitutional
in Shaw v. Reno.
1 6
The Fourth Circuit accepted the town's argument that its proposed plan
complied with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The court recognized its
established principle of according great deference to a legislative body's
plan to remedy prior vote dilution. In addition, the Fourth Circuit stated
that courts must give deference to a legislature's selection of the appropriate
size of the governing body, unless the evidence shows that that body selected
a particular size to dilute minority voting power. Because the plaintiffs
made no such showing, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred
in reducing the size of the Ahoskie Town Council from five members to
four.
The court then determined whether the town's proposed plan violated
Section 2. Citing its holding in McGhee v. Granville County1 7 the Fourth
Circuit noted that the appropriate remedy for vote dilution is to restructure
the districting system to eliminate the dilution to the maximum extent
possible. The court could accept the town's restructuring proposal because,
according to the court, it provided black voters with the maximum available
opportunity to elect representatives of their choice. Under the town's plan,
black voters would be virtually guaranteed two black Town Council members
and would be able to exert considerable influence in the at-large election
for the fifth member because of their substantial percentage of the voting
population. The court acknowledged that theoretically the best plan would
have been to have a racially-balanced swing district elect the fifth member.
However, such a plan was impracticable in tiny Ahoskie, because, due to
the one person/one vote requirement, such a swing district would include
only 900 citizens, which meant that a minor population shift could alter
the racial makeup of the district.
Because the demographics of Ahoskie precluded the formation of a true
swing district, the court found that the town's proposal was the best available
plan. It therefore reversed the district court's ruling and remanded with
instructions to implement the town's proposal. In reaching this conclusion,
the Fourth Circuit distinguished a factually similar Eleventh Circuit case.
516. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
517. 860 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1988).
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In United States v. Dallas County Commission,2 8 the Eleventh Circuit
confronted the issue of whether the lower court's proposed plan to eliminate
vote dilution in the election of five school board members complied with
Section 2.5 9 The court of appeals rejected the district court's remedy, which
consisted of two districts with a black majority, two with a white majority,
and an at-large election for the fifth member.520 The Eleventh Circuit
reasoned that the at-large election perpetuated the inability of black voters
to access the political process, because the lower socio-economic standing
of black citizens in the county counterbalanced their slight edge over whites
in total voting population. 2' The court instead adopted a plan in which
white majorities comfortably held two districts, black majorities held two
other districts, and a swing district contained a 61.3 percent majority of
black voters.52
The Fourth Circuit distinguished Dallas County on the grounds that
Dallas County, Alabama, was large enough (50,000 residents) to allow the
Eleventh Circuit to create a true swing district. Because the population of
Ahoskie was too small to maintain a viable swing district, the best available
plan was an at-large election for the fifth seat. Although the Fourth Circuit
chose not to elaborate further, it also could have questioned the precedential
value of Dallas County. The three-judge panel in that case was severely
fragmented, with one judge writing a strong dissent on the grounds that a
61.3 percent majority of black voters in reality constitutes a "safe" black
district, not a swing district.5 2 The third judge concurred specially in the
judgment "with regret," stating that although he found the dissent persua-
sive, considerations of stare decisis compelled him to concur in the deci-
sion. 52
4
In evaluating remedies for violations of Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, courts must undertake a fact-intensive inquiry. No two cases in this
field are identical, because the demographics of each are so important to
the outcome. In Hines, therefore, the Fourth Circuit provided the best
available remedy to the black voters of Ahoskie, North Carolina. After
recognizing that the court must defer to the legislative body's proposal and
that a swing district would provide the best, albeit unavailable, remedy, the
Fourth Circuit settled on the next best alternative. The new electoral system
in Ahoskie virtually guaranteed black voters two black Town Council
members, and black voters obtained a reasonable chance at electing a third
black member in the at-large election. This decision fulfilled the Voting
Rights Act's requirement that minorities have an equal opportunity to
518. 850 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1988).
519. United States v. Dallas County Comm'n, 850 F.2d 1433, 1437 (11th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989).
520. Id. at 1438.
521. Id. at 1439-40.
522. Id. at 1441-42.
523. Id. at 1446 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
524. Id. at 1443 (Hill, J., concurring specially).
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participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice.512
B. Burdens on Right to Vote
Mandatory disclosure of social security number on voter
registration application unconstitutionally burdens right to
vote.
Greidinger v. Davis
988 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir. 1993)
In order to register to vote, all citizens of Virginia who possess a Social
Security Number (SSN) must disclose their SSN on the Virginia Voter
Registration Application.5 26 Any registered voter in Virginia may obtain
access to these applications and, consequently, access to the SSN of every
Virginia voter.127 In addition, lists providing the SSN's of registered voters
are available to political parties and other organizations that encourage
citizens to register to vote.528 Virginia law mandates that each recipient of
a voter SSN list sign an oath that attests to the proper usage of the lists. 529
However, outside this precautionary oath, the Board of Elections makes no
other attempt to regulate the usage of these SSN lists. Further, the Board
of Elections is not aware of any situations in which this SSN list distribution
scheme prevents voter fraud.
Traditionally, courts have reviewed two distinct types of statutes that
curb access to the right to vote. First, courts have examined cases involving
so-called "absolute denial" statutes that prevent an identified class of
525. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988) (mandating that minorities have equal opportunity to
participate in political process and to elect representatives of their choice).
526. VA. CONST. art. II, § 2.
527. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.1-56 (Michie 1985).
528. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.1-23(8) (Michie 1993). The statute provides that the following
groups of people may obtain lists of voter SSNs:
[Clandidates for election or political party nomination to further their candidacy,
political party committees or officials thereof for political purposes only, incumbent
officeholders to report to their constituents; nonprofit organizations which promote
voter participation and registration for that purpose only; and for no other purpose
and to no one else.
Id.
529. Id. The pertinent parts of the oath, which must be signed are as follows:
I understand that the lists requested are the property of the State Board of Elections
... and I hereby affirm that I am a person authorized by S 24.1-23 of the Code of
Virginia to receive a copy ... and I further affirm that the lists will be used only
for the purposes prescribed and for no other use, and that I will not permit the use
or copying of such lists by persons not authorized by the Code of Virginia to obtain
them.
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persons from voting, regardless of any action or inaction of the individual.530
Second, courts have examined "burdensome condition" statutes that merely
make voting easier for some people than for others. 3 This second type of
statute places potentially unconstitutional burdens on an individual's right
to vote. In most cases, courts have employed strict scrutiny as the standard
by which they analyze the absolute denial statutes. When reviewing the
burdensome condition statutes, however, many courts have applied the
rational basis test. Ballot access cases, however, reveal a different result. In
these cases the Supreme Court has chosen to apply what is essentially a
strict scrutiny test to all statutes, even those making it difficult, but not
impossible, to achieve a position on a ballot.1
32
In Greidinger v. Davis,533 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit considered whether Virginia's statutes mandating disclosure
of voters' SSNs, which make these SSNs publicly available, violate the
constitutional right to vote under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
In Greidinger, the plaintiff, Marc Alan Greidinger (Greidinger), filled out
a voter application, but declined to reveal his SSN. As a result, he received
a Denial of Application for Virginia Voter Registration.
Greidinger's application did not provide any information about whether
or not disclosure of his SSN was a requirement in order to vote. Further-
more, the application did not indicate how the state would use the SSN or
that any registered voter or other political group would be able to obtain
the records containing his SSN. Greidinger filed a civil suit against his local
registrar and the State Board of Elections (Board), but later dismissed the
former as a defendant. In this suit, Greidinger sought preliminary and
permanent injunctive relief, declaratory relief, writs of mandamus and
prohibition, and costs and attorney's fees.
According to Greidinger, Virginia's voter registration application was
defective in two ways. First, Greidinger alleged that, by requiring the
disclosure of his SSN as a prerequisite to registration, and by subsequently
publishing his SSN, Virginia's voter registration scheme unconstitutionally
burdened his right to vote. Specifically, Greidinger (1) alleged that the
530. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 633 (1969) (holding
that statute which prevented non-property owners in certain school districts from voting was
violative of equal protection); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966)
(holding that predicating right to vote on poll tax violates equal protection); Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) (holding that statute preventing military personnel from voting
where stationed violated equal protection); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944) (striking
down white primary laws).
531. See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 762 (1973) (upholding state law that
conditioned right to vote in party primary on voter's registration as party member thirty days
before previous general election); see also McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S.
802, 811 (1969) (affirming state's refusal to provide absentee ballots to pretrial detainees).
532. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 805-06 (1983) (holding statute which
required candidate to file statement of candidacy in addition to nominating petition in March
for November election unconstitutional).
533. 988 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir. 1993).
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Virginia statute that affords any registered voter an opportunity to view the
voter registration books infringed on his fundamental right to vote; and (2)
challenged the Virginia statute that allows the distribution of a registered
voter's SSN to such a potentially large group of people. Greidinger's second
allegation was that Virginia's voter registration scheme violated section 7(b)
of the Privacy Act of 1974.11
4
An important observation lies in the fact that Greidinger did not
challenge the constitutionality of Virginia's receipt and internal use of his
SSN. Rather, Greidinger's concerns focused on the distribution of his SSN
pursuant to applicable Virginia statutes. Similarly, Greidinger did not allege
a constitutional right to privacy in his SSN. However, he did assert that
the privacy interest in his SSN was strong enough to disallow mandatory
disclosure of his SSN to public or political entities as a prerequisite to voter
registration.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
held that Virginia's voter registration procedures were not violative of
Greidinger's fundamental right to vote. Applying strict scrutiny, the district
court found that Virginia's voter registration scheme was necessary to
promote the compelling state interest of conducting fair and honest elections.
The court concluded that the burden imposed on Greidinger's voting rights
was minimal. The court reasoned that the voter registration scheme furthered
such state interests as eliminating voter duplication and fraud, keeping track
of voters moving to different locations, and eliminating disqualified voters
from voter lists.
The district court also found that the Board was not in compliance
with the Privacy Act because of the Board's failure to inform registered
voters that disclosure of SSNs was a mandatory prerequisite to voting, what
the statutory authority for this requirement was, and how the state might
use the SSNs. The district court, however, did not grant Greidinger's request
for attorney's fees because the Privacy Act allows for an award of costs
and fees only as a result of willful or intentional conduct. In addition, the
Board was able to correct its violation of the Privacy Act before the entry
of a final judgement. The district court's final order, therefore, dealt only
with Greidinger's constitutional claim.
Greidinger filed an appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The
Fourth Circuit resolved the issue of the constitutionality of Virginia's
mandatory disclosure and subsequent distribution of the SSNs of registered
voters by holding that this voter registration scheme created an intolerable
burden on the fundamental right to vote that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments protect. The court disposed of the case by instructing Virginia
to cure this problem either by discontinuing the requirement that an indi-
vidual provide his or her SSN before voting or by eliminating the use of
SSNs in voter registration records that are open to public inspection. In so
doing, the Fourth Circuit limited its holding to that portion of Virginia's
534. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982).
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voter registration scheme that allowed public distribution of SSNs. The
court was careful to distinguish its holding from a situation in which a state
merely uses SSNs internally. The Fourth Circuit also remanded the case to
the district court for a continued investigation of the Privacy Act notice
and Greidinger's attorney's fees claim.
Although the Fourth Circuit stated that the right to vote is an essential
right, the preservation of which is necessary in order to maintain a free,
representative society, the court also commented that some qualification
and regulation of this right is necessary. The court described a balancing
of a state's right to restrict voting rights with a state's responsibility to
preserve citizens' fundamental rights. Because this balancing must necessarily
include a specific examination of the facts of each case, the court declined
to formulate an objective test of broad applicability that would determine
which restrictions on citizens' rights are constitutional.
In reaching this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit examined cases involving
voter qualifications and ballot access. From these cases, the Fourth Circuit
extracted a two-prong test for determining whether a statute is constitutional,
regardless of whether the deprivation is absolute or merely incidental. First,
the court considered the character and magnitude of the injury to the First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights that Greidinger sought to vindicate.
Second, the court identified and evaluated the precise interest the state put
forward as a justification for the burden that the state imposes. When a
substantial burden on a citizen's constitutional rights exists, such burden
must serve a compelling state interest. The state must then demonstrate that
the burden is narrowly tailored to serve that interest, or the court will find
the burden unconstitutional.
Applying this two-pronged test, the Fourth Circuit determined that the
burden the state placed on Greidinger's right to vote was substantial. The
court reasoned that, because an individual's SSN could provide access to
essentially all personal and financial documents and accounts, Virginia's
mandatory disclosure provision imposed a substantial burden on the right
of the citizens to vote. The court indicated that the key factor in its
determination was the public distribution of the SSNs and the potentially
"financially ruinous" results to the citizens of Virginia.
The Fourth Circuit determined, however, that Virginia had set forth a
compelling state interest that justified the disclosure and dissemination of
SSNs. The court found that Virginia's requirement of disclosure of SSNs
as a prerequisite to voter registration provided a safeguard against voter
fraud and promoted participation in the electoral process. However, the
court concluded that the public disclosure of SSNs was not narrowly tailored
to fulfill this state interest. The court found that Virginia could develop
other methods to advance the compelling state interests that Virginia seeks
to promote which would be less intrusive and less burdensome on Virginia's
citizens.
Essentially, the Fourth Circuit reduced its analysis to three questions.
First, did Virginia place a burdensome condition on the fundamental right
to participate in the electoral process through voting? Second, did some
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mitigating factor afford the state the right to impose such a condition?
Finally, is the scheme that Virginia has established in order to further this
interest that defends the infringement on the rights of the state's citizens
structured in order to cause the least amount of inconvenience to those
affected by the imposition? After answering the first two questions in the
affirmative, the Fourth Circuit found that, to the extent that the voter
registration scheme permitted the public disclosure of Greidinger's SSN as
a condition of his right to vote, the scheme created an intolerable burden
on the First and Fourteenth Amendments rights.
Although Virginia law provides that registered voters are permitted to
obtain voter lists for limited purposes that further the state's interest in
insuring fair elections, the court's finding that the distribution scheme
challenged in this case was too far reaching to be "narrowly tailored" to
meet the state's interest was not surprising. There are other ways that
Virginia could regulate voting without distributing SSNs which could lead
to financial ruin for an unknowing and innocent voter.
The Fourth Circuit's analysis and holding are consistent with rulings
from other jurisdictions535 as well as prior Supreme Court cases536 dealing
with conflicts between an individual's fundamental right to vote and the
state's interest in regulation of elections. Rather than presenting an issue of
first impression, Greidinger follows that line of cases which curb the states'
imposition of burdensome conditions on otherwise eligible voters.
535. See Paul v. Indiana Election Bd., 743 F. Supp. 616, 625 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (holding
that state's interest did not justify burden placed on citizens through state's blanket prohibition
on write-in voting); see also Hobson v. Pow, 434 F. Supp. 362, 366 (N.D. Ala. 1977) (holding
that close constitutional scrutiny applied to state's infringement on fundamental right to vote).
536. See Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992) (holding that prohibition on write-in
voting did not unreasonably infringe on citizens' rights); see also Burson v. Freeman, 112 S.
Ct. 1846 (1992) (holding that strict scrutiny applied but that state showed compelling interest
in protecting integrity and reliability of elections by having restricted zone around polling places).
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